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Abstract
Cloud-based applications are problematic from a privacy perspective because they typically
have access to large amounts of user data and metadata. This centralisation of user data
creates an attractive target for actors such as criminals, suppressive governments, and
companies selling the data. At the same time, the popularity of mobile and web applications
has led to a growing amount of sensitive data being stored in the cloud.
This dissertation focuses on collaborative applications, such as Google Docs and
Microsoft Office Online, where users currently rely on cloud-based solutions. It explores
decentralised alternatives that allow the use of end-to-end encryption and anonymous
communication systems to improve both information privacy and communication privacy.
One approach for a collaborative application to synchronise data in a privacy-preserving
way is to use Tor hidden services, providing end-to-end encrypted communication, while
also hiding collaborators’ identity. However, running Tor comes at a cost. We explore the
costs of running a hidden service on a smartphone. Smartphones are nowadays the most
frequently used computing devices, but they are also relatively resource-constrained. We
build an empirical model of monthly cellular data traffic, and estimate a median 198 MiB
for a typical user. We further estimate that the network activity would cost at least 9.6%
of daily battery capacity on a Nexus One using 3G Internet. We explore four optimisations
that, in combination, reduce the estimated median data cost to 61 MiB.
We also consider the security and privacy properties of decentralised collaborative
applications, and explore a challenge that is introduced by a decentralised design – the
lack of a trusted server guaranteeing consistency between collaborators. We present a
novel snapshot protocol that ensures consistency, whilst allowing the past edit history to
be hidden from new collaborators, and without relying on a consensus mechanism.
Lastly, we evaluate the overhead of the snapshot protocol by replaying editing histories
from 270 Wikipedia articles, and demonstrate how its correctness and security properties
are achieved. Assuming the number of collaborators remains small, the protocol is scalable
in terms of CPU, memory, and network usage. It substantially reduces the amount of data
transferred to a new collaborator compared to a basic protocol that transmits the full
history. The computational cost is in the order of milliseconds per operation, indicating
the protocol is suitable for applications where the rate of edits is relatively low.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Users have been moving more and more from stationary computers to mobile devices
like laptops, smartphones, tables, and smartwatches. In the UK, smartphones are now
the most popular device for accessing the Internet [Int18]. Users often own multiple
devices, and synchronize their data between devices using the cloud. Cloud services,
and the increasing computational power and sensor hardware on devices, have increased
convenience and opened up many possibilities. The amount of sensitive data generated,
stored, and processed there increases the importance of effective security measures to
protect the data on the devices, in the cloud, and in transport.
Significant effort has been put into building better tools and promoting best practices
for security and data protection. Techniques such as sandboxing, permission models, code
signing, compartmentalization, and trusted execution environments attempt to ensure the
integrity of executed code, limit the permissions of untrusted code, mitigate the effects
of malicious code or an exploited vulnerability, or protect sensitive data. Developers
and applications rely increasingly on Transport Layer Security (TLS) for encrypted data
exchange, supported by mechanisms such as Certificate Transparency, HTTP Strict
Transport Security, and Public Key Pinning. Multi-factor authentication has raised
the bar for hijacking sensitive accounts such as online banking or email. Additionally,
more effective distribution of security patches, and rejection or blacklisting of malicious
applications in app stores, decrease the impact of vulnerabilities after they are discovered.
However, an important vulnerability remains. Storing large amounts of sensitive data
in one place makes makes the service provider an attractive target for internal and external
attackers, and a data breach can have disastrous consequences. No computer system
is perfectly secure, and numerous high-profile breaches show that even large companies
are susceptible to attacks. To name a few examples: in 2013, attackers stole personal
information on all 3 billion user accounts at Yahoo [Per17]; in 2014, details of 83 million
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customers were affected by a breach at JPMorgan Chase [AHF14]; personal data of 57
million Uber customers and drivers was compromised in 2016 [Kho17].
Storing data in the cloud can also be problematic in countries where service providers are
obliged to hand over data to law enforcement and intelligence agencies without appropriate
judicial oversight. For certain groups of people who deal with sensitive data, such as
medical professionals, lawyers, journalists, diplomats, engineers, activists, and others, this
trust model is particularly problematic for legal, ethical, business, and personal safety
reasons.
The Snowden revelations in 2013 about NSA mass surveillance of innocent citizens
and industrial espionage have led to increased public awareness of the limitations of
the protection of people’s personal data. Since then, many researchers, developers, and
companies have worked on building end-to-end encrypted communication solutions. While
not a new idea – protocols such as PGP and OTR had been around for many years –
existing solutions were often difficult to use correctly and suffered from low adoption rates.
Today, messaging applications such as Signal, WhatsApp, and Apple iMessage, have made
end-to-end encrypted messaging and file transfers the default for more than a billion users.
While end-to-end encryption has raised the standards for communication privacy, it
only solves part of the problem. Because even encrypted data is typically processed by
central servers, service providers still collect large amounts of metadata about users, such
as IP addresses, locations, contacts, and communication patterns. This kind of data can
be very revealing, and can be processed more efficiently at scale compared to message
contents, which makes it a prime target for intelligence agencies, oppressive governments,
advertisers, and other companies. To tackle this problem, systems for anonymous and
censorship-resistant messaging, web browsing, and file sharing – such as Mixminion, Tor,
Freenet, or Loopix – have been developed. Similarly, cryptographic techniques have been
applied to build decentralised currencies such as Bitcoin, and others that aim for additional
anonymity such as Zcash and Monero.
Collaborative applications, such as document editors, shared calendars, or synchronized
address books allow one or more users to edit a document or dataset from multiple devices
concurrently. Concurrent changes are merged, ideally without loss of data or creating
conflicts that need manual intervention. Such systems maintain a local copy of the data
structure on every collaborating user’s device. Whenever the user makes an edit on a
device, these changes are first applied to the local copy, and then an edit message containing
the change is sent to a central server. In widely deployed collaborative document editing
applications, such as Google Docs, when the server receives document edit messages, it
modifies these messages to assist devices in resolving potentially conflicting concurrent
edits, and propagates these updated messages to the devices used by all collaborating
users.
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Therefore, while communication between user devices and the server can be encrypted,
the server itself must be able to read and modify messages, and thus must be trusted to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of a cleartext copy of the document. Furthermore,
all updates to a document must be shared via the central server, and the server can thus
also capture details on the changes that devices perform on the document. For these
reasons, the current generation of collaborative document editing systems do not support
end-to-end encryption between user devices.
What makes it difficult to build collaborative applications with end-to-end encryption?
When a document is edited by a single user on one device at a time, storing the document
encrypted on an untrusted server is relatively straightforward using traditional file-level
encryption. The problem becomes more complicated when multiple users can edit the
document concurrently. This requires either locking the file, or parts of the file, when a
user is working on it, or using a different approach that allows concurrent changes to be
merged in a way that is consistent across devices without manual intervention. The need
for manual merging is accepted in some collaboration tools, e.g. version control systems
for software development. However, it is usually undesirable for real-time collaborative
applications such as document editing because resolving conflicts would be disruptive.
A number of algorithms and data structures have been developed that allow concurrent
edits on a document, and provide a way of consistently applying these across devices. These
can be grouped into two approaches: Operational Transformation (OT), and Conflict-free
Replicated Data Types (CRDTs). The former is used in most established collaborative
editing applications, including Google Docs. OT algorithms tend to be relatively complex,
and most of them rely on a central server. CRDTs are a more recent approach; they tend
to be simpler, and they support peer-to-peer communication between devices because they
do not require a total ordering of operations. This also makes them suitable for end-to-end
encryption, by sending messages using a suitable secure messaging protocol.
A peer-to-peer based model is also desirable for limiting the amount of metadata
collected by a central server. However, having devices communicate directly brings some
practical challenges. First of all, mobile devices usually do not have publicly addressable
IP addresses, so building a direct communication channel is not straightforward. Second,
devices may frequently be oﬄine or have unreliable network connections. Lastly, without
a trusted server, devices need to ensure in a decentralised way that their copies of the
document are consistent, even in the presence of malicious or malfunctioning devices.
Furthermore, since devices may frequently or permanently be oﬄine, they should be able
to make progress without requiring a certain proportion of devices to be online.
This dissertation presents and evaluates potential solutions to these challenges. First,
it evaluates the use of Tor hidden services as a decentralised privacy-preserving way for
mobile devices to communicate. Second, it presents a novel protocol that allows devices to
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ensure they are in a consistent state, even in the presence of malicious or malfunctioning
devices, while allowing the past editing history to be hidden from new collaborators that
are added to a shared document. Lastly, it evaluates the costs of the presented protocol
and shows how the protocol achieves its integrity and privacy properties.
1.1 Dissertation outline
Chapter 2 introduces the necessary background for later chapters. It describes different
approaches for collaborative editing; cryptographic tools such as accumulators,
redactable signatures, and Merkle trees; and systems for anonymous communication,
in particular the Tor anonymity network and its hidden services.
Chapter 3 describes the kind of collaborative applications we envision. It further defines
the scope of this dissertation, our assumptions, and the threat model.
Chapter 4 discusses the use of Tor and its hidden services to provide a privacy-preserving
means of communication between smartphones that does not rely on a centralised
server infrastructure. It evaluates the costs of such a solution for typical usage
patterns of smartphones running a hidden service, in particular in terms of cellular
data traffic, and provides an estimate for its battery usage.
Chapter 5 introduces the concept of authenticated snapshots for collaborative applica-
tions. Snapshots allow new users or devices to join a group of collaborators and to
start collaborating from the current state of the shared document or data set without
receiving the full history of edits. We present a scalable protocol that provides
this feature, while still allowing a new collaborator to verify the consistency of the
snapshot with the view of other honest collaborators. This allows existing collabora-
tors to hide past edits from new collaborators and can decrease the communication
overhead when joining the group, while not sacrificing consistency.
Chapter 6 evaluates the costs of the protocol introduced in Chapter 5, in particular in
terms of the computational and communication overhead. Furthermore, it explains
how the protocol fulfils the design goals and security and privacy properties stated
in Chapter 3, and provides a proof for the consistency property which requires more
elaborate discussion.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by summarising the work and results and providing
some directions for future work.
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1.2 Publications and contributions
What follows is a list the publications I co-authored during the course of my PhD.
1. Stephan A. Kollmann, and Alastair R. Beresford. “The Cost of Push Notifications
for Smartphones using Tor Hidden Services.” In 2017 IEEE European Symposium
on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW).
This publication forms the basis of Chapter 4 of this dissertation. The original
idea emerged from discussions with Alastair. The experiments were designed by
myself in collaboration with Alastair. I implemented all the necessary code for the
instrumentation of Tor, the experiment setup, and the data analysis. I executed
the experiments, and collected and analysed the data for the evaluation. I thank:
Alastair for help with writing; Nikilesh Balakrishnan, Lucian Carata, and Ripduman
Sohan for their assistance with the experimental method; and Martin Kleppmann,
Laurent Simon, Daniel R. Thomas, and Diana Vasile for helpful discussion and
insight.
2. Martin Kleppmann, Stephan A. Kollmann, Diana A. Vasile, and Alastair R. Beresford.
“From secure messaging to secure collaboration.” In 26th International Workshop on
Security Protocols (2018).
This publication is a position paper. Ideas from it are contained in Chapters 1, 3
and 5. It was the result of many hours of discussion between all authors, and written
primarily by Martin.
3. Stephan A. Kollmann, Martin Kleppmann, and Alastair R. Beresford. “Snapdoc:
Authenticated snapshots with history privacy in peer-to-peer collaborative editing”.
To appear in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2019 (3).
This publication forms the basis of Chapters 5 and 6. Martin conceived the original
idea of authenticated snapshots. I designed the protocol for snapshots, and imple-
mented the prototype and the code for the experiment setup and data analysis. I
further executed the experiments and collected and analysed the data for evalua-
tion. I conducted the theoretical analysis of the protocol properties in Chapter 6.
Throughout, Alastair and Martin contributed with useful discussions and feedback,
and assisted in writing; Martin helped in particular with writing up the formal
description of the protocol. I thank Ricardo Mendes, Laurent Simon, Tom Sutcliffe,
Daniel R. Thomas, Diana Vasile, and Jiexin Zhang for helpful discussions and insight.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
Secure, privacy-preserving decentralised collaborative editing requires a number of building
blocks. This chapter explains the background for the components required for later
chapters. First, appropriate algorithms and data structures that allow users to edit a
document concurrently from multiple devices are needed. Such techniques are discussed
in Section 2.1. Since we aim for a decentralised system, and therefore do not want to
rely on central servers, at least some of the devices need to be able to exchange messages
between themselves directly. This by itself is not straightforward, since most consumer
devices, especially mobile devices, are behind firewalls and routers using Network Address
Translation (NAT), and are therefore not directly addressable. Additionally, for a privacy-
preserving system, it can be desirable to hide which users are collaborating, even from
someone observing the network traffic. One way to address both issues is to use Tor
hidden services, which give each device a globally addressable unique identifier, and provide
end-to-end encryption and anonymity to devices (under a certain threat model). Tor and
Tor hidden services are described in Section 2.6.1, and the costs for this approach are
discussed in Chapter 4.
Traditional centralised collaborative applications use the central server not only as
a central point of communication, but clients also put a substantial amount of trust
into the server. They tend to rely on the server to enforce access control policies, to
protect confidentiality and integrity of the data, and to ensure that all devices have a
consistent view of the shared document. When a new device is added as a collaborator, in
a centralised system, the server can provide the latest state of the document to the new
device. Usually, the server is assumed to be trusted, so there is no mechanism for devices
to verify that their view of the document is consistent. In a decentralized system, devices
can use secure messaging protocols to protect confidentiality and integrity of the shared
data from non-collaborators. However, devices need to either trust the information they
get from other collaborators, or the system needs to provide a way for them to verify that
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their view is consistent with other devices’, e.g. to prevent a collaborator from claiming
that another collaborator has written something they never have. In principle, this can be
achieved using cryptographic hashes and digital signatures, or using consensus algorithms.
However, things are less straightforward if there are no guarantees about devices being
online, and if new devices only receive the latest state of a document, and not the editing
history. This problem is considered in more detail in Chapter 5. The solution presented
there relies on constructs such as cryptographic accumulators (Section 2.3) and redactable
signatures (Section 2.4).
2.1 Collaborative editing
In (real-time) collaborative editing systems, each client typically keeps a replica of a shared
document or data set that is replicated between clients asynchronously. To be considered
usable, collaborative systems need to fulfil a number of additional properties compared
to single-user applications. First, a responsive user interface requires local changes to be
applied with minimal delays. Second, this should be achieved without using locks on the
document or parts of it, since locks require consensus between devices and therefore cause
delays, or even unavailability of the service in case of a network partition. Third, replicas
need to stay consistent. Since processing, network delays, and network partitions make
it impossible for replicas to always stay perfectly in sync, a weaker notion of consistency
is required. A commonly used consistency model is the CCI model [SJZ+98]. The CCI
model requires three properties (properties and the definition below are taken from the
original paper):
• Convergence: When the same set of operations have been executed at all sites, all
copies of the shared document are identical.
• Causality preservation: For any pair of operations Oa and Ob, if Oa has happened
before Ob, then Oa is executed before Ob at all sites.
• Intention preservation: For any operation O, the effects of executing O at all sites
are the same as the intention of O, and the effect of executing O does not change
the effects of independent operations.
The causality preservation property above relies on the happened-before relation on
operations, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. Causal ordering relation (happened-before relation) “≺”. Given two
operations Oa and Ob, generated at sites i and j, then Oa ≺ Ob, if and only if (1) i = j and
the generation of Oa happened before the generation of Ob; or (2) i 6= j, and the execution
of Oa at site j happened before the generation of Ob; or (3) there exists an operation Ox,
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such that Oa ≺ Ox and Ox ≺ Ob. Two operations are concurrent if neither Oa ≺ Ob, nor
Ob ≺ Oa.
The last property, intention preservation, leaves room for interpretation, and the
interpretation depends on the application. For character-wise text editing, the usual
interpretation is that each inserted character can be assigned a unique identifier; if a
character x is added to a string abc between a and b, it ends up between a and b on
all replicas, even if other operations happen concurrently; if a character is deleted on at
least one replica, it is deleted from all replicas. Attiya et al. [ABG+16] give a precise
specification of a replicated list data type to capture this intention. Essentially, they
require that list elements have a globally unique identifier, and a total order exists over all
elements that is consistent with the list order.
Two main approaches have been proposed for real-time collaborative editing. The
traditional one is Operational Transformation; more recently, Conflict-free Replicated
Data Types have been proposed. Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 explain the two approaches.
Section 2.1.3 briefly discusses how version control systems fit into this space.
2.1.1 Operational Transformation (OT)
Consider a text document shared between two users, initially containing the string “bce”.
User 1 inserts ‘a’ at the beginning of the string (changing the string to “abce”), and
concurrently, User 2 inserts ‘d’ at position 3 (changing the string to “bcde”). Now
both users send their edits to each other. When User 2 applies the edit by User 1 and
inserts ‘a’ at position 1, the end up with the string “abcde”. However, if User 1 directly
applies User 2’s edit, she will end up with “abdce”, diverging from User 2. Operational
Transformation (OT) systems solve this problem by transforming concurrent operations
against each other. In the above example, User 1 would transform User 2’s operation
against her own, changing the insert position from 3 to 4. The example is illustrated in
Figure 2.1.
Generally, OT systems contain two key components: the transformation functions
that transform functions against each other, and the control algorithms that control
the transformation process. To achieve convergence when concurrent operations may be
executed in arbitrary orders, two properties need to be fulfilled in OT systems:
Convergence Property 1 (CP1). Given two concurrent operations Oa and Ob on the
document state s, the transformation function T preserves CP1 if:
s ◦Oa ◦ T (Ob, Oa) = s ◦Ob ◦ T (Oa, Ob).
This means that applying Oa followed by Ob transformed against Oa on a state s
produces the same state as applying Ob followed by Oa transformed against Ob.
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Figure 2.1: Example of concurrent editing of a document initially containing the string “bce”,
using OT. One user adds ‘a’ at the beginning, while another user adds ‘d’ after ‘c’. The users
then exchange their edit operations, and each user transforms the other user’s operation against
their own before applying it locally.
Convergence Property 2 (CP2). Given three concurrent operations Oa, Ob and Oc
on the document state s, T preserves CP2 if:
T (T (Oc, Oa), T (Ob, Oa)) = T (T (Oc, Ob), T (Oa, Ob)),
meaning that transforming Oc against Oa and then against T (Ob, Oa) produces the
same operations as transforming Oc against Ob and then against T (Oa, Ob).
While it is relatively easy to design transformation functions that satisfy CP1, it
turned out to be surprisingly difficult to preserve CP2. A number of proposed OT
algorithms were later shown to violate CP2 and therefore cause divergence under certain
circumstances [IMOR03, IROM06, OUMI05]. Therefore, instead of preserving CP2, many
OT systems opt for control algorithms that constrain when operations are transformed
against each other. To achieve this, to the best of our knowledge, all existing OT
systems that avoid the need to satisfy CP2 rely on an implicit or explicit total order of
operations [XS16]. This is often achieved using a central server that either serializes all
operations before forwarding them, as in Jupiter [NCDL95] or Apache Wave (formerly
Google Wave) [WMLT15], or using a central sequencer that provides sequence numbers,
as in SOCT3 and SOCT4 [VCFS00]. However, there also exist OT systems that use
distributed schemes to achieve a total ordering, for example TIBOT [LLS04].
2.1.2 Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs)
Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) are an alternative approach for real-time
collaborative editing. CRDTs do not need conflict resolution or transformation of oper-
ations, because operations are designed such that concurrent operations can be applied
conflict-free in any order. Updates at a replica are applied locally immediately without any
synchronization, and are broadcast asynchronously to other replicas. All replicas converge
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to the same state provided that they receive all updates eventually. More formally, CRDTs
provide strong eventual consistency [SPBZ11b] while remaining available under arbitrary
network partitions (in the sense of the CAP theorem [Bre00, GL02]). The following
definition is taken from Shapiro et al. [SPBZ11b].
Definition 2.2. Strong eventual consistency. An object is strongly eventually consistent
if the following properties hold:
Eventual delivery: An update delivered at some correct replica is eventually delivered
to all correct replicas.
Strong convergence: Correct replicas that have received the same updates have equiva-
lent state.
Termination: All method executions terminate.
CRDTs have been proposed for counters, registers, sets, maps, lists [RJKL11, SPBZ11a,
SPBZ11b], XML documents [MUW10], and JSON [KB17a]. A shared text document can
be stored and replicated using any list CRDT. However, a number of CRDTs have been
proposed that are especially optimised for collaborative editing [PMSL09, NMMD13,
WUM09, WUM10].
There are two main types of CRDTs: state-based, and operation-based. The following
sections give an overview of both.
2.1.2.1 State-based CRDTs
A state-based CRDT provides three methods that can be executed on a replica:
• An update method that updates the local state;
• a query method that allows reading the local state; and
• a merge method that merges a state received from another replica into the local
state.
Each replica broadcasts their state to other replicas, e.g. after every update or periodi-
cally.
Example: Counter An increment-only replicated counter can be implemented by
keeping a vector (c1, ..., cn) as the state, where n is the number of replicas. To increment
the counter on replica i, increment ci. Merging states is done by taking the element-wise
maximum of the states. To retrieve the current counter value, sum up the vector elements.
This counter does not support decrementing in the same way as incrementing since
merging with a lower value has no effect. However, a counter allowing a decrement
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operation can be implemented using a second increment-only counter that counts the
number of decrements.
Since state-based CRDTs broadcast the entire state, they are usually not well suited for
applications like real-time collaborative document editing, where transmitting the entire
document for every change would cause a large overhead.
2.1.2.2 Operation-based CRDTs
Operation-based (or op-based) CRDTs do not have a merge method. Instead, after
applying an update locally, a replica broadcasts enough information to allow other replicas
to replay the update. Assuming delivery of messages in causal order, a sufficient property
for an operation-based CRDT is the commutativity of any concurrent operations. An
op-based CRDT with this commutativity property is also called Commutative Replicated
Data Type (CmRDT). The following examples describe two CmRDTs, Treedoc and RGA;
Treedoc is a basis for the protocol presented in Chapter 5.
Example: Treedoc CRDTs were first introduced by Preguic¸a et al. when they proposed
Treedoc [PMSL09], an operation-based CRDT for collaborative editing. Consider a shared
document consisting of a sequence of atoms. An atom is the smallest unit of content
supported by the editor, e.g. a character of text. The basic idea of Treedoc is to assign
a globally unique position identifier pos to every atom. Position identifiers are totally
ordered, such that the total order is consistent with the order of the atoms in the
document. Additionally, the space of position identifiers is dense, i.e. for any position
identifiers pos1 and pos2, one can create a new position identifier posnew with the property
pos1 < posnew < pos2. Treedoc allows two operations:
• insert(pos , atom): Inserts the new atom atom into the document at position pos .
• delete(pos): Removes the atom at position pos . For the operation to be valid, such
an atom must exist in the state of the device that initiates the operation.
In Treedoc, the principle is to use paths in a binary tree as position identifiers. Figure 2.2
shows a possible representation of the string “abcde”. For example, the path for character
‘e’ is “11”. The order of atoms in the document is given by an infix order depth-first
traversal of the tree. When inserting a new atom, one derives a new position identifier
by creating a suitable descendant of the node to the left or right of the desired insertion
position. However, this alone is not enough to guarantee uniqueness of the identifier, since
more than one user can perform insertions concurrently. To solve this, Treedoc treats
each tree node as a major node that can contain multiple mini-nodes. Each mini-node
contains an atom and has a disambiguator attached. Disambiguators need to be ordered
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Figure 2.2: Possible tree representation of the string “abcde” as used in Treedoc.
and unique within a major node. When necessary, the paths used for position identifiers
include the disambiguators. It is necessary only for the last node in the path, and if the
path follows a child mini-node directly. If no disambiguator is given, a path element refers
to a child of a major node.
Choosing disambiguators One can use the unique replica identifiers as the disam-
biguators. However, in this case, nodes must not be removed when atoms are deleted,
since otherwise a node with the same path can be re-inserted later, breaking the global
uniqueness of position identifiers. Instead, when a corresponding atom is deleted, the
node is marked as a tombstone. Tombstones can be garbage-collected if it is clear that all
replicas have seen the deletion and no further delete operation can refer to the old atom.
However, if devices often go oﬄine permanently without notice, such a garbage-collection
scheme is impractical.
To avoid tombstones, one can instead use globally unique disambiguators, such as
(ctr , replicaID) pairs, where replicaID is a unique identifier of a replica, and ctr is a
per-replica counter. In this case, leaf mini-nodes can be discarded immediately when the
corresponding atom is deleted. Non-leaf nodes can be discarded when all its children have
been discarded. Figure 2.3 shows an example representing the string “abcdxye” using
(ctr , replicaID) disambiguators.
Example: Replicated growable array (RGA) A replicated growable array (RGA) is
another CRDT for lists, proposed by Roh et al. [RJKL11]. It allows insertions, updates, and
deletions of elements. Each operation has an associated unique timestamp. Timestamps
are totally ordered, and this ordering needs to be consistent with the causal order of
operations. For example, given a vector clock −→v O for an operation O, one can use a pair
(sumv , sid), where sumv =
∑
i
−→v O[i], and sid is a unique site identifier. A position in the
list is identified by the timestamp of the operation that inserted it.
An RGA defines three (remote) operations:
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Figure 2.3: Possible representation of the string “abcdxye” in Treedoc using globally unique
disambiguators. The atoms ‘x’ and ‘y’ have been inserted concurrently at the same position
of the tree; the disambiguators are used to create unique position identifiers and a consistent
ordering of these atoms.
• insert after(timestamp, atom): Inserts the new element atom into the document
directly after the position timestamp.
• update(timestamp, atom): Changes the value of the element at the position timestamp
to atom.
• delete(timestamp): Removes the element at the position timestamp.
To be valid, all operations require that the corresponding position exists at the time the
operation is initiated. However, an insertion may refer to an adjacent position that is
deleted concurrently, and since such an insertion may arrive at a replica after the deletion,
deleted list nodes need to kept as tombstones.
RGA achieves commutativity of concurrent operations by using the ordering of times-
tamps. Concurrent insertion operations are treated as if they have happened in increasing
order of their timestamps. If multiple updates happen concurrently for a position, the
update with the highest timestamp is effective. If update and delete operations happen
concurrently, the deletion takes effect.
These rules ensure that there is a uniquely defined state for each set of operations,
independent of the order concurrent operations are received in. Consider two concurrent
operations Oa, Ob, where Ob has a higher timestamp than Oa. If a replica receives Oa after
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it has already applied Ob, it could undo Ob and then apply both operations in the right
order. However, for better efficiency, RGA is designed such that it never requires undoing
of operations; instead concurrent operations can be applied directly in any order.
For example, consider a document containing [a, b, c]. Now two replicas concur-
rently insert x and y, respectively, after a: Ox = insert after(timestampa, x), Oy =
insert after(timestampa, y). Let timestampx and timestampy, respectively, be the times-
tamps of the operations, and suppose timestampx < timestampy. Thus, the correct
final state is [a, y, x, b, c]. Each replica keeps a linked list of nodes storing a 3-tuple
(timestamp, lastupdate, atom), where timestamp is the timestamp of the operation that
inserted the element, lastupdate is the timestamp of the operation that last updated the
element, and atom is the content. A replica that applies Oy first is in state [a, y, b, c], so
na¨ıvely applying Ox by inserting x after a would result in a wrong state. Instead, when
applying an insert, the algorithm skips over any elements right of a that have a higher
timestamp. Since timestampy > timestampx, and timestampx > timestampb (since the
operation that inserted b happened before Ox), x ends up in the correct place.
A deletion marks an element as deleted (if it has not already been marked). Updates
are only applied if the element is not marked as deleted, and no update with a higher
timestamp has been applied previously.
2.1.2.3 Drawbacks of CRDTs compared to OT
As explained above, CRDTs have a number of advantages over OT. However, they also
come with some costs. Unlike OT algorithms, CRDTs for collaborative editing assign a
unique immutable identifier to each atom, which creates additional metadata overhead
and therefore space and communication complexity. CRDTs for collaborative editing can
be grouped into two categories: tombstone-based CRDTs such as RGA, and variable-size
identifier CRDTs such as Treedoc or Logoot. In tombstone-based approaches, identifier
information must be retained in the document in the form of tombstones, even if the
corresponding portions of the document are deleted by the user. Tombstones can only
be discarded after a garbage collection process that requires distributed consensus and is
rarely implemented in practice. On the other hand, CRDTs with variable-sized identifiers
do not require tombstones to be retained, but they have the downside that identifiers grow
quickly. For example, consider Treedoc and suppose that a user writes a piece of text
from left to right. This causes a highly unbalanced tree that resembles a linked list and
the identifiers to grow linearly with the number of edits. This growth can be somewhat
reduced using an optimised allocation strategy such as in LSEQ, but the identifiers in
practice remain substantially larger than a simple index.
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2.1.3 Version control systems
For collaborative editing of source code and other files that are part of software development
projects, version control systems are widely used. While the collaborative editing techniques
above (OT and CRDTs) are more suitable for individual files, version control systems are
designed to handle large numbers of files; however, modern version control systems also
allow concurrent editing of individual files.
The first popular version control system was called Source Code Control System (SCCS),
developed in 1972 by Marc Rochkind at Bell Labs. Users had to acquire an exclusive lock
on a file before working on it, and thus could not edit the same file concurrently.
The second generation of version control systems, including CVS (1985) and Subversion
(2000), used a client/server model. The server keeps a repository holding the authoritative
copy of all files and metadata; clients check out files from the repository and keep a local
copy that they work on. The client needs to commit changes to the server to share them
with other collaborators. When committing, the server checks whether another client has
committed changes since the last checkout. If so, the client trying to commit first needs to
merge the remote changes into their local copy. Merging can often be done automatically,
but in some cases needs to be performed manually by the user, e.g. if the same source
code line was modified by both.
More recently, distributed version control systems have started to be widely used. Git
(2005) and the simultaneously developed Mercurial are two popular examples. Distributed
version control systems follow a peer-to-peer approach, where every peer holds a complete
copy of a repository. This allows peers to perform commits and other operations locally,
making them faster and allowing oﬄine operation. Commits can be exchanged directly
between peers in the form of patches. Concurrent changes are again merged automatically
or manually. In practice, it is common to use a server as a specialised peer that holds the
authoritative copy.
Distributed version control systems like Git have some similarities with operation-based
CRDTs: they are both decentralised; and a basic commit in Git is essentially a set of
deletion and insertion operations. An important difference is that in OT and CRDTs, there
are no manual merges, since the same set of operations always has to result in the same
final state. This makes OT and CRDTs better suited for real-time collaboration, where
requiring manual merges would be disruptive, and the user interface can usually be designed
to allow users to easily spot if another user is editing the same part of the document
concurrently. On the other hand, it makes them less well suited for off-line collaboration
on documents like source code. Using OT or CRDTs, if two users concurrently edit the
same line of a source code file (assuming character-based atoms), the result will be a
combination of both changes, which can lead to a nonsensical result. Some mechanism for
conflict detection and manual resolution is needed for non-real-time collaborative systems.
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2.2 Secure collaboration
Numerous approaches for real-time collaborative editing have been proposed that reduce
the amount of trust that clients need to put into a central server, e.g. SPORC [FZFF10],
SECRET [FMMS17], or a system proposed by Huang and Evans [HE11]. These systems
are usually primarily concerned with confidentiality of the shared document. Integrity and
consistency is considered to varying degrees; some systems use authenticated encryption
and/or hash chaining.
In terms of communication patterns, designs can be split into centralised and peer-to-
peer architectures. Currently, many existing systems that aim for secure collaboration
require a central server because they rely on OT algorithms that need a total ordering of
operations.
Systems that offer confidentiality can be categorized into document-based encryption,
and operation-based encryption.
Document-based encryption
In document-based encryption, the document plain-text is encrypted, and a collaboration
algorithm such as OT is used on the ciphertext. An advantage of using the document-based
approach is that it can be used on top of an existing OT system. However, using commonly
used block cipher modes of operation, such as GCM or CBC, adding a single character can
cause huge changes in the ciphertext; naively applying this approach is inefficient and does
not work if users concurrently perform edits. To address the first problem, Huang and
Evans propose using incremental encryption [HE11] using the uncommon RPC mode of
operation [BGG94]. To address both problems somewhat, Felsch et al. propose a system
called SECRET [FMMS17], where they split the document into small parts and encrypt
them individually using GCM mode.
Operation-based encryption
In contrast to the document-based approach, operation-based encryption encrypts individ-
ual operations or parts of them. In this category, Feldman et al. propose a collaboration
system called SPORC [FZFF10] based on OT, where clients encrypt operations using a
symmetric key, and sign them using the individual signing keys. It requires a server only
to totally order all operations. The system uses hash chains to ensure the integrity of the
editing history, and to achieve fork* consistency [LM07]. A malicious server can partition
the clients into two or more groups and only show them edits from their group starting
from some point. However, once two clients from different groups are able to communicate,
they will detect such a fork. SPORC also has support for snapshots. However, it does not
offer a way for a new collaborator to verify the integrity of a snapshot other than verifying
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that the user who signed the snapshot had permission to access the document when they
signed it.
Clear et al. use a different approach that, unlike SPORC, does not require a custom
server implementation and can be run on top of an existing OT system, in their case
Google Docs. Here, insert operations are transformed such that the content is encrypted.
The server can still observe the type of operations and their length, and can perform
transformations on them.
The protocol proposed in Chapter 5 falls into the operation-based encryption category.
2.3 Cryptographic accumulators
The protocol presented in Chapter 5 uses cryptographic accumulators as an efficient way
for devices to attest their current state, while allowing other devices to prove certain
statements about that state using the accumulator, without revealing the state itself.
A cryptographic accumulator allows a finite set X to be accumulated and represented by
a single, constant-sized value, accX . For every element s ∈ X , one can efficiently compute
a witness ws∈X that can be presented to prove the membership of s with regards to accX ,
i.e. proving that s is part of the set accumulated in accX . However, it is computationally
infeasible to compute a witness for an element x /∈ X (collision-freeness).
Some accumulator schemes allow efficient addition and deletion of elements to an
existing accumulator. These are called dynamic accumulators. Accumulator schemes may
also allow proofs of non-membership, i.e. a proof that a certain element has not been
accumulated. Such an accumulator scheme is called universal.
Another desirable property of accumulators is indistinguishability. Informally, an accu-
mulator is computationally/unconditionally indistinguishable if it is infeasible/impossible
for an adversary to gain any information about the accumulated set from the accumulator
value. A precise definition is given in [DHS15]. For some accumulator schemes, indistin-
guishability can be achieved by accumulating an additional, random value. This has the
caveat that it weakens collision-resistance by allowing membership proofs for the random
value.
Known accumulator schemes often require generating a key pair (sk, pk), where the
secret key sk acts as a trapdoor. Knowledge of the trapdoor allows breaking the collision-
freeness property. For these schemes, depending on the application, a trusted setup may
be required, where a trusted third party generates the key pair and discards the trapdoor.
For dynamic accumulators, the secret key may be required for efficient additions and/or
deletions.
Cryptographic accumulators have been been proposed based on RSA [BP97, BD93],
bilinear maps [Ngu05, CKS09], Merkle trees [CHKO12], and vector commitments [CF13].
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The following explains the RSA accumulator in more detail, which is also used in
Chapter 5. Section 2.3.2 briefly explains an alternative way to construct accumulators,
based on bilinear maps.
2.3.1 RSA accumulator
RSA accumulators [BD93, BP97] are based on the RSA assumption [RSA78]. An RSA
accumulator requires an RSA secret key consisting of two safe primes1 p and q, and a base
value x that is drawn randomly from the cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo N ,
where N = pq is the RSA modulus [DHS15]. In the elementary form of the accumulator,
the accumulator value is calculated as:
accX = x
∏
a∈X a mod N. (2.1)
Due to the multiplications in the exponent, the elements to be accumulated are restricted
to prime numbers for collision-freeness. Additionally, it requires a stronger variant of the
RSA assumption, the strong RSA assumption [BP97].
While anyone with knowledge of x and N can accumulate values, it is more efficient with
knowledge of the secret key. Accumulating k values requires k modular exponentiations
without knowledge of the factorization of N , but can be reduced to a single modular
exponentiation and k − 1 modular multiplications if the factorization is known. The
exponent is computed by multiplying all elements modulo ϕ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
Generalisation to allow all integers
To remove the restriction to prime numbers, Baric´ and Pfitzmann proposed a variant
of the accumulator that uses prime representatives [BP97]. They constructed prime
representatives as follows:
Let Ω(a) be a random oracle that returns a random number r for each new input, and
returns the same number r if asked again for the same input. The prime representative
h(a) for an element a is computed as h(a) = 2lΩ(a) + d, where l is suitably large, and
d is an l-bit number chosen such that h(a) is a prime. In other words, one appends l
bits to Ω(a) such that the result becomes prime. Using this variant based on a random
oracle also removes the dependency on the strong RSA assumption, relying on the normal
RSA assumption instead [BP97]. In practice, the random oracle can be replaced by a
secure hash function. Collision-freeness of the accumulator then also depends on the
collision-freeness of the hash function. For better readability, we omit this hash function
in the remainder of this section.
1A prime p is safe if p = 2p′ + 1, where p′ is an odd prime [BD93].
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Membership proofs
Let b ∈ X . To show that b is accumulated in accX , one presents a witness wb∈X computed
as:
wb∈X = x
∏
a∈X−b a mod N. (2.2)
Thus, a witness for an element is equal to the accumulator value for all the remaining
accumulated elements. To verify the correctness of the witness, one checks:
w bb∈X mod N = accX . (2.3)
In addition to memberships proofs for individual elements, RSA accumulators allow
batch membership proofs, i.e. one can provide a single witness for a subset S ⊆ X . The
witness is again computed by accumulating all remaining elements, and verification works
accordingly:
wS⊆X = x
∏
a∈X\S a mod N, (2.4)
(wS⊆X )
∏
a∈S a mod N
?
= accX . (2.5)
Note that computing a witness does not require knowledge of the secret key; it requires
only x, N , and the accumulated set X . On the other hand, anyone in possession of the
secret key can efficiently forge membership proofs for arbitrary non-accumulated elements.
For any c < N , one can compute wc∈X = acc
1
c
X mod N , which can be done efficiently if
the factorization of N is known.
Updates
The RSA accumulator is a dynamic accumulator scheme, allowing efficient additions and
deletions to an existing accumulator instance. Adding an element is straightforward:
accX∪{e} = acceX mod N. (2.6)
Removing an element e from the accumulator requires calculating the e-th root modulo
N . This is essentially the same as performing an RSA decryption, and thus assumed to be
hard without knowledge of the factorization of N . If the factorization is known, it can be
done efficiently by raising to the multiplicative inverse of e modulo λ(N) = lcm(p−1, q−1).
Here, λ(.) is the Carmichael function, which gives the smallest positive integer m such that
am ≡ 1 (mod N) for every positive integer a less than N that is coprime to N . The inverse
can be computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm to find t such that t · e ≡ 1
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(mod λ(N)), which is equivalent to solving the following linear diophantine equation:
t · e = uλ(N) + 1. (2.7)
Then, the e-th root modulo N can be computed by raising to the power of t:
(ze)t ≡ z · (zλ(N))u ≡ z · 1u ≡ z (mod N), (2.8)
and hence the accumulator can be updated as follows:
accX\{e} = acctX mod N. (2.9)
To update an existing witness w after an element e was added to the accumulator, w
is raised to the e-th power modulo N . If e was removed from the accumulator, a witness
wy∈X for an element y 6= e can be updated by finding a and b such that ae+ by = 1. The
updated witness is calculated as:
wy∈X∪{e} = w by∈Xacc
a
X∪{e} mod N [CL02]. (2.10)
Indistinguishability
RSA accumulators can achieve indistinguishability by using the transformation described
earlier, i.e. accumulating an additional (secret) random value. Equivalently, one can choose
a random base value [dMLP+12, DHS15].
2.3.2 Accumulators based on bilinear maps
Accumulators in this class are based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption [BB04],
or the Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) assumption [CKS09]. Accumulators based on the
SDH assumption were proposed by Ngyuen [Ngu05]. Let G be a cyclic additive prime order
group generated by g, and let GM be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. Let
e : G×G→ GM be a bilinear map. The accumulator has an upper bound t for the number
of accumulated elements. The accumulator requires a secret key s, and the public key is
(g, gs, gs
2
, ..., gs
t
, u), where u is randomly chosen from Z∗. The accumulator value for a set X
of size at most t is calculated as accX = gu
∏
a∈X (a+s), and the witness for an element b ∈ X is
computed as wb∈X = g
u
∏
a∈X\{b}(a+s). The accumulator value can also be evaluated without
the secret key by expanding the polynomial h(x) =
∏
a∈X (a+x) = a˜0+a˜1x+a˜2x
2+...+a˜tx
t,
and evaluating gh(s) using the public key. The witnesses can be evaluated similarly.
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2.4 Redactable signature schemes
As mentioned in the previous section, in Chapter 5, we use signed cryptographic accu-
mulators as a way for devices to attest (sign) their current state. When creating an
authenticated snapshot, a device essentially includes these signatures from other devices.
Since some devices may have not received the most recent edits (because they have been
oﬄine), we make use of the concept of redactable signatures to redact deleted atoms.
A redactable signature scheme (RSS) [SBZ01, JMSW02] allows a party without knowl-
edge of the secret signing key to remove parts of a signed message and to update the
signature, such that the redacted message can be verified using the updated signature
and the public key of the original signer. This gives a useful privacy-preserving property,
e.g. for redacting medical histories of patients. The redactability property can be trivially
achieved by signing each atomic submessage of the original message using a standard
digital signature scheme, and throwing away the signatures of any redacted parts. This
approach is not efficient in terms of computational and communication costs; a desirable
scheme should improve in at least one of these dimensions.
One example RSS is the one described by Johnson et al., based on the homomorphic
properties of RSA [JMSW02]. The scheme works similar to RSA accumulators (Sec-
tion 2.3.1). Again, the signing party chooses an RSA key pair N = pq and a base x. Let
h(.) be a hash function returning odd primes like the one described in Section 2.3.1, ex-
tended to sets such that h(S) =
∏
a∈S h(a). To sign a set S, the signer computes y = x
1
h(S)
mod n. To verify the signature, one checks that yh(S) = g. For U ⊆ S, the signature
for the redacted subset S\U can be obtained by computing y′ = yh(U). Another way of
getting an RSS is to add all atomic submessages to an accumulator, sign the accumulator
using any digital signature scheme, and provide witnesses for all submessages. To redact
parts of a message, one removes the corresponding witnesses [DPSS16, PSP12]. For a
message containing m submessages, this in general requires Θ(m) witnesses as part of the
signature. However, if the accumulator scheme has certain properties such as allowing
batch membership verification, the signature size can be reduced to O(1) [DPSS16]. This
is possible, for example, with the RSA accumulator, because it supports witnesses for
subsets of the accumulated set, and such witnesses can be computed without knowledge of
the secret signing key.
2.5 Merkle trees
Another cryptographic tool used in Chapter 5 is a Merkle tree. We employ them to
allow devices to check consistency of signatures from different devices that are part of an
authenticated snapshot.
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A Merkle tree (sometimes referred to as hash tree) is a tree, where each leaf node is
labelled with the cryptographic hash of a data block, and each non-leaf node is labelled
with the hash of its children’s hashes [Mer88]. The hash associated with the tree root is
called the root hash. Merkle trees allow efficient verification of the validity of individual
data blocks. Due to the collision-resistance of the underlying hash function, verifying any
data block at the leaf only requires a trusted root hash, and the hashes of any siblings
of nodes along the path to the root, which do not need to be trusted. This also allows
proving that a certain value is contained in the Merkle tree. This property makes Merkle
trees suitable for use as cryptographic accumulators [CHKO12].
Furthermore, Merkle trees allow running a tamper-evident append-only log on an
untrusted server [CW09], as in Certificate Transparency [LLK13]. In addition to the
membership proofs above, such logs use a predetermined way of constructing the tree,
and consistency proofs, which, given the root hashes (commitments) of two states of the
same log, provide an efficient proof that the earlier state is a prefix of the later one. A
consistency proof consists of a subset of nodes from the later tree that allows verifying
the root hash of this tree, and – using a subset of the same nodes – the root hash of the
earlier tree.
2.6 Anonymous communication
A common way to define anonymity in the context of communication systems is as
“the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.” [PK01]
Therefore, anonymity is a relative concept; it depends on the size of the anonymity set
and on any additional information held by the adversary that could help them identify the
subject. In anonymous communication, one differentiates between anonymity of the sender
(sender anonymity), and the receiver (receiver anonymity) of a message, and the respective
anonymity sets. More generally, anonymity systems aim for unlinkability of some sorts.
Unlinkability “of two or more items (e.g. subjects, messages, events, actions, ...) means
that within this system, these items are no more or no less related than they are related
concerning the a-priori knowledge.” [PK01] This can mean, for example, the unlinkability
between a sender and a message, between sender and recipient, or between two messages.
A stronger concept than anonymity is unobservability, which in the context of anonymous
communication means that the adversary does not find out whether a particular sender
sends, or a particular receiver receives a message at all.
Most modern anonymous communication systems rely on relays, which forward messages
or packets to other relays or to the intended recipient. An important concept introduced
by Chaum are mixes [Cha81]. A mix collects a number of encrypted messages, decrypts
them, and later forwards them in a batch. The idea is that an adversary who can observe
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the incoming and outgoing network links should not be able to link incoming and outgoing
messages. To avoid having to trust a single mix, in mix networks, a sender chooses a
sequence of mixes, encrypts the message in layers with the public key of each of the chosen
mixes, and has the messages routed through all of those mixes. Mixmaster [MCPS04],
Babel [GT96], and Mixminion [DDM03] are systems that use different variants of this
design. The anonymity in these systems comes at the cost of high latencies, since to
prevent traffic analysis, mixes need to delay forwarding messages.
To support low-latency communication, onion routing [GRS99] was developed. In onion
routing, packets are encrypted in layers and sent through a number of relays, similar to mix
networks. Unlike mix networks, onion routing is circuit-based however. The most popular
low-latency anonymity system, Tor [DMS04], is based on this principle. Section 2.6.1
explains Tor in more detail. Since onion-routing is aimed at low-latency applications,
such as web browsing, the mixing performed by relays is minimal, making it susceptible
to traffic analysis attacks and therefore not resistant against a global passive network
adversary. For example, an adversary can link streams going into and coming out of the
Tor network if they can observe both network links.
More recently, Piotrowska et al. proposed Loopix [PHE+17], an anonymity system that
is based on mix networks, but uses a combination of mechanisms to allow lower latencies
than traditional mix networks, while still being resistant against a global passive adversary
and some active attacks. To achieve this, it uses several types of cover traffic, and random
forwarding delays at the mixes (from an exponential distribution). Furthermore, every client
is connected to a provider, which provides oﬄine storage for received messages. Message
delays in Loopix are typically in the order of seconds. This combination of properties could
make Loopix an attractive building block for future collaborative applications resistant
against a global passive adversary that aim for a relatively low latency, but where a few
seconds delay and the cost of the required cover traffic are acceptable.
In Chapter 4, we explore the use of Tor as a privacy-preserving communication channel
for collaborative applications. The remainder of this section describes Tor in more detail
to give the reader the necessary background for the analysis in Chapter 4.
2.6.1 Tor
The Tor [DMS04] network is composed of clients, which generate and consume traffic,
including smartphones, laptops, or desktops; and servers (relays), which forward traffic to
other relays and make connections to the public Internet on behalf of clients. To use the Tor
network, clients download the latest network status document on average approximately
every 90 minutes, which lists information about currently (December 2018) around 6 400
Tor relays available worldwide [Tora]. The network status document is managed by a
small number of more trusted servers, called directory authorities, who vote on a consensus
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of its contents once an hour. The directory authorities publish additional, relatively static,
information on relays in relay descriptors every 18 hours. After downloading the network
status document, clients download any relay descriptors mentioned in that document that
the client does not already have. The client also downloads certificates of authorities where
it does not already have a current one.
Clients use relays to build circuits through a sequence of (typically three) relays.
Such circuits support an overlay network between the client and the final public Internet
service required. The client applies layers of encryption in such a way that none of
the relays, nor the final Internet service, is able to determine which devices on the Tor
network are connecting to which Internet services. Because circuit construction takes time,
clients proactively build circuits in anticipation of any requirement for data connectivity;
circuits can also support multiple concurrent TCP streams. Tor clients periodically send
keep-alive messages on idle open connections to prevent the connection from expiring at
any intermediate routers. The default interval between keep-alive messages is currently
5 minutes. To improve the privacy properties of Tor, circuits are (at least partially) rebuilt
every 10 minutes.
2.6.2 Tor hidden services
In addition to supporting clients connecting to services such as websites on the public
Internet, Tor also allows Tor clients to publish hidden services2. A hidden service is
identified by an onion address; in version 2, the onion address consists of the first 16
characters of a base32-encoded SHA1 hash of a public key generated by the client. In 2017,
the Tor team announced version 3 of hidden services, where the onion address is a 56-
character string containing the base32-encoded version of the concatenation of the full public
key, a checksum, and a version field. The relevant research described in this dissertation
was conducted before, and so version 2 of the protocol is described here. The principles
remain the same in version 3, but it uses more recent cryptographic algorithms and other
mechanisms to improve security. Onion addresses are long-lived identifiers, distributed
through an out-of-band mechanism between parties who wish to communicate. For
example, Facebook offers a Tor hidden service at https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/.3
An onion address allows Tor clients to establish circuits with the hidden service using the
Tor rendezvous protocol [Torb, Torc], and therefore transfer data to and from the service
over the Tor network. The design of Tor hidden services prevents any single relay from
learning the IP address associated with an onion address, therefore providing anonymity to
2Hidden services are now officially called “onion services”
3Note: Facebook have spent considerable computational resource to final a public key whose base32-
encoded SHA1 is memorable.
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both a hidden service provider and its clients. The rendezvous protocol is described below,
where we assume that Bob wants to run a hidden service and Alice wants to connect to it.
Bob creates a hidden service
1. Bob asks his Tor client to create a new hidden service. This generates a public-private
key pair for the service. The public key of the service identifies the service and is
used to generate an onion address.
2. Bob shares his onion address with Alice via an out-of-band mechanism.
Bob runs a hidden service
3. Bob’s Tor client chooses a small number of (typically three) relays as introduction
points. Bob then establishes a circuit to each introduction point and sends a single-
use public key, or service key, and signs a message to prove he is the owner of this
public key.4 Bob’s Tor client must keep the circuits to the introduction points open
while the service is running to receive connection requests from new clients.
4. Bob’s Tor client generates a service descriptor containing the public key, the service
key, and the introduction points. The service descriptor is uploaded to a few
(currently six) hidden service directories, chosen based on the descriptor ID, which is
a hash of the service’s public key, the current date and time, and other deterministic
data. Bob’s Tor client publishes a new descriptor once an hour, or whenever its
content changes.
Alice connects to Bob’s hidden service
5. Alice’s Tor client determines the set of hidden service directories responsible for
Bob’s key using his onion address and the current time, and retrieves Bob’s service
descriptor from one of them.
6. Alice’s Tor client establishes a rendezvous point. It does so by randomly choosing
a Tor relay, building a circuit to it, and asking it to act as a rendezvous point,
specifying a randomly chosen 20 byte rendezvous cookie.
7. Alice’s Tor client connects to one of Bob’s introduction points and requests an
introduction to Bob by providing a hash of Bob’s service key. Alice also sends a
rendezvous request, including the address of the rendezvous point, the rendezvous
cookie, and the first part of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, all encrypted under Bob’s
temporary service key.
4Earlier versions used the public key of the hidden service instead of a single-use service key, but this
allowed the introduction point to monitor Bob’s activity.
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8. The introduction point forwards the rendezvous request to Bob. Bob checks the
request is valid and not a replay.
9. Bob’s Tor client creates a new circuit to the rendezvous point chosen by Alice and
asks the rendezvous relay to complete a circuit to Alice. Bob’s request contains the
rendezvous cookie, the second part of the Diffie-Hellman exchange, and a handshake
digest. The rendezvous point forwards the latter two to Alice’s Tor client. Alice’s
Tor client checks that the handshake is valid, and both sides derive a new set of keys.
A new circuit is now established between Bob and Alice.
10. Alice can now establish one or more TCP connections over her circuit with Bob.
2.7 Summary
This chapter briefly summarised the background required for the rest of the dissertation.
It introduced the two dominant approaches for real-time collaborative editing: OT and
CRDTs. The majority of OT algorithms rely on a central server, making them badly
suited for a decentralized architecture and end-to-end encryption. For this reason, the
work described here is based on CRDTs, which are decentralised by design. The chapter
also considered version control systems, which are more suitable for larger projects and
non-real-time editing, and existing approaches to secure collaborative editing.
The remainder of the chapter summarized a number of computer security and cryp-
tography concepts needed to achieve the privacy and integrity properties of the protocol
presented in Chapter 5. Cryptographic accumulators, redactable signatures, and Merkle
trees were briefly explained. Lastly, the most important approaches for anonymous com-
munication systems were summarised. Tor was described in more detail to provide the
necessary background for Chapter 4, which explores the costs of running Tor hidden
services on smartphones.
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CHAPTER 3
Privacy-preserving collaborative
applications
As discussed in the Introduction, currently deployed systems for collaboration, such as
Google Docs, require users to fully trust the service provider with their data and metadata.
Since this is often undesirable from a privacy and security standpoint, in this dissertation
we explore systems with better privacy properties.
We envision a collaboration software system that can be used by any number of users.
Users can form groups of collaborators, where every collaborator can view and edit a
shared document or other data set. Every user can have one or more devices, and every
participating device stores a copy (replica) of the shared document or data set. The system
should support end-to-end encryption between devices to protect confidentiality of the
shared data set, and it should protect metadata about the shared data set, such as the
document name, and about users, such as identity, location, and IP address.
For simplicity, we usually consider individual devices instead of users, since in most
cases, devices of the same user can be treated the same as devices from different users.
We consider both applications where data is shared between multiple users, as well as
applications where data is synchronised between multiple devices owned by the same
person.
A data set consists of indivisible elements (atoms). In a collaborative editing application,
an atom is typically a character, a word, a line, or a paragraph. In a photo sharing
application, individual photos could be atoms. Every collaborating device can add to or
delete atoms from the data set. Edit operations can be performed concurrently on multiple
devices, and devices can also perform modifications while they are only connected to a
subset of collaborators, or oﬄine. No consensus between devices is required; instead, the
system provides eventual consistency. We assume a design where every collaborator can
add new devices to the group. However, in principle, users could require a corresponding
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permission to do so. Devices may also be removed and have their membership revoked;
however we do not consider revocation in this dissertation.
The prime example of the kind of collaborative application we consider is a collaborative
text editor, where users share a text document, and every collaborator can add or delete
text. In Chapter 5, we present a protocol for such a collaborative text editor. However, the
principles discussed apply to a wider range of collaborative applications. Other applications
that can use the same principles and protocols include shared or synchronized to-do lists,
note-taking applications, calendars, address books, password managers, or photo albums.
3.1 Design goals
We divide our design goals into three groups: functionality, integrity properties, and
privacy properties. For integrity and privacy goals, we define a threat model in the next
section (Section 3.2).
Functionality: The design must allow real-time collaborative applications, where
users that open a shared document simultaneously can see edits by themselves and by other
collaborators with minimal delay. Users should continue to be able to edit the document
if they are oﬄine. Similarly, users should be able to continue editing and collaborating
with other users that are reachable, even if any number of other collaborators are oﬄine or
partitioned. The design should be able to support snapshots, i.e. new collaborators should
be able to start from a compacted state of the document and not require the past edit
history. Lastly, the system should not incur large costs in terms of computation, memory,
storage, or communication, even if a document grows relatively large. We aim for the
system to be usable on resource-constrained devices such as smartphones.
Integrity: The system needs to have a way to ensure that only authorized users are
able to perform edits of the shared document. All edits should be attributable to the
originator. Users should also be able to identify the author of parts of the document
that were added before they joined. If any two honest devices have received the same
set of messages, they must have the same view of the document. More generally, honest
devices must always have consistent views of the document. Edit operations are causally
ordered, and after a device processes an operation, its state must reflect this operation,
all operations that have happened before this operation, and possibly some concurrent
operations. Any inconsistencies or forks between edit histories of honest devices should be
promptly detected if these devices communicate. Devices should be able to resolve any
forks they detect.
Privacy: The contents of a shared document must be visible only to authorized
collaborators. Non-collaborators should not be able to observe metadata about the
collaboration, such as a document title or the identities of the collaborators. Furthermore,
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new collaborators should not be able to see the history of edits that happened before they
joined.
Assumptions
We assume devices are recent personal computing devices like desktop computers, laptops,
tablets, or smartphones. Such devices can frequently be oﬄine for largely varying time
periods, and may stop participating without notice, for example if the device is lost or
breaks. To exchange messages, collaborating devices need to have a way of communicating
either directly, e.g. via a local network, Bluetooth, or peer to peer over the Internet, or
indirectly via a server or other collaborators. Thus, we assume that a connected graph of
communication links exists between all collaborating devices. However, not all devices
need to be connected simultaneously and they may be partitioned temporarily. While
group size is not limited, we assume that groups of collaborators remain relatively small
and accordingly we optimize performance for smaller group sizes.
3.2 Threat model
We consider the following types of adversaries:
Global network adversary. A global network attacker can observe, and arbitrarily
create, modify, delay, or drop network traffic between collaborators.
Non-global network adversary. A non-global network attacker can perform the same
actions, but can only control traffic on a small fraction of the network.
Malicious collaborator. A malicious collaborator has the same abilities as an honest
collaborator, but may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. He may further create
any number of additional collaborators and collude with them.
For the anonymity of collaborators, we aim for resistance against a non-global network
adversary, as in real-time anonymity systems such as Tor. Investigating the use of
anonymous communication systems with a stronger threat model, such as Loopix [PHE+17],
is an interesting direction for future work. For all other privacy and integrity properties, we
aim for resistance against a global adversary, and, where relevant, a malicious collaborator.
Adversaries might attempt to achieve the following goals:
Break confidentiality. Network adversaries may try to break confidentiality, to obtain
plain text contents of a shared document.
Link collaborators. Network adversaries may try to find out whether a particular person
or device is collaborating on a particular document or with a particular other device.
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Break consistency. Any adversary may try to cause honest devices to have inconsistent
views of a shared document.
To simplify analysis and to focus on particular aspects of the problem, we make a
number of assumptions.
• Adversaries are not able to break standard cryptographic primitives such as encryp-
tion, digital signatures, cryptographic hashes, and accumulators.
• Every collaborating device is able to verify the authenticity of other devices’ public
keys, for example through a public key infrastructure (PKI).
• Devices do not have access to the private keys of other honest devices.
• To ensure progress, network adversaries cannot partition the network indefinitely.
3.3 Scope of this work
Essential components of the kind of collaborative application we consider include: a user
interface; algorithms and data structures that can handle modifications to the shared
state; a transport mechanism that allows collaborating devices to exchange messages
that preserve both confidentiality of the contents as well as metadata privacy; a way
to authenticate other users such as a PKI; and mechanisms to ensure the integrity and
consistency of the data shared between correctly behaving devices, even in the presence of
malfunctioning devices or malicious collaborators.
In this work, we focus on two of these aspects. In Chapter 4, we consider using the Tor
network to exchange messages between devices in a privacy-preserving and decentralised
way. Since, in Western countries, smartphones have become the most frequently used
computing device that is commonly used for such applications – but also one of the
most resource-constrained one – we evaluate the costs of using Tor as a peer-to-peer
communication medium between smartphones. In Chapter 5, we present two protocols
that ensure the integrity and consistency of the data set seen by different collaborating
devices. The first protocol assumes a fixed set of collaborators or that new collaborators
receive the full set of editing operations from the time a shared document or data set was
created. The second only sends the current state of the data set to new collaborators,
providing edit history privacy by withholding the complete history of operations. Chapter 6
evaluates the overhead and savings of the later protocol, and argues how it fulfils the
integrity, consistency, and privacy properties.
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CHAPTER 4
Tor hidden services on
smartphones
To distribute changes to a shared document to other collaborators, devices need a way to
communicate. In this chapter, we explore the costs of running a Tor hidden service on a
device that allows the phone to receive messages from any other machine connected to the
Tor network. If every collaborating device runs a Tor hidden service, devices can exchange
messages directly over the Tor network, without relying on a central server.
To allow the research results to be applied more generally, we consider a push notification
service that allows arbitrary small messages to be transferred to a smartphone via a Tor
hidden service running on the phone. We consider the costs for the receiving device in
terms of battery usage and data transferred over the network.
Because mobile devices tend to have limited allowances for cellular data, we explore
in detail the cost in terms of data transferred over the cellular network per month on
typical end-user devices. Since this cost largely depends on the patterns of connectivity of
individual devices, we first build an empirical model of the costs of the different parts of
the Tor protocol, and combine this model with data about connectivity patterns of devices
from the Device Analyzer project.
Lastly, we explore a number of strategies that aim to reduce the cellular data usage of
running a Tor hidden service.
4.1 Push notifications
Push notification services provide reliable, energy efficient, store-and-forward messaging
between servers and clients. This mode of communication is sufficiently compelling for
mobile devices that push notification services are integrated into operating systems. For
example, Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) is embedded into Android through the Google
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Play Services API.1 GCM is also available as a library for developers of iOS apps and
developers of extensions for the Chrome web browser. Consequently, push notification
services are widely used by apps to support both device-to-device communication (e.g.
sending and receiving messages between users of a social media app) as well as supporting
information dissemination (e.g. news and sports score apps).
Push notifications provide app writers and client device owners with four advantages:
first, if the client device is switched off, or temporarily disconnected from the Internet,
the push notification service will store messages and deliver them when the device is next
online; second, push notification software on the client initiates a single long-lived TCP
connection from the client device to the service, avoiding issues with NAT and firewalls, as
well as removing the need to poll servers periodically for updates; third, multiple messages
destined for a variety of apps on a single client device can be coalesced temporally and
multiplexed down a single TCP connection, saving battery life and improving performance;
finally, an app server can achieve service fan-out by sending a single copy of a message to
a push notification service and requesting that the message is delivered to many devices
on a group or topic basis.
There are downsides to push notifications however. From a privacy perspective, a
push notification service has the disadvantage that the service can see the sender and
the recipient of every notification across a broad range of apps and thus may conduct
surveillance and censorship. While data is encrypted between the app server and the
notification service, and between the notification service and the handset, there is no
requirement for it to be encrypted end-to-end. Therefore, app data can often be read by
the push notification server. In addition, regardless of support for end-to-end encryption
between an app server and a handset, metadata on which handsets use which apps, as
well as the location of the user (e.g. via the handset’s IP address), are revealed to the
notification service.
In this chapter we explore the design space of more privacy-friendly push notification
services based on Tor.
4.2 Push notifications over Tor
We consider three overall designs: use push notification services as deployed today; connect
to a single push notification service via Tor; or run a separate push notification service per
app and connect to each of these via Tor. In the latter two, connections via Tor could
be made outbound from the phone to the service or a Tor hidden service running on a
smartphone.
1GCM has been deprecated by Google in April 2018, and has been superseded by its successor, Firebase
Cloud Messaging [Per18].
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Connecting to a single push notification service may be more energy efficient than
using one push notification service per app since separate messages from multiple app
servers (likely destined for a variety of apps on the same handset) can be coalesced into a
batch for delivery in a single Tor circuit. The downside is that the push notification service
learns the app servers (and therefore apps) communicating with a single handset, although
it does not necessarily know the identity or location of the handset if such communication
is sent over Tor.
Running a hidden service on a smartphone does not, at first glance, appear to provide
much benefit over the use of an outbound Tor connection to a push notification service. Im-
portantly, however, hidden services allow app developers to avoid using a push notification
service at all if the aim of the app is to share data between client devices.
Mobile devices typically sit behind a NAT or firewall. Thus, direct phone-to-phone
communication is often difficult or impossible. If every device operates a Tor hidden service,
direct communication between two smartphones is now possible, as an onion address is
globally unique and accessible. The downside to this approach is that both the sending
and receiving smartphone need to be online simultaneously for data to flow. This requires
careful scheduling of smartphones to wake from low-power states and both devices to have
network connectivity at the same time. An energy- and data-efficient solution is likely a
prerequisite for mobile apps that use device-to-device communication, such as messaging
or collaborative apps. We therefore focus on data and energy issues of Tor hidden services.
We leave the issue of scheduling communication between devices for future work, although
such issues have been addressed before. For example, the PEN network supported direct
peer-to-peer communication, with a scheduling algorithm that was more efficient than the
more traditional (centralised) master-slave scheme [WJ02, p. 21].
Both connecting to push notification services via Tor, and the use of Tor hidden services,
inherit the anonymity properties of Tor, which is resistant to local adversaries who are
able to control any local network. This means that a local adversary does not learn the
endpoints of any connections. In addition, the app server may also be located behind a
hidden service, providing anonymity for the app server too.
Regardless of whether we use a single push notification server, a push notification
service per app, or phone-to-phone communication, our primary concern is that using Tor,
and possibly running a Tor hidden service, may be significantly less energy-efficient, or
may result in substantially more data usage, than traditional push notification services.
Quantifying and improving the cost of Tor is a requirement in all three use-cases and is
thus the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
We note that the use of Tor to support push notifications may increase latency for
message delivery, but we do not believe the typical latency times found on Tor will lead to
large problems for push notifications. We therefore leave this analysis for future work.
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4.3 Cost of running a hidden service
We present a series of experiments to measure data usage requirements and to estimate
the energy consumption of using Tor and operating a Tor hidden service on smartphones.
Our testbed consists of two Nexus 5X smartphones running Cyanogenmod (Android 6.0.1).
To support the creation and operation of Tor hidden services, we developed a simple
custom app that uses Tor project’s Orbot Android app (version 15.1.2) to run a hidden
service. Our app accepts connections to the hidden service and logs any data sent to
it, allowing us to explore data transmission at various rates between the smartphone
and another computer. To avoid problems with the phone going into deep sleep, we
configured the phone to always stay awake. To provide a comparison with Google’s Cloud
Messaging (GCM) service, we installed and enabled the Google Play Services Framework
when necessary.
We obtained full packet traces of all traffic on a Linux workstation by connecting the
smartphones to a NETGEAR WiFi access point with an Ethernet uplink connected to
a workstation. The workstation was configured to route data onto the wider Internet,
allowing connections to and from the Tor network and GCM. The experiments where
conducted between December 2016 and February 2017.
4.3.1 Measuring Tor traffic
To estimate the cost of using Tor for push notifications, we wanted to construct an empirical
model of Tor traffic. Such a model is important for accurately estimating the data and
energy costs an app might generate using any of the Tor-based push notification systems
we discussed in Section 4.2.
As discussed in Section 2.6.1, the Tor client takes part in many different network
activities which we break down into nine categories in order to build an empirical model:
• regular downloads of the network status;
• relay (micro) descriptor data;
• creating circuits to introduction points;
• regular uploads of hidden service descriptors;
• sending keep-alive messages along established connections to Tor relays;
• downloading authority certificates;
• measuring circuit timeouts;
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• establishing and closing connections to a (first hop) Tor relay; and
• creating circuits, responding to connection requests, and data communication associ-
ated with a hidden service.
In this section we describe how we quantify the amount of network traffic in each above
categories. We use this analysis in Section 4.5 to derive an empirical model of Tor data
usage and assess the real-world impact of using Tor with handsets in the Device Analyzer
project.
Tor traffic is encrypted, and thus it is not straightforward to obtain a breakdown of
traffic by category. We therefore instrumented the Tor source code to identify and log the
purpose (thus category) of all network data sent or received by the Tor client. We used
the log to associate this category with each packet in the network trace captured by the
workstation.
Tor clients and routers communicate with one another via TLS connections with
ephemeral keys. Traffic on these connections consist of 514-byte cells, which contain a
header and a payload. Cells are either control cells, used to create, extend, or destroy
a circuit, or are payload cells, containing encrypted data travelling over an existing
circuit. The circuits themselves are used to support connectivity for client applications
(e.g. allowing an app on the phone to make a TCP connection to a push notification
service) and maintain connectivity to the Tor network (e.g. downloading the network
status; uploading a hidden service descriptor; sending a keep-alive message; and so on).
Our instrumented Tor client generally allows us to determine the purpose of each cell
sent or received, but associating this with the network trace captured by the workstation
is difficult because: multiple cells may be carried inside a single IP packet; a single cell
may be split across IP packets; and TLS handshake messages, TLS headers, TCP headers
and TCP retransmissions introduce additional overhead that should be associated with
the underlying category of use.
Accounting for the TCP header size and retransmissions is relatively easy as these
are visible in the packet trace. To account for TLS headers and overheads, we record the
number of bytes read and written to the TLS stream, and to the underlying TCP socket.
We match the byte counts written to the TCP socket with the bytes sent in the network
trace to determine which cells (or parts of cells) are contained within a specific network
trace. The overheads resulting from TLS and TCP are assigned proportionally to the cells
contained within the relevant packets.
Determining the purpose of each cell is straightforward in most cases since the cell
header associates the cell with a specific circuit, and additional instrumentation allows
us to record the current purposes of a circuit or of the stream associated with the cell.
One complication is that the assignment of a purpose to a cell cannot be made directly
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after data is read from the underlying TLS connection, since only part of a cell may be
returned. Additional bookkeeping is thus needed so that the purpose can be determined
after complete cells have been received and parsed. Another difficulty is that many TCP
streams can be multiplexed down a single circuit. For circuits that were used for more
than one purpose, some traffic can exist that cannot be assigned to a particular TCP
stream (e.g. creating a new circuit); if the purpose cannot be uniquely inferred, the traffic
cost is shared equally between all the purposes associated with the circuit.
Consequently, there are two approximations in our analysis that are small and therefore
do not have a material impact on our analysis. First, since Tor preemptively builds circuits,
some of these circuits may not have been used; we find unused circuits were responsible
for only 0.1% of the total traffic. Second, when cells cannot be associated with a TCP
stream, and their purpose cannot be inferred, we assign their cost equally to all purposes
associated with a given circuit; this only affected 0.2% of the total traffic. Section 4.4.1
offers more details.
4.4 Results
We now report on four experiments. First we measure the cost of maintaining a Tor
hidden service for a fixed IP address and stable Internet connection. We then measure the
additional cost of changing our IP address, a regular occurrence for a smartphone as it
moves between cellular data and WiFi networks. Third, we explore the overhead of data
transmission across the Tor network. These results allow us to produce a model of the
cost of running a Tor hidden service, something we build on in Section 4.5. Finally, for
comparison, we measure the overheads of using GCM.
4.4.1 Hidden service maintenance
We measured the network traffic induced by maintaining a Tor hidden service over a
48-hour period using our testbed. We recorded 32.5 MiB of Tor traffic, including IP
headers across 46,790 packets, or an average of 693 KiB (975 packets) per hour. The large
majority of traffic volume in bytes was caused by network status consensus downloads
(79.9%), with another 11.7% caused by hidden service descriptor uploads. Downloading
relay descriptors caused 4.3% of traffic, keep-alive messages 2.5%, and introduction circuits
0.2%. Establishing and closing connections to entry (first hop) relays was responsible for
0.8% of traffic. Measuring circuit timeouts used 0.2%, another 0.2% were used to fetch
authority certificates, and the remaining 0.1% were used to manage circuits that remained
unused. Table 4.1 provides further detail.
At the time of writing, directory authorities vote on a new network status consensus
every hour, which is valid for three hours. Clients download a new consensus at a randomly
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Type of traffic KiB/h KiB% Packets/h Packets%
Network status download 554 79.9% 694 71.2%
Relay descriptors 30 4.3% 47 4.9%
HS descriptor 82 11.7% 144 14.8%
Keep-alive 17 2.5% 54 5.6%
Introduction circuits 1 0.2% 3 0.3%
First-hop connections 6 0.8% 24 2.5%
Measure circuit timeout 2 0.2% 3 0.3%
Authority certificate 2 0.2% 3 0.3%
Unused circuits 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Total 693 100% 975 100%
Table 4.1: Average network traffic generated when maintaining a Tor hidden service.
chosen time between 105 and 170.6 minutes after their current consensus becomes valid.
We observed a total of 38 consensus downloads, with an average size of 699± 9 KiB. In
addition, we saw one case where the directory server returned a “304 Not modified” status.
In this case, the client retried the download after one minute, resulting in the same status
code. When the client tried again at a different server 10 minutes later, it received a full
consensus document again. This caused an additional 8 KiB of traffic. We also observed
336 hidden service descriptor uploads. Keep-alive messages are padded to the size of a
cell, with the total size of keep-alive IP packets being 595 bytes, which is answered by an
ACK packet of 52 bytes. Both sides of the connection send a keep-alive packet, resulting
in 4 packets and 1 294 bytes exchanged per idle connection every 5 minutes.
4.4.2 Network connectivity changes
Smartphones regularly change their network connectivity as they move between WiFi
access points and connections via cellular data services. Whenever such device connectivity
changes, connections to the Tor network must be re-established because the source IP
address used to support the TCP connections underlying Tor circuits changes.
To estimate the total additional network traffic caused by network connectivity changes,
we ran the same measurements as in Section 4.4.1, while periodically forcing network
connectivity changes, and compared the results. We forced a disconnect of the WiFi
connection every 20 minutes, and a reconnect 5 seconds later. When Orbot detects that
the network is down, Tor shuts down all connections and starts rebuilding connections
when connectivity is back. We then measured the amount of traffic generated over 48
hours and classified it as in Section 4.4.1. Our experiments showed that network status
document and relay descriptor downloads were not affected by connectivity changes. We
therefore exclude traffic classified as one of these categories from the comparison to reduce
noise. The version of Orbot we used chose new introduction points after each reconnect,
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Interval 1 B 512 B 1 KiB
1 min 2.7(7.6) 3.2(7.8) 3.8(9.2)
8 min 5.7(15.7) 6.1(16.4) 7.2(19.6)
12 min 9.1(25.1) 9.9(26.7) 9.7(25.4)
Table 4.2: The average additional network traffic in KiB (number of packets) generated per
message over Tor for different message sizes and different sending rates.
and re-uploaded the hidden service descriptors. Based on Section 4.4.1, which describes
the traffic required for a set of hidden service descriptor uploads, we also exclude traffic
related to them to get an estimate of the remaining traffic caused by a connectivity change.
Ignoring traffic related to these three activities, we calculated the difference in total traffic
compared to the idle connection (Section 4.4.1). Excluding these, we measured 5 628 KiB
of traffic, compared to 1 362 KiB for the idle connection. During the 48 hour period,
the WiFi reconnected 143 times. We therefore estimate an average additional traffic per
reconnect of 29.8 KiB, primarily for re-establishing connections, introduction circuits,
and other circuits. Adding the approximately 70 KiB it takes to upload hidden service
descriptors, a reconnect generates roughly 100 KiB of traffic.
4.4.3 Data transmission
We measured the overhead of transmitting data over the Tor network. To do so, we sent
messages of three different sizes (1 B, 512 B, 1 KiB) at three different intervals (1 min,
8 min, 12 min) to one of our smartphones. We chose 8 and 12 minute intervals to explore
the effect of circuit rebuilds, which currently occur every 10 minutes (Section 2.6.1). For
each message, we established a fresh TCP connection to the hidden service and sent a
stream of bytes of the given length before closing the connection. For each combination,
we sent messages for 4 hours. Table 4.2 shows how much traffic was generated on average
by a single message for different message sizes and rates. We estimated this amount by
counting all traffic not labeled as network status download, relay descriptor download,
hidden service descriptor upload, certificate authority download, or measuring circuit
timeout over the 4 hour-period, subtracting the expected amount of traffic for the same
categories for maintaining the hidden service as measured in Section 4.4.1 (429 bytes in
1.4 packets per minute), and dividing by the number of messages sent. Note that we count
keep-alive traffic, as receiving messages may reduce or increase the need for keep-alive
messages.
4.4.4 Comparison with GCM
For comparison, we used our testbed to measure the costs of maintenance, connectivity
changes, and message overhead of using GCM. To determine the traffic relevant to GCM,
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we filtered TCP traffic from the smartphone whose destination was mtalk.google.com,
ports 5228–5230.
Push notifications over GCM requires Google Play Services (PS) running on the handset.
PS initiates and maintains a single open TCP connection to a GCM server to receive
push notifications. To keep the connection alive, PS periodically sends keep-alive messages
to a GCM server. The active keep-alive intervals can be determined by typing the code
*#*#426#*#* in the Phone app. Using this technique, we experimentally confirmed that,
for mobile data connections, PS used a 28-minute interval. On WiFi, PS uses a proprietary
adaptive algorithm to determine an interval of between 110 seconds and 29 minutes; in
our case the interval was typically set to 19, 24, or 29 minutes.
There were no entries in the smartphone system log concerning keep-alive messages.
Thus, to quantify data usage and packet count for keep-alive messages, we looked at the
packet trace from the smartphone deployed with our testbed with PS installed and enabled.
To ensure that PS connected to GCM and waited for push notifications, we wrote and
launched a simple app that waits for incoming GCM messages. We observed a periodic
burst of three or four packets with a total length between 224 and 278 bytes, which
matched the WiFi heartbeat interval. From the 246 bursts we observed, the average total
size was 238± 22 bytes (not counting duplicate packets). Alongside this periodic burst,
we sometimes observed up to four additional packets containing duplicate TCP packets
(up to 528 bytes in total). The contents of the packets were encrypted, so we could not
determine further details of the keep-alive message or the purpose of the retransmission.
The average total size including duplicate packets was 258± 57 bytes.
We repeated the experiment described in Section 4.4.2 for GCM on a Nexus 5X handset.
We again forced the phone to reconnect to WiFi every 20 minutes. We ran the experiment
for 48 hours. We measured the amount of traffic within a minute after each reconnect
and observed a burst of traffic, with an average size of 2.9± 1.5 KiB (16.8± 1.6 packets)
in 141 out of 143 cases when the phone reconnected to WiFi. In two cases, we observed
no additional traffic directly after a reconnect. We assume that the fact that we did not
change the IP address might have resulted in PS not reconnecting in these cases.
To measure the traffic overhead when sending messages to the smartphone, we sent
similar messages to our GCM-enabled app as we did over Tor in Section 4.4.3. We used
the same message sizes and intervals (1 min, 8 min, 12 min; 1 B, 512 B and 1 KiB) and we
measured each combination for 2 hours. The average traffic per message did not noticeably
differ for different intervals. Per 1-byte message we observed on average 0.3 KiB, per
512-byte message, 0.8 KiB, and per 1024-byte message, 1.3 KiB of traffic.
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4.5 Empirical model
In this section, we use the results of Section 4.4 to derive a model for the data usage of a
hidden service on a smartphone. We use this model to evaluate the data usage and energy
costs of using Tor to support a push notification service on real devices in Section 4.5.1.
The model is based on the results from our measurements and therefore on the state of
the Tor network at the time of our experiments. Future work could take into account the
changing nature of the Tor network and create a model that depends on parameters like
the number of Tor relays that notably impact the amount of network traffic.
To estimate the total network traffic required to maintain the hidden service on a
phone, we require knowledge of the connectivity profile of a device: the periods the
device is connected to the Internet via WiFi or a cellular network, when the IP address
of the handset changes, and when no network connectivity is available. Network traffic
is generated by periodic network status and relay descriptor downloads, hidden service
descriptor uploads, and the creation and maintenance of Tor circuits to introduction points.
In the following, we look at each of these in turn.
The network status document is downloaded at regular intervals. Building on our
analysis in Section 4.4.1, we assume that the Tor client starts a network status download
when either: a disconnected device connects to the Internet and has no valid network status
document; or time t (chosen uniformly at random from the interval [105, 170.6] minutes)
has passed since their current download became valid. We assume that a new network
status document becomes valid on the hour, every hour (in UTC) and the client always
downloads the most recent valid document. We assume that each consensus download
produces 716 419 bytes of traffic, the average measured in Section 4.4.1.
We assume that the client downloads a set of relay descriptors immediately after it
downloads a network status document. We assume that this requires 30 356 · h bytes of
traffic, where h is the number of hours that have passed since the last network status
download. This is based on the average descriptor download traffic we observed per hour,
and should give a good approximation, especially because the large majority of descriptor
downloads happen shortly after a network status download.
We assume that each time the phone changes the way it connects to the Internet,
it needs to rebuild its Tor connections and circuits (including those to the introduction
points), which costs 30 548 bytes of traffic, the average measured in Section 4.4.2.
We assume that the client uploads its hidden service descriptor immediately after it
has (re-)established its connections to the introduction points, or 60 minutes after the
last upload. We assume that each set of uploads (to six directories) incurs 71 504 bytes of
traffic, the average measured in Section 4.4.1.
54
Finally, we assume that for every 5 minutes the device is connected to the Internet,
1 474 bytes of keep-alive traffic is generated, the average measured in Section 4.4.1. We do
not include periodic changes of the introduction points, as these have a small impact on
total traffic (0.2% during the experiment described in Section 4.4.1) and in our analysis,
the Tor client changes introduction points once a day. Similarly, for simplicity, we do not
include other traffic in our model since the remaining traffic was only approximately 1%
of the total traffic during our measurement.
4.5.1 Evaluation
To evaluate the energy and data usage costs of using Tor to support push notifications, we
use our model from Section 4.5 together with connectivity profile data of smartphones
from the Device Analyzer project [WRB14a].
Device Analyzer is an Android app, available on the Google Play Store since May
2011, and has been installed on over 30 000 handsets. It gathers a wide variety of system
statistics, including: app usage; metadata on calls placed and received; metadata on text
messages sent and received; Bluetooth devices seen and connected to; WiFi access points
seen and connected to; cell network coverage for calls and data; and battery and power
usage. Data collected by the app is processed on the handset to obscure direct personal
identifiers (e.g. phone numbers) before uploading data to a server at the University of
Cambridge.
We analyzed traces from the 30 444 devices in the Device Analyzer dataset. We
excluded devices with less than 30 days’ worth of data. We further excluded devices where
Device Analyzer data collection had been interrupted at any point, had large jumps in
their device clock, or where the device clock was obviously wrong or broken. For each
device trace from the remaining 2 014 devices, we estimate the volume of cellular data
required to maintain a Tor hidden service. We do this by assuming that cellular data
is used when a cellular connection is available and a WiFi connection is not. Since the
Tor client uses timing randomisation when downloading the network status document, we
simulate the connectivity pattern of the device 40 times and take the average amount of
traffic.
The baseline violin plot in Figure 4.1 shows our estimate of the cost of running a Tor
hidden service for 30 days on the 2 014 devices from the Device Analyzer dataset. An
equivalent numeric summary is shown in Table 4.3. Cellular data usage is high, with a
median cost across all devices of 198 MiB. For 10% of the devices we estimate a cellular
data usage of 362 MiB or more. By way of comparison, GCM maintenance, without any
IP address changes, costs on average 258 bytes every time it needs to send a heartbeat
(Section 4.4.4), or 0.44 MiB over 30 days for heartbeat interval of 24 minutes. Even
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factoring in multiple network changes per day, at 2.9 KiB per change, total costs would
still likely be only a couple of MiB per month.
We use EnergyBox [VNTP14] to estimate the energy costs of maintaining a Tor hidden
service on a smartphone. EnergyBox takes a packet trace, a smartphone model, and a
connectivity profile (WiFi or cellular). To provide a reasonable lower-bound estimate
for the energy costs, we reused the 48-hour packet trace collected for our experiment in
Section 4.4.1 and assumed this trace was transferred over the cellular data network (3G)
with a Nexus One device on the TeliaSonera network, the only device and network operator
the EnergyBox authors provide an energy model for. The Nexus One was released in
2010, and we expect newer devices’ batteries to last longer. Over the 48-hour period, the
estimated total energy costs were 5 346 J; or 2 673 J = 0.743 Wh per day. The Nexus One
device has a battery capacity of 5.18 Wh, so, assuming a battery profile where the device
is charging for 8 hours over night and on battery for 16 hours, this represents 9.6% of total
battery capacity – a significant amount. Note that this value only takes into account the
energy required for network communication, and additional power is required to make a
hidden service work, e.g. to keep the device awake when needed.
4.5.2 Reducing Tor data usage
The above numbers demonstrate that running a Tor hidden service on a smartphone
generates several hundreds of megabytes of cellular data traffic per month on a typical
device – an unacceptable volume for all but those with a generous data package. As the
EnergyBox paper [VNTP14] demonstrates, there is a strong correlation between data
volume and energy usage. Therefore, we evaluate four strategies to reduce the amount of
data that Tor requires, thereby reducing energy usage. These strategies may impact user
anonymity. We leave evaluating this for future work.
Strategy A: Reconnect to the same introduction points
In the version of the Tor client we used in our experiments, Tor chose a new set of
introduction points whenever a device changed its IP address. This is a known issue that
is supposed to be fixed [torg]. However, we found that changes in network connections
continued to require new introduction points. As of December 2018, a fix was under
development [torf].
Changing introduction points requires the Tor client to generate a new hidden service
descriptor and upload it. This causes additional traffic, and also affects anyone wanting to
connect to the hidden service: other clients may have cached the hidden service descriptor
and therefore connectivity is broken. At the time of writing, this was still an open issue in
the Tor bug tracking database [tore].
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Figure 4.1: Estimated traffic over the cellular network over 30 days for 2 014 devices in the
Device Analyzer dataset. The leftmost violin plot shows a data usage estimate for Orbot’s
current behaviour; the remaining ones estimate data usage with various data reduction strategies
developed in Section 4.5.2.
Strategy A in Figure 4.1 estimates the data usage costs for a Tor client that reconnects
to the same introduction points when the IP address of the smartphone changes, and
therefore does not need to re-upload the hidden service descriptor.
Strategy B: Proactively fetch network status on WiFi
If we assume free data usage over WiFi, a straightforward strategy to reduce cellular data
costs is to proactively download the most recent network status document as soon as it is
available. This has the downside of causing additional traffic at the directory mirrors and
will also increase energy costs. Strategy B in Figure 4.1 explores this option.
Strategy C: Defer fetching network status on cellular
Since mobile devices regularly move between WiFi and cellular data, it makes sense to
delay downloading the network status document until just before expiry in the hope that
WiFi connectivity appears before a download over the cellular network becomes necessary.
This may additionally reduce the total number of network status document downloads.
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Base A B C BC D ABCD
Median 198 165 172 169 154 95 61
Mean 367 305 333 322 304 188 119
Std.dev. 141 108 138 132 132 101 45
90th perc. 362 341 353 329 327 172 120
99th perc. 649 424 628 612 607 517 202
Table 4.3: Estimated traffic in MiB over the cellular network over 30 days for 2 014 devices in
the Device Analyzer dataset.
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Figure 4.2: Average size of the compressed output of diff -d -e on pairs of all microdescriptor
consensus documents from 1 November to 30 November 2016, compared to the compressed size
of the full network status documents.
This strategy may cause spikes in download requests on directory mirrors in the Tor
network if many clients adopt the policy. Strategy C in Figure 4.1 explores this option.
Strategy D: Download network status diffs
The network status document is updated every hour, but only a small part of it changes
from hour to hour. Therefore, we consider the potential benefits of downloading the
difference between two network status documents. This is not a new idea [Pal08] – a
version of this was implemented in 2014 [Mar14] – but it had not yet been integrated into
the main branch of Tor or available in Orbot at the time of our experiments. To estimate
potential savings from downloading differences instead of full documents, we looked at all
720 consecutive network status documents from November 2016 (UTC).
We compared documents pairwise by applying diff -d -e and then gzip -9 to the
output to calculate the size of a diff. We calculated how the size of the diff changed as the
time period between the pairs of documents increased. Figure 4.2 shows the average size of
the compressed difference between all pairs of documents, grouped by the number of hours
between the start of the validity of the two documents. The knee in the curve at 18 hours
is due to the fact that Tor relays update their relay descriptors every 18 hours. The data
shows that using diffs can drastically reduce download size if time between network status
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downloads is small. The diff between two consecutive network status documents is a mere
6% of the size of the full network status document; it is still 35% smaller after 18 hours,
reaching the size of a full network status download only after 6 days. Thus, consensus
diffs can be particularly beneficial for devices that constantly stay connected to the Tor
network and frequently download the consensus. To account for the overhead incurred
by downloading the diffs, we add 17.6% to the sizes of all compressed diffs for our model.
We calculated this percentage by comparing the average traffic incurred for a consensus
download in Section 4.4.1 with the average size of compressed consensus documents from
November 2016.
Strategy D in Figure 4.1 computes the cost savings on cellular data if network status
diffs follow the averages found in Figure 4.2.
4.6 Related work
Previous work has highlighted a scalability problem in Tor’s design: every client needs
up-to-date information on all relays, resulting in a total bandwidth expenditure that grows
with the number of clients times the number of relays [MTHK09, MOT+11]. Several
papers propose more scalable solutions using peer-to-peer architectures [MTHK09, NW06,
PRR09, RP04, MB09]. These approaches are usually based on using distributed hash
tables (DHTs) and/or random walks letting clients find random relays on demand without
needing the entire list of relays. Mittal et al. [MOT+11] proposed an alternative approach
to improve Tor’s scalability: keep the existing client-server architecture, and let clients
obtain random relays from directory servers or guard relays using private information
retrieval techniques. While the focus was to reduce the data usage from network status
downloads on the Tor network centrally, such techniques also offer benefits to mobile
devices with limited data usage requirements and energy constraints.
Loesing et al. [LSWW08] measured the time taken to complete the steps involved in
connecting to a hidden service. Lenhard et al. [LLW09] conducted similar experiments
with similar results. They also measured the time a Tor client takes to complete the
bootstrapping phase under low-bandwidth conditions. Solberg and Bezem [SB13] measured
various performance characteristics of the Tor network and Tor hidden services, including
throughput, access time, connection latency, and reliability, for both the public and a
private Tor network.
Wiangsripanawan et al. [WSSN07] and Doswell et al. [DAKS13, DKAS15] looked at
the impact of mobility on the performance of Tor in client mode. They explored the
problem of changing network connectivity, and the resulting change in IP address, the
need to re-establish Tor circuits, and the loss in connectivity. Wiangsripanawan et al. also
considered location privacy. To keep connections alive across changes of IP address, they
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propose re-establishing a circuit to the same exit node. Doswell et al. estimated the impact
on throughput, and proposed client throttling to reduce the amount of “wasted” traffic,
and the use of a trusted (private or public) bridge relay to keep circuits open, allowing the
client to quickly reconnect to the circuits. Neither of these papers consider the costs of
running a hidden service from a mobile device.
Briar2 is an open source app that uses Tor hidden services to support instant messaging
between smartphones without using other cloud infrastructure or push notification servers.
They do not quantify the costs of running a hidden service; the results from our work
provide support for the introduction of network status diffs.
4.7 Discussion
A few months after we published the results presented in this chapter [KB17c], Tor
developers finished implementing consensus diffs; the changes have been merged into the
main development branch in May 2017 [tord]. Based on the results presented above, we
therefore expect that data usage of maintaining a Tor hidden service has been reduced
with more recent versions of Tor. Since the number of Tor relays and the size of the
consensus document have remained nearly the same since our experiments, we expect that
the median cellular data usage has now roughly halved to around 100 MiB, assuming the
connectivity patterns of typical users have also remained similar.
However, there remains significant work to be done. Our experiments show that Google
Cloud Messaging costs in the order of 1 MiB per month, nearly two orders of magnitude
less than a Tor hidden service with all four of our data reduction strategies deployed.
Similarly, transmission of a single 1 KiB message consumes significantly more over Tor
(between 3.8 KiB and 9.7 KiB of data; see Table 4.2) as compared with GCM (1.3 KiB;
See Section 4.4.4).
The introduction of Doze [And] in Android 6.0 makes some form of privacy-preserving
push notification service all the more important. Doze is enabled when the handset is
stationary for a period of time, not charging and the screen is off. When Doze is enabled, a
handset conserves battery life by suspending apps, including suspending background tasks,
network communication, alarms, and wake locks. Consequently, GCM and its successor,
FCM, is an essential developer tool if an app needs to receive messages from an external
source because high-priority messages sent over the network to Google Play Services are
not affected by Doze.
Some popular apps such as Facebook already allow users to connect via Tor from
their smartphone. However, they currently lack support for push notifications for these
connections. With some further work to Tor as outlined in Section 4.5.2, using Tor for
2https://briarproject.org/
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push notifications may be acceptable for such users. Tor hidden services are also likely to
be useful to support direct phone-to-phone communication in next-generation apps such
as Briar.
Scaleability is a concern if Tor hidden services become popular for deploying push-
notification services. If millions of mobile devices start running a Tor hidden service, the
increased bandwidth requirements on the Tor network and the large number of hidden
service descriptors that need to be managed by hidden service directories will require
more Tor relays to be deployed. This will in turn increase the size of the network status
document that needs to be downloaded to the devices regularly. Future work is therefore
required to develop more scalable anonymity networks.
Data and source code used to produce the results in this chapter are available [KB17b].
Data from Device Analyzer is already available from the Device Analyzer project.
4.8 Ethical considerations
Experiments were conducted on the live Tor network and using anonymized personal data
from the Device Analyzer project. In the following we shortly discuss how this was done
according to ethical principles for research.
The Device Analyzer project has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Department of Computer Science at the University of Cambridge. It is designed to protect
user privacy. For example, all personal identifiers in the dataset are replaced by a salted
hash [WRB14b]. This dataset is available to researchers under the condition that they do
not attempt to re-identify users.
We used the dataset to obtain a realistic distribution of network connectivity patterns
and made no such attempts and did not link the data with any other dataset containing
personal identifiers.
We captured network packet traces from the live Tor network. In particular, we
captured network traffic between contained the encrypted network traffic between our
experiment phone and Tor entry nodes. Additionally, we did not store the cryptographic
keys necessary to decrypt any of the traffic, thus the only usable data from the traces is
metadata about the packets exchanged with Tor entry nodes. This metadata contains the
IP addresses of the Tor entry nodes, as well as timing and size of packets. IP addresses
of Tor entry nodes are publicly known and thus not sensitive. The timing and size of
packets was needed for our research, and this information is not sensitive either since it
only relates to our own traffic and would not give an adversary any significant advantage
in de-anonymizing other users.
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4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we showed that using Tor, the cellular data cost of maintaining a Tor
hidden service from a smartphone today is high, with a median cost across all devices of
198 MiB in the version we used. In the worst case, we expect devices with monthly cellular
data usage in excess of 600 MiB. Energy costs were also significant: we estimated the
network activity would cost at least 9.6% of battery capacity on a Nexus One connected
to the Internet via 3G with a daily charge cycle.
We explored four cost-reducing strategies for maintaining a Tor hidden service on
a smartphone: reconnect to the same introduction points when the phone’s IP address
changes; proactively fetch network status on WiFi; defer fetching network status on cellular
connections; and download network status diffs. Combined, these four strategies result in a
more reasonable total monthly median cost of 61 MiB. The most effective of the strategies,
consensus diffs, has been added to Tor after our results were originally published.
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CHAPTER 5
Authenticated snapshots
In this chapter we describe how to build a document collaboration system that supports
concurrent edits by several user devices, and that does not require a server to receive
and centrally process all edits. Our protocol supports end-to-end encryption of all
communication between user devices. Moreover, it allows devices to communicate peer-to-
peer via an anonymisation network such as Tor [DMS04] or Loopix [PHE+17], allowing
the collaboration activity to be hidden from an attacker who may be performing traffic
analysis.
Without a trusted server that authenticates users and holds the authoritative version
of the shared document, user devices need another means of verifying the integrity,
authenticity, and consistency of edits they receive from other users. For example, consider
a scenario where lawyers from different companies are negotiating a contract using a shared
document editor. It is essential that everyone has a consistent view of the document and
that changes can be traced back to the author. In Section 5.2, we describe the system
architecture, including the design goals and threat model. In Section 5.3, we first present
a simple protocol that uses digital signatures and cryptographic hashes to verify the origin
of an operation, and to efficiently check if all devices have seen the same set of document
edits. This protocol is sufficient if the set of participants in a collaboration group is fixed
or if new collaborators can receive the full editing history. If it is not desirable that new
collaborators can see all changes that happened before they joined and parts that have
been deleted, the protocol presented in Section 5.4 can be used, which extends the basic
protocol by support for authenticated snapshots. Any device can invite new collaborators
by sending them an authenticated snapshot created from the current document state. The
new collaborator can verify that the snapshot is consistent with views by other devices,
and start collaborating with the group, without being able to see edits that happened
before they joined.
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We make use of operation-based CRDTs (Section 2.1.2) in order to ensure that
concurrent edits to a document can be merged by user devices without conflicts. We
have chosen CRDTs because they are decentralised by design and do not need a central
server – data can flow directly between devices. This model contrasts with the Operational
Transformation approach to document collaboration [NCDL95, EG89], as used in Google
Docs [DR10], which requires a central server.
After presenting the protocol in this chapter, in Chapter 6 we evaluate its costs and its
correctness and security properties.
5.1 Adding new collaborators
Designing a collaborative editing application becomes more challenging if new collaborators
are invited to join the editing session for an existing document. In this case, the new
collaborator must be given a copy of the document at the time she is invited, and then be
sent any subsequent edits to the document. We identify three approaches to inviting new
collaborators:
1. If existing collaborators keep a log of all editing operations that have occurred
since the creation of the document, they can send a copy of that log to the new
collaborator, who can then reconstruct the current state of the document from the
edits. The new collaborator can also use the hashes and signatures on the operations
to verify the integrity of the edit log. This approach is used by the protocol we
describe in Section 5.3, but it has significant disadvantages. In particular, storing,
transmitting, replaying, and checking the integrity of the edit log incurs substantial
costs in storage, network bandwidth, and processing time; and the edit log contains
all past versions of the document, including any text that has been deleted in the
current version.
2. To reduce the cost and improve the privacy properties of the first approach, the new
collaborator could be sent only a snapshot of the current state of the document, not
including its past editing history. To ensure consistency, each existing participant can
be asked to confirm the validity of the snapshot. However, if any existing participants
are oﬄine, the new participant must either wait (potentially indefinitely) until they
are next online, or go ahead and accept the risk that its snapshot is inconsistent
with other participants’ view of the document.
3. To overcome the downsides of the first two approaches, we develop a new protocol
in Section 5.4. In this protocol, new collaborators are only sent a snapshot of the
current state of the document, plus a cryptographic proof of the integrity of the
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snapshot. The new collaborator can then use this proof to verify the snapshot,
without having to wait for any communication with other participants.
This chapter describes a scheme that allows authenticated snapshots to be created by
devices collaboratively editing a document in a peer-to-peer setting. The solution allows
devices to verify that a snapshot represents a state of a document that is consistent with
(possibly earlier) states of the document that have been signed by all collaborators.
5.2 System architecture
We envision a collaborative document editing system as described in Chapter 3, with
an arbitrary number of users, each of whom may own one or more devices. Document
editing software is installed on each device, allowing the user to create a new document,
invite others to collaborate on a document, and join an existing document. The software
allows users to edit any document regardless of whether they are currently connected to a
network or not; if no network connection is available, then document changes are applied
locally and sent to peers when network connectivity returns. Modelling typical mobile
devices, we assume that devices may frequently be oﬄine, and that devices may suffer a
permanent failure without warning; e.g. if dropped in water.
To protect document editing metadata from traffic analysis, we assume that all
communication takes place via an anonymous communication network such as Tor [DMS04]
or Loopix [PHE+17]. We assume that an existing key exchange and encryption protocol
protects the confidentiality of messages sent via the network. In addition, we assume
a public key infrastructure, such as CONIKS [MBB+15], which is able to map human-
readable names, such as cellphone numbers and email addresses, to public keys. This
infrastructure is used by the software to allow users to invite collaborators by looking up
the public key associated with a human-readable name.
5.2.1 Design goals and threat model
We assume the adversary is able to control network communication and can read, modify
and delay any traffic, including partitioning the network for arbitrary periods of time;
however, the adversary is unable to break the anonymity of the underlying anonymous
communication network. Further, we assume the adversary can create an arbitrary number
of fake users with devices that may participate in group collaboration; these devices may
deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. The adversary cannot compromise the public-key
infrastructure and does not have access to secret keys of honest participants; therefore the
adversary cannot forge messages or signatures created by honest participants.
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We assume that an existing encryption layer in the underlying communication network
protects the confidentiality of messages between participants. On top of this network, our
protocol provides the following properties in the face of the adversary:
Edit integrity. The shared document can only be modified by a group member.
Attributability. All edits are attributable to the honest device that made the modifica-
tion. Group members can identify who added a certain part of a document, even if
it was added before they joined.
Consistency. Devices have consistent views of the document. When an honest device
processes an edit operation, it must have previously processed exactly those edits
that happened before this operation, and possibly some concurrent edits.
Snapshot consistency. On joining a group, a new member can check the integrity of
the document, i.e. they can verify that the state is consistent with states seen by
other collaborators. In particular, they can verify that all modifications made or
seen by collaborators up to a certain point are represented in the snapshot, and that
no modifications were falsely attributed to a collaborator.
Edit history privacy. A new group member cannot see edits made before she joined the
group, other than what can be inferred from the document state when she joins; in
particular, she cannot see parts of the document that were deleted before she joined.
Convergence. When honest group members communicate, their local copies of the shared
data converge towards a consistent state, even if arbitrarily many group members
are malicious.
Availability. Any two participants can collaborate on a document, even if all other
collaborators are oﬄine; in particular, the protocol does not require any quorum of
devices to be reachable.
Scalability. Assuming a bounded number of collaborators, protocol messages add only a
constant communication overhead compared to a simple protocol that does not allow
authenticated snapshots; communication and computational overhead for inviting a
new member, sending and processing a snapshot is practically linear in the number
of atoms in the document at the time of the snapshot.
We prove in Chapter 6 that the protocol described in Section 5.4 satisfies these
properties. The properties protect against different kinds of attacks an adversary might
attempt. For example, an estate agent selling a house could try to present different views
of a contract to different parties, showing different sale prices and keeping the difference.
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In a collaborative code editor, an attacker may want to insert malicious code and attribute
it to someone else.
Edit history privacy allows, for example, lawyers to collaborate on a contract and later
share it with a third party, while ensuring that the third party is unable to see potentially
sensitive contents of any previous versions of the contract. Edit history privacy is also
useful when researchers working on a paper want to share a draft with a colleague, but
would prefer not to reveal previous unpolished versions of the paper.
Our proposed method of collaboration also works if data is shared via a local network,
potentially disconnected from the Internet, such as Bluetooth or local WiFi. However, in
this case we must assume that the protections afforded by the anonymity protocol are not
available.
5.3 Basic protocol
In this section, we describe a basic protocol for collaborative editing of a text document
that relies on all collaborators having a copy of the full editing history of the document.
In Section 5.4 we will show how to improve the protocol’s privacy properties so that new
collaborators can be given a snapshot containing only the current document state, and
not the past editing history.
The document is initially created on one particular device, and any existing device
can add a new collaborating device using an addDevice operation (see Section 5.3.4). We
assume that each device has a distinct secret key, and that when a new collaborating
device is added, the sender of the invitation can verify the linking of device identifier and
public key of the device being added (for example, by means of a PKI). Moreover, we
assume that each device is identified by a unique device identifier, deviceID , which may
for example be a hash of its public key.
5.3.1 Breaking text into atoms
Following the Treedoc algorithm [PMSL09], we represent a collaboratively editable text
document by a set of atoms. Each atom represents an editable unit of text, for example,
a character, a word, a line, or a sentence, and the metadata associated with it. The
granularity of atoms can be chosen depending on the application, and does not affect the
operation of the protocol.
An atom is a 4-tuple (pos , src, ctr , txt):
• pos is a variable-length bit string that identifies a position in the document as in
Treedoc (Section 2.1.2.2).
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• src is the deviceID of the source (the device on which the atom was originally
created).
• ctr is a sequence number that is incremented by the sender as described in Sec-
tion 5.3.2.
• txt is a text fragment (e.g. character, word, or line).
Note that an atom can be uniquely identified both by its position identifier, and by the
tuple (src, ctr).
We then define a total ordering on atoms based on the position identifiers:
(pos1, src1, ctr 1, txt1) < (pos2, src2, ctr 2, txt2)⇐⇒ (pos1 < pos2) (5.1)
The text of the document is obtained by sorting the set of atoms by this ordering, and
concatenating the associated text fragments in that order. We allow the text to be edited
through two types of operation: inserting an atom, and deleting an atom. Replacement of
text is expressed as deletion and subsequent insertion.
5.3.2 Sending messages
Collaborators communicate by sending and receiving messages. Each collaborator main-
tains a set of messages it has sent and received; for example, msgsA is the set of messages
sent or received by A.
Each message is a 5-tuple (src, ctr , op, deps , sig), constructed as follows:
• src is the deviceID of the source (the device that created the message).
• ctr is a sequence number that is 1 for the first message sent by a particular src, and
incremented for each subsequent message from src:1
ctr =

1 if @ (src, , , , ) ∈ msgssrc
1 + max
{
c | (src, c, , , ) ∈ msgssrc
}
otherwise
(5.2)
• op is an operation: either insert(pos , text) to represent the insertion of a new atom,
delete(src ′, ctr ′) to represent the deletion of an existing atom, noop if the document
has not been changed, or addDevice(deviceID , publicKey) to announce the addition
of a collaborator device. The noop operation is useful so a device can acknowledge
that it has seen a certain state without performing any changes.
1We use the underscore as placeholder for a fresh, existentially quantified variable. For example,
(x, , ) ∈ A is shorthand for ∃ y, z. (x, y, z) ∈ A, and @ (x, , ) ∈ A is shorthand for @ y, z. (x, y, z) ∈ A.
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• deps is the set of dependencies of this message, that is, a reference to the most recent
prior message from each device:
deps =
{
(s, c, h(m)) | (5.3)
m ∈ msgssrc ∧ m = (s, c, , , ) ∧
@ c′. ((s, c′, , , ) ∈ msgssrc ∧ c < c′)
}
deps is a set of triples consisting of the source deviceID , the sequence number of
the most recent message seen from that source, and the hash of that message. The
hash h(m) of message m = (src, ctr , op, deps , ), is computed as a cryptographic
hash of the message contents (excluding the signature), and is used to check that all
collaborators have received the same message contents:
h(m) = H(src ‖ ctr ‖ op ‖ deps), (5.4)
where m = (src, ctr , op, deps , ).
H(· · · ) can be any secure hash function, such as SHA-256. Note that this creates a
directed acyclic graph of hashes, where each message references the previous message
from the same device and any messages received from other devices. This hash-DAG
is similar to the commit history in the Git version control system.
• sig is a digital signature of the preceding elements of the message tuple, using the
private key of the sender src:
sig = signsrc(docID ‖ src ‖ ctr ‖ op ‖ deps), (5.5)
where docID is a document identifier that uniquely identifies the document. We
assume that the document identifier is known to all participants, e.g. through the
messaging protocol.
When the source device src sends a message m, it adds the message to its message set:
msgs ′src = msgssrc ∪ {m}, (5.6)
where m = (src, ctr , op, deps , sig).
m is sent to the other collaborators using a secure messaging protocol, which we elide
in this description. Any protocol that protects the confidentiality and integrity of the
message against network attackers can be used.
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5.3.3 Receiving messages
When a message m = (src, ctr , op, deps , sig) is received by a destination device dst , the
destination device performs the following checks:
1. There is no existing message from the same src with a counter value greater than or
equal to the incoming message:
∀c. (src, c, , , ) ∈ msgsdst =⇒ c < ctr . (5.7)
2. The dependencies are satisfied:
deps ⊆ {(s, c, h(m′)) |m′ ∈ msgsdst ∧ (5.8)
m′ = (s, c, , , )
}
If msgsdst does not contain the dependencies because they have not yet been delivered,
the message m can be buffered locally, and the destination device can request
retransmission of the missing messages. Then the delivery of m can be retried after
other messages have arrived. However, if the check fails because the hashes are
mismatched, m must be rejected.
3. sig is a valid signature of docID ‖ src ‖ ctr ‖ op ‖ deps , checked with src’s public key.
If all of these checks succeed, m is added to the destination device’s message set:
msgs ′dst = msgsdst ∪ {m}. (5.9)
Assuming second preimage resistance of the hash function and unforgeability of the
signatures, the destination device knows that msgsdst ⊇ msgssrc if the above checks
succeed, since the hashes in deps transitively include all messages in msgssrc at the time
the message was sent.
Finally, on any device A, the set of atoms S(msgsA) that make up the document is
the set of atoms that have been inserted but not deleted:
S(msgs) =
{
(pos , src, ctr , txt) | (5.10)
(src, ctr , insert(pos , txt), , ) ∈ msgs ∧
@ ( , , delete(src, ctr), , ) ∈ msgs}
The text of the document is obtained by sorting this set of atoms as described in Sec-
tion 5.3.1.
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5.3.4 Adding a new collaborator
When an existing collaborator wants to add a new device as a collaborator, it first
broadcasts a message containing an addDevice(deviceID , publicKey) operation to announce
to other devices that a certain device has been added. Moreover, the device A that
invites the new collaborator must send the entire set msgsA to the new device. The new
device can then check the integrity of these messages by performing the same checks as in
Section 5.3.3.
If A is malicious, it may try to make the new device’s view of the document diverge
from the rest of the group. However, A is limited to two attacks: it can give the new
device an old version of the document (corresponding to a subset of msgsA), and it can
give the new device a document containing edits that have not yet been sent to other
collaborators. In either case, when the new collaborator communicates with other group
members, they will exchange the missing operations. If their views of the edit history are
inconsistent, they will detect this situation and can then run a suitable resolution protocol
to reach consistent states.
5.4 Privacy-enhanced protocol
The protocol described in Section 5.3 has the problem that the full editing history, including
any deleted past content of the document, is exposed to a new collaborator when she joins.
In this section we present a revised protocol that avoids this problem.
Specifically, we want to be able to send a new collaborator only the current set of
atoms, rather than the full set of operations that led to this set of atoms. However, simply
changing the protocol of Section 5.3.4 to send S(msgsA) instead of msgsA removes any
ability for the new collaborator to check the integrity of the document, since it cannot use
the checks in Section 5.3.3. Thus, a malicious device could send the new collaborator an
arbitrarily corrupted set of atoms.
In order to allow any new collaborator to check the integrity of the set of atoms, we use
RSA accumulators [BP97, BD93]. Each device i generates an RSA key pair with primes
(pi, qi), and makes the modulus Ni = piqi public. Moreover, device i also chooses an xi
with 1 < xi < Ni and makes it public. For practical purposes, xi can be fixed.
Since the following protocol description contains a considerable number of variables,
for reference, Table 5.1 contains a list of the variables used, with a short description and
the section where the variable is defined.
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Variable Description Section
docID Unique identifier of the shared document 5.3.2
src Unique deviceID of the device that created a message 5.3.2
ctr Per-device sequence number of a message 5.3.2
op Edit operation 5.3.2
pos Position identifier 5.3.1
txt Atomic text fragment 5.3.1
deps List of dependencies of a message 5.3.2
sig Cryptographic signature of a message signed by the originator 5.3.2
h(m) Hash of message m 5.3.2
r Per-message random nonce 5.4.1
acc Accumulator value corresponding to the current set of atoms 5.4.1
Tsrc Merkle tree of messages from device src 5.4.1
Tsrc[c] Merkle tree of messages from device src up to ctr = c 5.4.1
mr Set of root hashes of Merkle trees Tsrc for all devices src 5.4.1
mh Hash of mr 5.4.1
msgsd Set of messages sent or received by device d 5.3.2
Sd Set of atoms that are part of the document view of device d 5.4.1
sdesc Set of state descriptors for all collaborating devices 5.4.3
mproofs Merkle consistency proofs proving that devices’ views are consistent 5.4.3
mnodes Subset of Merkle tree nodes required to continue appending leaves 5.4.3
wit Witness proving which atoms were present in a device’s view 5.4.3
Table 5.1: Variables used in the description of the privacy-enhanced protocol, with reference to
the section where the variable is defined.
5.4.1 Sending messages
We update the definition of a message in Section 5.3.2 by adding three additional elements:
a nonce r , an accumulator acc, and a hash mh. In our revised definition, a message is an
8-tuple (src, ctr , op, deps , r , acc,mh, sig):
• src, ctr , op, and deps are defined as in Section 5.3.2.
• r is a 128-bit random prime.
• acc is the value of an RSA accumulator over the current set of atoms Ssrc =
S(msgssrc), which is derived from msgssrc as shown in (5.10), and r :
acc(Ssrc, r) = x
P (Ssrc)r
src mod Nsrc, (5.11)
where P (S) =
∏
a∈S
prime(a). (5.12)
The function prime(a) is a hash function that returns only prime numbers, as
described in Section 2.3. We accumulate r in addition to the set of atoms to make
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the accumulator indistinguishable, i.e. to prevent guessing the accumulated set based
on the accumulator value [DHS15].
• mh is the hash of a set of Merkle trees, defined as follows. Let Ts be a Merkle
tree [Mer88] containing all message hashes received from device s in order of their
sequence number (including the current message if s is the sending device src), and
let MTH(Ts) be the Merkle tree root hash of Ts. Then
mh = H
({
MTH(Ts) | s is a deviceID
})
. (5.13)
In Section 5.4.3 we use this construction to prove that the sequence of messages
from a particular sending device is an append-only sequence, following the approach
of Certificate Transparency [DGHS16, LLK13]. To ensure that mh is unique, the
elements of the set are hashed in a fixed order, e.g. in lexicographic order of deviceIDs.
• sig is extended to also cover the accumulator and the Merkle tree root hash. Moreover,
instead of op, we include h(m) in the data to be signed:
sig = signsrc(docID ‖ src ‖ ctr ‖ h(m) ‖ deps ‖ acc ‖mh). (5.14)
This construction allows a new collaborator to verify the signature of a partial
message without necessarily knowing the operation contained in the message. The
hash of the message, h(m), is extended by the nonce and accumulator:
h(m) = H(src ‖ ctr ‖ op ‖ deps ‖ r ‖ acc),
where m = (src, ctr , op, deps , r , acc, ).
(5.15)
In practice, the accumulator can be maintained incrementally, so it does not need to be
recalculated from scratch for every message sent by src. When a new atom a is added to
Ssrc, the new accumulator can be computed with two modular exponentiations, provided
that the sender remembers the accumulator excluding the nonce, acc(S, 1):
acc(S ∪ {a}, r) = xP (S ∪ {a})·rsrc mod N (5.16)
= acc(S, 1)prime(a)·r mod N
When an atom a is removed from Ssrc, we can update the accumulator by computing the
multiplicative inverse of prime(a) modulo ϕ(N). That is, we use the extended Euclidean
algorithm to find t and u such that
t · prime(a)− 1 = uϕ(N) = u(p− 1)(q − 1), (5.17)
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which can be done efficiently by the device that knows the secret key (p, q). Then, by
Euler’s theorem, we have
xt·prime(a) = x · (xϕ(N))u = x · 1u = x mod N, (5.18)
and hence we can update the accumulator as follows:
acc(S − {a}, 1) = (xP (S−{a})·prime(a)src )t mod N
= acc(S, 1)t mod N. (5.19)
5.4.2 Receiving messages
When a message m = (src, ctr , op, deps , r , acc,mh, sig) is received by a device dst , it first
performs the same checks as in Section 5.3.3.
Next, to validate the accumulator acc, dst computes the set of atoms that existed on
the source device src at the time m was sent. To this end, we first find the subset of
messages in msgsdst that are referenced in the message dependencies deps :
msgsIn(deps) =
{
(s, c, , , , , , ) ∈ msgsdst | (5.20)
∃ c′. (s, c′, ) ∈ deps ∧ c ≤ c′}
As defined in (5.10), the set of atoms at the time m was sent is the set of atoms that were
inserted but not deleted in the set of messages msgsIn(deps) ∪ {m}. Thus, dst can check
that the accumulator satisfies:
acc
?
= xP (S(msgsIn(deps) ∪ {m}))rsrc mod Nsrc. (5.21)
If dst has already verified the message hash h(m), this check is redundant and only
serves to verify that src has calculated acc correctly. However, dst can only verify the
hash if it can compute the hashes of all dependencies, which may not be the case if it does
not know the full operation history because it has joined from a snapshot (as described in
Section 5.4.3). If any dependencies of a message predate (or happened concurrently to)
the snapshot from which dst was initialised, verifying the accumulator allows dst to check
that the sender’s state is consistent with its own.
If dst has already verified an earlier accumulator accold (with corresponding nonce
rold) from src, it can compute the new accumulator incrementally. Let Sadded be the set
of atoms added, and Sremoved the set of atoms removed since accold. To add all atoms in
Sadded, dst can perform modular exponentiations to compute acc
P (Sadded)
old mod Nsrc. As
the factorization Nsrc = psrcqsrc is private to src, dst cannot compute multiplicative inverses
modulo ϕ(Nsrc), and thus cannot remove elements from src’s accumulator. However, dst
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can check if the provided accumulator acc is correct by adding the removed atoms to acc:
acc
P (Sadded)r
old
?
= accP (Sremoved)rold mod Nsrc (5.22)
Lastly, the destination device verifies that mh has been computed correctly by recom-
puting the value based on its own operation hash trees.
5.4.3 Adding a new collaborator
Similarly to the process in Section 5.3.4, the device sending the invitation first broad-
casts a message containing an addDevice(deviceID , publicKey) operation to the existing
collaborators, where the public key now also contains the accumulator RSA modulus of
the device. Next, the collaborator A who invites the new device sends a snapshot to the
new device. The snapshot is a 4-tuple (SA, sdesc,mproofs ,mnodes), where SA = S(msgsA)
is A’s current set of atoms, as defined in (5.10). We show in Section 5.4.3 how sdesc is
constructed and checked, and we discuss mproofs and mnodes in Section 5.4.3. Using the
snapshot, a new device B can start collaborating from the current state, but does not
learn contents that were added to the document earlier but deleted since then. Note that
to ensure this privacy property, devices must not forward a message to devices that were
added later (in the dependency graph) than the message. After B has received a snapshot,
it immediately broadcasts a message containing a noop operation. The accumulator value
of this message allows other devices to verify that B has received a set of atoms consistent
with their own. Because B cannot verify the hashes of dependent messages that happened
before or concurrently to a snapshot, it must only accept messages that happened after its
noop message. If any messages happened concurrently to the snapshot, B must request a
new snapshot that also contains the effects of these concurrent messages. After processing
this snapshot, B publishes a new noop operation. Whether a message was created logically
before, after, or concurrently to another message, can be determined straightforwardly
based on the sequence numbers in the message and its dependencies.
State descriptors
sdesc is the set of state descriptors, one for each of the existing collaborators. A state de-
scriptor is an 8-tuple (src, ctr , hash, deps , acc,mh, sig ,wit), where the first seven elements
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are taken from the most recent message sent by src:
sdesc =
{
(src, ctr , h(m), deps , acc,mh, sig ,wit) | (5.23)
m ∈ msgsA ∧
m = (src, ctr , op, deps , r , acc,mh, sig) ∧
wit = witness(S(msgsIn(deps) ∪ {m}), r) ∧
@ c′. ctr < c′ ∧ (src, c′, , , , , , ) ∈ msgsA
}
The last element, wit , is a witness that cryptographically proves the relationship between
acc (the accumulator from src) and SA (the current set of atoms):
witness(Ssrc, r) = x
P (Ssrc−SA)·r
src mod Nsrc (5.24)
Using (5.20), let Ssrc = S(msgsIn(deps) ∪ {m}) be the set of atoms in the document
at the time when m, the most recent message from src, was sent. Ssrc may reflect the
state of the document at some point arbitrarily far in the past, depending on the time
when src was last active. If A knows the full message history, Ssrc is known to A. We
will consider the case where A has only seen a partial history in Section 5.4.3. The newly
invited collaborator, however, does not know Ssrc for any src 6= A, since the snapshot
contains only SA, the current set of atoms on device A.
In the intervening time between state Ssrc and the current state SA, atoms may have
been added or removed. The set Ssrc −SA in the exponent of (5.24) contains exactly those
atoms that have been removed.
When device B receives a snapshot from device A, it performs the following steps to
verify SA and sdesc:
1. For each atom (pos , src, ctr , txt) ∈ SA, verify that:
(a) The pair (src, ctr) is unique:
∀p, t. (p, src, ctr , t) ∈ SA =⇒ p = pos ∧ t = txt . (5.25)
(b) The atom’s ctr is contained in the state descriptor for device src:
∃ c′. (src, c′, , , , , , ) ∈ sdesc ∧ ctr ≤ c′. (5.26)
(c) The atom’s ctr is contained in deps in A’s own state descriptor:
∀deps . (A, , , deps , , , ) ∈ sdesc =⇒
∃ c′. (src, c′, ) ∈ deps ∧ ctr ≤ c′. (5.27)
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2. For each state descriptor, i.e. for each (src, ctr , hash, deps , acc,mh, sig ,wit) ∈ sdesc:
(a) Verify that sig is a valid signature of docID ‖ src ‖ ctr ‖ hash ‖ deps ‖ acc ‖mh,
checked with src’s public key.
(b) Find the subset of atoms in SA that already existed in Ssrc. Although the set
Ssrc is not known to the newly invited device B, the intersection Ssrc ∩ SA can
be computed from src’s state descriptor:
Ssrc ∩ SA =
{
(p, s, c, t) ∈ SA | (5.28)
(s = src ∧ c ≤ ctr) ∨
(s 6= src ∧ ∃ c′. (s, c′, ) ∈ deps ∧ c ≤ c′)}
We can then use wit to verify that the computed set Ssrc ∩SA is indeed a subset
of Ssrc:
witP (Ssrc ∩ SA) ?= acc mod Nsrc. (5.29)
If the snapshot is correct, the exponent from (5.24), P (Ssrc−SA)·r , is multiplied
with the exponent P (Ssrc ∩ SA) from (5.29), yielding P (Ssrc) · r as in the
accumulator definition (5.11).
(c) Check that ctr is the most recent sequence number seen from src:
∀d. ( , , , d, , , ) ∈ sdesc =⇒ (5.30)
∀c. (src, c, ) ∈ d =⇒ c ≤ ctr .
(d) Ensure that there is a state descriptor for every device in deps :
∀s. (s, , ) ∈ deps =⇒ (s, , , , , , ) ∈ sdesc. (5.31)
If any of the above checks fail, the snapshot must be rejected.
Computing witnesses incrementally
The above discussion, especially (5.23) and (5.24), assumes that the device A that sends
the snapshot has access to the full message history since the creation of the document.
In general, this may not be the case, since A might itself be a device that was invited by
snapshot.
However, the approach above easily generalises to the case where A starts from a
snapshot. In particular, the witness computation in (5.24) can be performed incrementally
without knowledge of Ssrc. Notice that the exponent P (Ssrc − SA) contains those atoms
that existed in Ssrc but have been removed in SA. Thus, device A can start with the witness
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wit = x
P (Ssrc−SA)r
src mod Nsrc for src, which is included in the snapshot. Subsequently,
whenever an atom a is removed from SA, and a ∈ Ssrc ∩ SA, the witness needs to be
updated by computing wit ′ = witprime(a) mod Nsrc. Adding an atom to SA, or removing
an atom that is not in Ssrc ∩ SA, leaves the witness unchanged. When A receives a new
message from src, it needs to recompute the witness from scratch. For this, A needs to
determine all atoms that have been deleted since that message and perform a modular
exponentiation for each atom. However, we expect that in most cases in practice if src
is online, the latest message will correspond to a state equal or close to the most recent
state at A, in which case that set is empty or small.
When A needs to construct a snapshot to invite a new device, they can then use the
latest witness for each src. Witness computation may be delayed until the time a snapshot
is generated, however it may be desirable to update the witnesses incrementally with every
message received or periodically, in order to allow snapshots to be created quickly.
Merkle tree consistency proofs
The third element of the snapshot, mproofs , serves as a cryptographic proof that there has
not been a fork in the editing history of the document. A fork occurs if a device presents
different and contradictory edits with the same sequence number to its collaborators.
In the basic protocol of Section 5.3, the message hashes in deps serve the purpose of
detecting forks. In the privacy-enhanced protocol of Section 5.4, the full message history
is not available to a newly invited collaborator, so we instead use Merkle trees to prove
that there is no fork among the state descriptors in sdesc.
As described in Section 5.4.1, each device keeps track of the sequence of messages
it has received from each collaborating device – an append-only log per source device.
Following the approach of Certificate Transparency [CW09, LLK13], we encode that log in
a Merkle tree. If no fork has occurred, each device will see the same sequence of messages
from each source device. However, since devices may be oﬄine, some devices may have an
incomplete view of other devices’ message logs. In those cases, we expect the message log
on one device to be a prefix of the corresponding logs on other devices.
We use Merkle consistency proofs to show that the per-source message sequence on
one device is a prefix of the corresponding message sequence on another device, without
revealing the actual messages. For each originating device src, mproofs contains a set of
Merkle consistency proofs as follows. Let Tsrc[c] be the Merkle tree containing the first c
messages from src. Let cd be the sequence number of the last message from src seen by d
at the time of the message corresponding to d’s state descriptor. Then Tsrc[cd] contains
exactly the messages from src received at device d at that time.
Now consider the Merkle trees Tsrc[cd] for all devices d, sorted in increasing order by
cd, and omitting duplicate cd. For each adjacent pair of Merkle trees in this set, mproofs
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contains a consistency proof showing that the larger tree is the same as the smaller one
with some additional leaves appended. By transitivity, those proofs show the consistency
of all trees for each originating device.
To check the consistency proofs, we proceed as follows. From each state descriptor,
extract the sequence number of the last received message from each device src. Group the
sequence numbers by originating device src and sort them in increasing order, omitting
duplicates. Now, for each two adjacent sequence numbers c1, c2 in this list, check that
mproofs contains a valid consistency proof between Merkle trees Tsrc[c1] and Tsrc[c2], i.e. a
proof that Tsrc[c1] is a prefix of Tsrc[c2]. The Merkle tree roots do not need to be included
with the proofs if they can be computed from a matching consistency proof. Compute the
Merkle tree roots of the trees Tsrc[c] for each counter c, and using those, verify the hash
over the Merkle tree roots mh within each state descriptor.
Lastly, mnodes contains a partial Merkle tree for each device, containing all nodes of
the latest tree Tsrc that are required for the newly invited collaborator to construct its
own Merkle trees. These partial trees need to contain enough information that the new
collaborator can extend the tree by appending leaves, for which it is sufficient to include
the root of every maximal complete subtree.
5.5 Related work
As discussed in Section 2.1, traditional collaborative editing applications rely on OT
algorithms [NCDL95, EG89] to synchronize changes between devices. More recently,
(operation-based) CRDTs [SPBZ11b, SPBZ11a] have been proposed to ensure convergence
without requiring consensus between devices, providing strong eventual consistency. At
the time of writing, there are a number of projects actively working on collaborative
editors or libraries based on CRDTs that allow devices to communicate peer-to-peer (using
WebRTC), including Teletype for Atom, Conclave, and Automerge. A number of authors
have also proposed server-based collaborative editing systems that provide end-to-end
encryption such as SPORC [FZFF10], SECRET [FMMS17], or Capsule [Kob18]. However,
to the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first one that provides authenticated
snapshots and allows devices to verify that their view is consistent with other devices,
even when other devices are oﬄine.
Version control systems (Section 2.1.3) such as Git, Mercurial, or Subversion are
another popular kind of tool for collaboration. They are not designed for real-time editing
and require manual merging if a possible conflict is detected. Authenticated snapshots
could also be implemented for version control systems; however we are not aware of any
existing system that supports them.
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Cryptographic accumulator schemes (Section 2.3) have been proposed based on
RSA [BP97, BD93], bilinear maps [Ngu05, CKS09], Merkle trees [CHKO12], and vector
commitments [CF13]. Variants of our protocol could also be designed based on other
accumulator schemes. However, we found RSA accumulators especially suitable because
they provide constant size public keys, witnesses, and batch membership proofs.
In a three-party authenticated data structure (ADS) [Tam03], a source replicates
some data to one or more servers, and the servers answer queries on the data from clients,
including a proof that allows clients to verify the authenticity of the response using a
digest provided by the source (e.g. a hash). Our proposed scheme can be seen as an ADS
for CRDTs, where the collaborators are sources, the inviter is the server, and a newly
invited device is the client.
A redactable signature scheme (Section 2.4) allows a third party without knowledge
of the secret signing key to remove parts of a signed message while still retaining a valid
signature. Our protocol essentially uses redactable signatures – the signature within a
message signs the current set of atoms, and the state descriptors within a snapshots contain
a signature of a possibly redacted state of that set.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a protocol for peer-to-peer collaborative editing that allows
new devices to be added as collaborators by sending a snapshot that only contains the
latest state of a document. Such a snapshot reduces the amount of data that needs to be
transferred to a new device and additionally hides the editing history of the document,
while still allowing the new device to verify its integrity. This is achieved without requiring
a consensus between collaborating devices and is therefore also suitable for devices that
are frequently oﬄine.
Future research might look at protocols that preserve information about the positions
where text fragments have been deleted, or alternatively, completely hide this information.
Another interesting research direction is developing CRDTs specifically designed for
authenticated snapshots and history privacy, with a reduced overhead. It would also be
interesting to design a protocol that does not only hide deleted parts from a new user, but
also hides the author of a piece of text, either from new users or from all collaborators.
In the next chapter, we will evaluate the performance of the protocol in terms of its
overhead and to what extent it meets the design goals stated in Section 5.2.1.
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CHAPTER 6
Authenticated snapshots protocol
evaluation
In Chapter 5, we described a protocol for collaborative editing with authenticated snapshots.
In this chapter, we evaluate the costs of the protocol, and how well it reaches the design
goals described in Section 5.2.1.
Section 6.1 provides an empirical evaluation of the computational and communication
costs, the memory and storage requirements, and an analysis of the scalability of the
protocol. Section 6.2 explains how edit integrity and attributability are achieved, and
Section 6.3 discusses edit history privacy. Section 6.4 shows how the protocol achieves the
desired consistency properties by providing a proof of how consistency between honest
devices is preserved even in the presence of arbitrarily misbehaving devices. Section 6.5
considers convergence and availability.
6.1 Costs and scalability
Significant costs arise for the creation and processing of messages, for inviting a new
collaborator, and for joining as a collaborator. We consider the computational costs of
these actions, the communication costs for different types of messages, and the memory
and storage requirements.
We implemented a prototype of the privacy-enhanced protocol in Java based on the
Treedoc CRDT with unique disambiguators [PMSL09], without optimizations. The instru-
mented prototype simulates all devices within a single thread of execution and measures
execution times of relevant operations as well as the volume of network communication.
We use a 2048-bit RSA modulus, and SHA-256 as the secure hash function.
81
To evaluate the costs of the scheme based on realistic data, we replayed edits from
Wikipedia editing histories. We randomly1 selected 300 pages from the English Wikipedia
on 16 May 2018. We excluded seven pages with only a single edit, and to ensure a
reasonable emulation time, we excluded 23 pages which had either more than 250 edits, or
more than 25,000 characters in the latest version; our results in this section demonstrate
clear trends which will not significantly change for larger edit histories or pages.
For the sake of estimating the communication costs, we assumed that deviceIDs are
128-bit random numbers (to achieve uniqueness with high probability in a decentralized
setting). For simplicity, we assume that all devices are always online, devices do not batch
multiple operations together into a single message, and that devices only send messages
when they edit the document. When replaying the editing history, we assumed that a
Wikipedia user or IP address corresponds to a device, and that new collaborators get
invited by and receive a snapshot of the document from the last person who edited the
document before them. We assume each line is represented as an atom, as commonly
done in the evaluation of CRDT algorithms [WUM09, WUM10, NMMD13] (the original
Treedoc paper used paragraph-level granularity [PMSL09]).
We did not consider the time taken for encrypting or decrypting messages, since the
choice of the encryption scheme is independent of our protocol, and modern encryption
algorithms are fast compared to the RSA accumulator operations. For signing, we used
ECDSA and the NIST P-256 curve.
We measured execution times on a 2013 desktop-class 3.20GHz i5-4570 CPU with
32 GiB RAM running Oracle JRE 1.8.0 172 with a heap size of 8 GiB. We chose a 8 GiB
heap size to reduce the number of garbage collection cycles and their impact on the
measurements, and because we simulated all devices within a single process. The heap
size of 8 GiB was enough to comfortably simulate up to 141 devices, therefore a single
device can run the protocol with substantially less memory.
The source code used for the experiments is available [Kol19]. The Appendix contains
the list of randomly selected Wikipedia pages used.
Prime representative generation Since RSA accumulators require a hash function
that produces primes for collision-freeness, we implement the prime representative generator
based on a method by Baric´ and Pfitzmann [BP97] as described in Section 2.3.1: For an
input x, we compute hˆ(x) = SHA-256(x), and find the smallest t-bit number d such that
appending d to hˆ(x) results in a prime number. In other words, we keep incrementing d
until 2thˆ(x)+d is prime. We test numbers for primality using the Miller-Rabin probabilistic
primality test [Rab80] with 50 iterations. We chose t = 16, since assuming Firoozbakht’s
1We used https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Random. For the curious, the selection process
is not uniform. Each Wikipedia page is assigned a “random index” from the interval [0, 1), and to select a
page, another random number is drawn from [0, 1) and the page with the next higher index is returned.
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conjecture [Rib04, p. 185] (which implies that the gap between primes pk and pk+1 is less
than ln2 pk − ln pk for all k > 4 [Sin10]), this should always allow a suitable d to be found.
Discussion of simplifying assumptions In a practical implementation, devices may
want to batch edits, and periodically broadcast noop messages to other clients to confirm
the latest seen document state. Devices may also be oﬄine temporarily or permanently,
delaying message delivery and processing until such devices comes back online again, but
this merely defers when costs are incurred.
Periodically broadcasting noop messages would cause additional network traffic and
devices would need to process additional messages. The dominant cost for processing noop
messages is the verification of the accumulator of the sending device (see Section 6.1.1.1).
This cost grows linearly with the number of atoms added and deleted since the last message
from the device. Therefore, processing noop messages would reduce the computational cost
for the accumulator verification for individual operations, however it is likely to increase
the cumulative cost if a large number of atoms are added, and the same ones deleted,
between edit operations from a device. Some additional costs may also be caused by
devices that regularly send noop messages, but do not make any (more) edits. On the
other hand, for devices that regularly send noop messages, other devices can skip the
iterative witness computation, as the witness is simply the accumulator base if a device is
up-to-date. Since we do not have reliable data on the network status of devices editing
Wikipedia, we defer evaluation of these trade-offs to future work.
6.1.1 Computation costs
The following describes the computational costs of processing individual operations. We
use c for the current number of collaborating devices, n for the current number of atoms
in the document, and m for the total number of distinct messages broadcast since the
document was created.
6.1.1.1 Basic editing operations
Processing any message requires checking the correctness of the hashes and the accumulator.
Of those, verifying the accumulator tends to be the most costly, as it requires a modular
exponentiation for every atom added or deleted since the last message from the source
device.
Insert operation In addition to the above, the dominant costs for inserting an atom are
calculating a prime representative, and updating the device’s accumulator, which requires
one modular exponentiation. Figure 6.1 shows the processing times we measured for insert
operations. The time does not grow with the number of devices, the median processing
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Figure 6.1: Measured processing times for an insert operation from another device. The time is
relatively constant in most cases, but can vary significantly for individual messages depending on
the number of changes that have happened since the last message from the same device because
verifying the updated accumulator takes time linear in the number of changes. The plot does not
show data for more than 80 collaborators due to lack of representative data; only 6 out of 270
pages had more than 80 collaborators in total. Overall, the median processing time is 5.6 ms,
and the 99th percentile is 11.0 ms.
time for a message containing an insert operation from another device was 5.6 ms, and
99% were processed within 11.0 ms. We observed outliers of up to 1.0 seconds, which
were caused by the cost for verification of the accumulator when a relatively large number
of changes have happened since the last message from the device that created the insert
operation. Note that these numbers are only for insert operations created on a different
device. Processing locally generated operations is faster, since they do not require the
source device’s accumulator to be verified.
Delete operation For a delete operation, the additional costs are dominated by the cost
of updating the device’s accumulator, which requires a modular k-th root computation,
and by the cost for the iterative witness computation. Figure 6.2 shows the time it took to
process delete operations from other devices, with iterative witness computation enabled
after every operation. Overall, the median cost for processing a delete operation was
12.4 ms, and 99% were processed within 64.9 ms. Outliers take up to 1.19 seconds and
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Figure 6.2: Measured processing times for a delete operation from another device. The worst
case execution time generally grows with the number of devices, as with every delete operation,
we incrementally update the witnesses for all other devices, unless the deleted atom has been
inserted after the last message from a device. Therefore, costs vary depending on the editing
behaviour of users, and how often they communicate. Roughly speaking, deleting older parts of
a document is more expensive, and more frequent synchronisation between devices also makes
deletions more expensive. We omit data for more than 80 devices where we have limited data.
Overall, the median processing time is 12.4 ms, and the 99th percentile is 64.9 ms.
were due to the accumulator verification. As for the insert operation above, these numbers
do not consider delete operations that were created on the same device, which are faster
to process.
6.1.1.2 Adding a new collaborator
Adding a new collaborator requires four steps:
1. Generating a snapshot on the inviting device,
2. verifying the snapshot and the new device,
3. initialising the local state on the new device, and
4. verifying the first message from every other device on the new device, and vice versa.
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Snapshot generation Creating a snapshot requires O(n+ c) (simple) operations, com-
puting O(c2) Merkle consistency proofs, plus computing a witness per device. Computing
the consistency proofs is fast for a moderate number of devices. Computing the witness
for a device requires a modular exponentiation for every atom that has been deleted since
the last accumulator seen from that device (but was already present then). However, we
iteratively compute witnesses with every message to minimize snapshot generation time,
as described in Section 5.4.3. Therefore, the time taken to generate a snapshot is negligible
compared to other costs such as its verification.
Snapshot verification Verifying the Merkle consistency proofs can take Θ(c2 logm)
time, where m is the total number of distinct messages broadcast since the document
was created. However, in practice, the cost for verifying a snapshot is dominated by the
costs for verifying that the set of atoms matches the accumulators, unless the number
of collaborators becomes large compared to the number of atoms in the document, and
many of them have sent their last message at different points in the history. For each
device, this requires one modular exponentiation per atom that is present both in the
latest document and in the accumulator from the device. Thus, for moderately large
groups of collaborators, the worst case cost is O(c · n). The actual cost for a device is
significantly smaller if a large number of atoms have been added since the last message
the device. Figure 6.3 shows how long each snapshot verification took in our experiments,
and its relationship to the product of the number of atoms and devices.
Initialisation from snapshot After a snapshot is verified, the remaining cost for initial-
ising a new device is dominated by the cost for calculating the device’s current accumulator
value based on the current set of atoms. The cost is n− 1 modular multiplications and a
single modular exponentiation.
Verifying first message from device When a device receives the first message from
another device, it needs to compute the current set of atoms at that device based on
the counters within the message and the operation history, and based on that verify
the accumulator value by re-computing it. This requires O(n) modular exponentiations.
We empirically verified this linear relationship; we observed a verification time of about
0.65 milliseconds per atom. Figure 6.4 shows the execution times of the verification for
our experiments with the Wikipedia pages; it demonstrates the linear dependency of
the execution time on the number of atoms present in the document at the time of the
message.
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Figure 6.3: Measured snapshot verification times. Verification time is at most linear in the
product of the number of devices and atoms, however it can be significantly lower if many atoms
have been added since the last message from collaborating devices.
6.1.2 Communication costs
Table 6.2 compares the amount of data transferred for different message types for the basic
and the privacy-enhanced protocols. The privacy-enhanced protocol requires additional
data for individual messages (for the nonce and accumulator value), but snapshot sizes
are smaller if the number of users is small compared to the number of atoms, since deleted
atoms do not need to be transferred. Using the Wikipedia data, we looked at the amount
of data that would need to be transferred to invite the user that has most recently made
her first contribution. Figure 6.5 shows a comparison of the amount of data transferred in
the basic scheme and the privacy-enhanced scheme. We observed a median 84% reduction
in data transferred for the privacy-enhanced scheme compared to the basic scheme. The
reduction was always more than 30%, and 98.2% in the best case.
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Figure 6.4: Measured execution times for verifying the first message from a device, dependent
on the number of atoms within the document at the time of the message. The time depends
largely (linearly) on the number of atoms because verification requires all atoms to be added to
an RSA accumulator.
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Empirical values
Variable Description Typical value min median max
d Number of collaborating devices variable 2 16 141
sdevID Size of device identifier 16 B
shash Size of hash 32 B
ssig Size of signature 72 B
snonce Size of nonce 16 B
sRSA Size of accumulator 256 B
spos Size of position identifier variable 1 B 3 B 117 B
scontent Size of atom text fragment variable 1 B 34 B 5.0 KiB
spubkey Size of public key (accumulator + signing) 256+32 B
shistory Size of message history (excl. signatures) variable 4.9 KiB 123 KiB 7.2 MiB
sdoc Size of document including metadata variable 699 B 4.8 KiB 77 KiB
Table 6.1: Description of different variables used in Table 6.2, and typical values. For the ones where typical values are highly variable, minimum,
median, and maximum values from our simulations with Wikipedia edit histories are included.
Basic protocol Privacy-enhanced protocol
Message sdevID + d(sdevID + shash) + ssig+ Op Basic + snonce + sRSA + shash
Op insert Message + spos + scontent Basic
Op delete Message + sdevID Basic
Op noop Message Basic
Op addDevice Message + sdevID Basic + spubkey
Snapshot shistory + d · ssig sdoc + d · (sdevID + shash + 2sRSA +O(d · log shistory) + ssig)
Table 6.2: Communication costs for different types of messages and operations. Small constants are omitted. Note that in the basic protocol, for
a snapshot it is sufficient to include the most recent signature from each device.
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6.1.3 Storage and memory requirements
A device needs to keep the atoms currently in the document in memory. In addition,
it must store, for each collaborator, the most recent message, the current witness, and
additional metadata. The device needs to store the message history to be able to relay
messages to other devices, and to calculate earlier states of the document which can be
needed to verify an accumulator or to calculate a witness. The memory requirements for
storing current atoms in a document corresponds to the y-axis in Figure 6.5, and the past
history corresponds to the x-axis. Therefore, the overall memory and storage requirements
are typically less than 10 MiB. A device may also keep an in-memory or disk cache of the
prime representatives of all atoms (34 bytes per atom in our prototype) as computing those
is costly. If memory/storage is scarce and the prime representative generator described
in Section 2.3.1 is used, it can also memorize only the last 2 bytes, and recompute the
remaining ones when needed.
6.2 Edit integrity and attributability
Cryptographic signatures attached to each message ensure that only group members
can modify the document. For the basic protocol of Section 5.3, the signatures also
provide attributability of all modifications. When using the privacy-enhanced protocol of
Section 5.4, a device can similarly use the signatures to attribute any changes made to
the document after it joined. Parts of the document that were added earlier – before or
concurrently to when a device joined – cannot be attributed directly using the signatures of
the messages containing the insert operations, since the new collaborator does not receive
those messages. However, attributability in this case is ensured by the signed accumulators
from each collaborator that are part of each snapshot, since the set of atoms certified by
each device in this way must also contain all atoms inserted by the device itself.
6.3 Edit history privacy
In the privacy-enhanced protocol, a new device, when joining, only receives the current
set of atoms, the set of devices collaborating, several sequence numbers and cryptographic
hashes, and a set of RSA accumulators. Assuming preimage resistance of the hash function
and due to including a 128-bit random nonce into every message, it is infeasible to infer
anything about previous contents from the hashes. RSA accumulator and witness values
each contain an accumulated 128-bit random nonce; since the new device never learns this
nonce, the accumulators are cfw-indistinguishable [DHS15], making it infeasible to infer
contents from the accumulator values. For efficiency reasons, we use the same nonces to
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Figure 6.5: Amount of data transferred to a new collaborator when invited by another device,
for the most recently added collaborator in each of the pages from the Wikipedia dataset for
the privacy-enhanced protocol in comparison to the basic protocol. The plot is log-log scale. A
point below the black diagonal line indicates that the privacy-enhanced protocol transfers less
data than the basic protocol. The privacy-enhanced scheme needs to transfer less data because
it does not transfer deleted atoms.
calculate message hashes and accumulators to improve efficiency; we believe this does not
introduce any weaknesses.
While the scheme hides the contents of all text deleted before a device joins, it does
not perfectly hide the editing history. Since a snapshot also includes metadata such as
position identifiers and sequence numbers, a new device can infer some information about
the history, such as the number of messages sent by each device. Moreover, gaps between
position identifiers can leak the fact that atoms have been deleted at a certain position
(but not the values of those atoms).
6.4 Consistency and snapshot consistency
We show that our protocol satisfies a variant of fork-join-causal consistency, as introduced
by Mahajan et al. [MAD11, MSL+11]. Stated informally, this consistency model requires
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that honest2 devices always observe the system in a state that is consistent with a global
execution graph, and that this execution graph correctly reflects the dependencies and
operations performed by devices.
To prove that our protocol satisfies this consistency model, we first show how to
construct the happens-before graph G (representing the global execution). For each honest
device n we also define a graph Gn representing n’s view of the execution. We then prove
that G and Gn are consistent with each other: that is, reading the document at a vertex
of Gn returns the same result as reading it at the corresponding vertex of G.
Definition 6.1. Let G be a directed acyclic graph. We then define the partial order ≺G
to be equal to the transitive closure of the graph. That is, for vertices a and b in G, we
have a ≺G b if there is an edge a→ b in G, or if there exists a vertex c such that a ≺G c
and c ≺G b. Similarly, the partial order ≺Gn is defined as the transitive closure of the
graph Gn.
Definition 6.2. An operation message is a message containing an operation (insert, delete,
noop, or addDevice, but not a snapshot) sent as part of the protocol.
Definition 6.3. For any vertex m in the graph G we define read(G,m) to be the set
of atoms in the document at the time immediately after m has been processed, i.e. the
set of atoms a such that there exists a vertex mI,a containing an insert operation for a,
with mI,a G m, and there exists no vertex mD,a containing a delete operation for a with
mD,a G m:
read(G,m) = S({m′ | m′ G m}) (6.1)
where the function S(. . . ) is defined in (5.10).
We can now formally define the fork-join-causal consistency model as follows.
Definition 6.4. An execution is fork-join-causally consistent if there exists a directed
acyclic graph G (the happens-before graph) that satisfies the following three properties:
FJC0. G contains a vertex for every operation message sent by an honest device, and also
a vertex for every operation message that is sent by a faulty device and processed by
at least one honest device.
FJC1. The operations of an honest device are totally ordered in G. This total ordering
must be consistent with the actual execution order of the operations at that device.
Specifically, if v and v′ are operations by n, then v .startTime < v ′.startTime ⇐⇒
v ≺G v′.
2We use the word “honest” to refer to devices that correctly follow the protocol (in the distributed
systems literature, the term “correct” is more common). A device that does not correctly follow the
protocol, regardless whether by accident or by malice, is called “faulty”.
92
FJC2. For each honest device n there exists a directed acyclic graph Gn in which there is
a vertex for every operation message sent or received by n, and edges corresponding
to the dependencies between those messages. By FJC0, for each vertex m in Gn
there is a corresponding vertex m in G. We then require that for each vertex m
in Gn, the document state is the same as the document state at the corresponding
vertex in G: read(Gn,m) = read(G,m).
Basic protocol For the basic protocol described in Section 5.3, G can simply be defined
as follows: G contains a vertex for each message m sent or observed by an honest device,
and a directed edge a→ b between vertices a and b if a is one of the dependencies of b.
Figure 6.6a shows an example of a happens-before graph for an execution where device
A inserts the atom ‘a’, followed by devices B and C concurrently adding atoms ‘b’ and ‘c’,
respectively. Device A then performs noop operations in order to acknowledge the receipt
of the edits from B and C. Figure 6.6b shows device C’s view of the execution. For clarity,
we omit addDevice operations.
noop
“ab”
A
B
C
ins(‘a’)
“a”
ins(‘b’)
“ab”
ins(‘c’)
“ac”
noop
“abc”
(a) Happens-before graph of execution (G)
A
B
C
ins(‘a’)
“a”
ins(‘c’)
“ac”
(b) Happens-before graph of C’s view of the execution (GC)
Figure 6.6: Happens-before graphs for an execution with three devices where devices B and C
perform concurrent inserts.
This definition of G trivially satisfies property FJC0. Moreover, from the protocol
definition it is relatively easy to see that property FJC1 is also satisfied. Every honest
device increments its sequence number with every message it sends, and an honest device
would not process a message from a device a that depends on a message from a with a
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higher or equal sequence number. Hence, the messages sent by an honest device are totally
ordered in G.
For the basic protocol, it is also easy to see that property FJC2 is fulfilled. If a device
n processes a message m, it needs to have processed all messages that happened before m
in Gn. The use of cryptographic hashes within the message dependencies ensures that the
set of messages preceding m in Gn is the same as the set of messages preceding m in G.
Privacy-enhanced protocol In the privacy-enhanced protocol of Section 5.4, the above
argument no longer works, since it relies on devices having received all messages that
happened before a message m before processing m, which is not necessarily the case:
devices do not receive messages that happened before they were added as a collaborator.
We illustrate the challenge by giving an example before proceeding to the formalisation.
Consider the execution visualised in Figure 6.7.
ins(‘b’)
noop
ins(‘a’)
“a”
A
B
C
del(‘a’) addDev(C) Snapshot
“ab” “b” “b” “b”
“b”
Figure 6.7: Happens-before graph of an execution where device B adds device C by sending it
a snapshot of the current state.
Suppose that honest device A fails permanently after sending the insert operation for
‘a’, and therefore it never receives the later operations. Further assume that device B is
faulty. Thus, there is no honest device that has observed the insert operation for ‘b’ or
the delete operation for ‘a’. Therefore it is not immediately clear how FJC2 can still be
preserved for the noop operation by C (and any later operations).
One option would be to add a vertex containing an insert operation for each atom that
C receives as part of the snapshot. However, this would allow too many executions. We
only want to allow executions where snapshots are consistent with earlier messages seen
by honest devices.
Since the messages containing the insertion of ‘b’ and the deletion of ‘c’ have not been
observed by any honest device, it is not relevant for G whether they actually happened. It
is only important whether it is possible to add a set of edit operations by faulty devices
directly before the message adding a new device (or sending an updated snapshot) such
that FJC1 and FJC2 are preserved. Thus we adapt the definition of G to allow the addition
of vertices containing insert and delete operations by faulty devices between the vertices
corresponding to messages observed by honest devices, and the vertex corresponding to
the addDevice message for a new device, or a message containing an updated snapshot.
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For each honest device n, Definition 6.5 describes the graph Gn that represents n’s
view of the execution. In summary, it contains insert operations for all atoms received
by n in its initial snapshot, all messages processed by n, and edges for the dependencies
between them. A device may receive more than one snapshot if another device performed
operations concurrently to the first snapshot (as described in Section 5.4.3); if this is the
case, n also contains insert and/or delete operations for atoms that were added/removed
in subsequent snapshots.
Definition 6.5. For the privacy-enhanced protocol, we define Gn such that it contains:
1. A vertex for each operation message sent or processed by n.
2. An edge a→ b between two messages processed by n if a is a dependency of b.
3. For each snapshot processed by n, a vertex ri (i = 1, ..., k). If n has sent any messages
after the snapshot, add an edge ri → ti to the vertex ti corresponding to the first
such message.
4. If n joined as a collaborator from a snapshot, for each atom a that was part of this
first snapshot, a vertex ua with an operation insert(a),
5. For each subsequent snapshot received by n, a vertex ua with an operation insert(a)
for each atom present in the snapshot if there is no previous vertex with an insert oper-
ation for a in Gn. In this context, previous means preceding a vertex ti corresponding
to a vertex corresponding to n’s first message after the snapshot.
6. Similarly for each subsequent snapshot received by n, a vertex wa containing an
operation delete(a) for any atom a with an insert operation, but no delete operation,
previously present in Gn that is not present in the snapshot.
7. For each such vertex ua or wa, an edge to the vertex ri corresponding to the snapshot.
Proof overview We construct a suitable happens-before graph G for an arbitrary
execution, showing that G is a directed acyclic graph (Lemma 6.4.1), and hence that
FJC0 and FJC1 are satisfied. Next, we show that deleted atoms cannot be re-added
(Corollary 6.4.2.1), a property that is useful for Lemma 6.4.3, which shows that FJC2 holds
for every message m, as long as it holds for every preceding snapshot. Finally, Lemma 6.4.4
shows that it holds for every snapshot, from which Corollary 6.4.4.1 deduces that FJC2
holds for G. We therefore conclude that the privacy-enhanced protocol is fork-join-causally
consistent.
Definition 6.6. For a message m = (src, ctr , op, deps , r , acc,mh, sig), let v(m) be its
version vector, containing the set of pairs (srcv, ctr v) with the counter from the latest
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message from each device included in m, i.e. ctr v = ctr for srcv = src, and otherwise ctr v
is the counter of the entry for srcv in deps. The version vector of a snapshot is defined
equivalently using the state descriptor of the creator of the snapshot.
Definition 6.7. We construct the happens-before graph G for an execution as follows.
1. Add a vertex for each operation message sent or processed by at least one honest
device.
2. Add a directed edge a→ b if a is a dependency of b and at least one honest device
has sent or processed both a and b.
3. For each snapshot received by an honest device n, add a vertex r that represents the
read of the snapshot by n. If n has sent any messages after the snapshot, add an
edge r → t to the vertex t corresponding to the first such message.
4. For each snapshot received by an honest device n that was created by an honest
device n′, add an edge ms → r, where ms is the message by n′ defining the document
state contained in the snapshot.
5. For each snapshot s received by an honest device n that was created by a faulty
device, we add insert and delete operations by faulty devices as required to make the
graph consistent as follows.
Let src be the deviceID of the device that created the snapshot s = (As, sdesc, , ).
Let (src, , , deps , , , , ) ∈ sdesc be the state descriptor for src in s.
For every honest device n′ let (n′, ctrn′ , ) ∈ deps be the snapshot’s dependency
on n′, and deps,n′ be the vertex in Gn′ corresponding to the message from n
′ with
sequence number ctrn′ .
For each device n′ we now find the set of operation messages that n′ has observed by
the time it produced deps,n′ , and define the union of all these messages to be ops(s):
ops(s) =
⋃
n′
{m′ | m′ Gn′ deps,n′} (6.2)
Let S(msgs) be the set of atoms that have been inserted but not deleted within a
set of operation messages msgs , as defined in (5.10).
Let As be the set of atoms received as part of the snapshot.
Mn = {( , srca, , ) ∈ As \ S(ops(s)) | srca is faulty} is defined to be the set of
atoms by faulty devices that are part of the snapshot but have not been seen by any
honest device before the snapshot.
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Now for each such snapshot s, do the following:
(a) For each message deps,n′ from an honest device referred to in deps , add an edge
deps,n′ → r, where r is the snapshot read vertex added in point 3.
(b) For each atom a ∈ Mn , add a vertex ia with an operation insert(a), an edge
deps,n′ → ia for each honest device n′, and an edge ia → r.
(c) For each atom a ∈ S(ops(s)) \ As, add a vertex da with an operation delete(a),
an edge deps,n′ → da for each honest device n′, and an edge da → r.
Lemma 6.4.1. G is a directed acyclic graph.
Proof. First observe that for any edge a → b where a is a dependency of b, a’s version
vector must be smaller than b’s. For a snapshot created by an honest device, point 4 of the
construction of G (Definition 6.7) adds a path between vertex ms and the corresponding
vertex r. For a snapshot created by a faulty device, point 5 adds a number of paths between
vertices for dependencies deps,n′ , and r. Since each r does not have outgoing edges except
to the corresponding t (as defined in point 3), and v(ms) < v(t) and v(deps,n′) < v(t),
the invariant v(a) < v(b) is preserved for all edges a→ b between actual messages, and
additional edges do not add cycles.
Since two consecutive messages mi, mi+1 sent by the same honest device always have
a dependency relation between them, and v(mi) < v(mi+1), from the above proof it also
follows that G is consistent with their real-time ordering. Thus, the FJC1 property holds
for G.
Lemma 6.4.2. Let n be an honest device, let m be a vertex corresponding to a message
in Gn, and let mD,a be a vertex containing a delete operation for an atom a. If mD,a G m,
and n has processed m, then all insert operations for a processed by n precede m in Gn.
Proof. Let (srca, ctra) be the source and counter of a, and let ca be the entry for srca in
the version vector of m. Since the insertion of a must have happened before mD,a and
therefore also before m, ctra < ca. Due to the checks performed on sequence numbers, n
does not accept an insert operation with a ctr less than or equal to the ctr of the latest
message from srca included in n’s state. Thus, if n has already processed m, it will not
accept an insert operation for a that happened either after or concurrent to m.
Corollary 6.4.2.1. If mD,a G m, m ∈ Gn, and a /∈ read(Gn,m), then for any vertex m′
that succeeds m in Gn (m ≺Gn m′), a /∈ read(Gn,m′).
Lemma 6.4.3. Let m be a vertex in G corresponding to a message, and let n be an
honest device such that m ∈ Gn. Assume that for every honest device n˜ and every vertex
rn corresponding to a snapshot received by n˜, read(G, rn˜) = read(Gn˜, rn˜) (note that this
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assumption will be proved in Lemma 6.4.4). Then for every such vertex m we have
read(G,m) = read(Gn,m).
Proof. By well-founded induction on m using the order relation ≺G. That is, for any
vertex m in G we assume the inductive hypothesis:
∀m′. m′ ≺G m =⇒ read(G,m′) = read(Gn,m′) (6.3)
and hence prove read(G,m) = read(Gn,m). We break this down into two subgoals,
read(Gn,m) ⊆ read(G,m) and read(G,m) ⊆ read(Gn,m).
read(Gn,m) ⊆ read(G,m): Let a be an atom in read(Gn,m). We start by showing that
there must be an insert operation for a at or before m in G. Let mI,a be the message
containing the insert operation for a observed by n. If mI,a = m, mI,a G m is trivially
true. Otherwise, there exists at least one edge d → m in Gn such that mI,a Gn d,
and there is no delete operation for a that precedes m in Gn. Thus, a ∈ read(Gn, d).
If d corresponds to an actual message, by the induction hypothesis, a ∈ read(Gn, d) =
read(G, d). Otherwise, d must be a vertex corresponding to a snapshot received by n, and
we can apply the assumption read(G, rn˜) = read(Gn˜, rn˜) to conclude a ∈ read(Gn, d) =
read(G, d). Therefore, there must be an insert operation for a in G at or preceding d,
m′I,a G d ≺G m.
To show that a ∈ read(G,m), it remains to be shown that there is no delete operation
for a at or before m in G. Suppose there was a vertex mD,a ∈ G containing such a delete
operation for a, with mD,a G m. We show that this contradicts a ∈ read(Gn,m). If
mD,a = m, this directly contradicts a ∈ read(Gn,m). Otherwise, at least one vertex d
with a edge d → m must contain or succeed the delete operation in G, mD,a G d. Let
d1, d2, ..., dk be all such vertices. We consider two cases, whether any such di is in Gn, or
not.
Case di ∈ Gn for some i. Let d be any such di. Since mD,a G d, a /∈ read(G, d). We
now show that d → m also exists in Gn and that a /∈ read(Gn, d). If d is an
actual message, d must be a dependency of m, and by definition of Gn, d → m
must be present in Gn. By the induction hypothesis, a /∈ read(G, d) = read(Gn, d).
Otherwise, d must be a vertex corresponding to a snapshot received by n. Since in
this case, d does not exist in any other device’s view, the edge d→ m can only exist in
G if it exists in Gn. Thus, d ≺Gn m. By the assumption read(G, rn˜) = read(Gn˜, rn˜)
we have a /∈ read(G, d) = read(Gn, d).
Since mD,a G d, and we can apply Corollary 6.4.2.1, which implies that a /∈
read(Gn,m).
98
Case di /∈ Gn for all i. Let d be any such di. We consider two cases: whether d corre-
sponds to an actual message, or not.
Consider first the case where d corresponds to an actual message received by an
honest device n′. Since d→ m ∈ G, d must correspond to one of m’s dependencies.
Thus, n must have processed d before processing m, unless m is the first message by
n after a snapshot. Since d /∈ Gn, the latter must be true. Since a /∈ read(G, d), by
the induction hypothesis, a /∈ read(Gn′ , d). Since mD,a G d, by Corollary 6.4.2.1,
in n′’s view, the document does not contain a at message m, i.e. a /∈ read(Gn′ ,m).
Since m was created by an honest device, and both n and n′ have processed it and
compared the accumulator value to its view of the set of atoms, they agree on the
set of atoms at m. Thus, a /∈ read(Gn′ ,m) = read(Gn,m).
Now consider the other case, where d is one of the vertices we added when constructing
G. Since m is an actual message, and there exists a edge d→ m in G, and d /∈ Gn,
d must be a vertex added for a snapshot processed by a different device n′, and
m must be the first message by n′ after that snapshot. Since mD,a G d, by the
construction of G, mD,a must either be included in one of the state descriptors for an
honest device n¯ contained in the snapshot (i.e. mD,a G sn¯, where sn¯ is the message
corresponding to n¯’s state descriptor), or mD,a must be an additional vertex added
to G in our construction (Definition 6.7, point 5(c)). In both cases, a is not part
of the snapshot received by n′, and the insert operation for a must have happened
before the snapshot. Let (srca, ctra) be the source and counter of a, and let ca be
the entry for srca in the version vector associated with the snapshot. Again in both
cases, ctra ≤ ca, and therefore, n′ would not accept an insert operation for a since
its ctr would conflict with the snapshot it has received. Therefore, in n′’s view, the
document does not contain a at message m, i.e. a /∈ read(Gn′ ,m). Since m was
created by an honest device, both n and n′ have processed m, and both devices
behave correctly, m’s accumulator value must match the set of atoms at both devices,
i.e. read(Gn′ ,m) = read(Gn,m). Thus, a /∈ read(Gn,m).
read(G,m) ⊆ read(Gn,m): Let a ∈ read(G,m). Thus, there exists a vertex mI,a with
an insert operation for a such that mI,a G m, and no delete operation before or within
m. If mI,a = m, since a delete operation cannot have happened before the insertion,
a ∈ read(Gn,m). Otherwise, there exists at least one edge d → m such that mI,a G d,
and thus a ∈ read(G, d).
We consider two cases, whether d ∈ Gn, or not.
Case d ∈ Gn. Depending on whether d corresponds to an actual message or to a snapshot,
we can apply the induction hypothesis or the precondition for snapshot vertices
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(read(G, rn˜) = read(Gn˜, rn˜)), to conclude that a ∈ read(Gn, d). Hence, there exists
an insert operation for a in Gn preceding m.
Next we show that there is no delete operation for a before m in Gn. Assume, for
the sake of contradiction that there was a message mD,a ≺Gn m containing a delete
operation for a. We show that this contradicts a ∈ read(G,m).
We first consider the case that there exists a set of vertices m1,m2, ...,mk correspond-
ing to actual messages such that mD,a → m1 → ... → mk → m. By construction
of G, the same set of messages and edges has to exist in G too, contradicting
a ∈ read(G,m).
Otherwise, if no such set of vertices exist, mD,a must be a vertex of the type added
for a snapshot in point 6 of the construction of Gn (Definition 6.5). Let ri be the
vertex corresponding to the snapshot directly after mD,a. The existence of the delete
vertex implies that a is not part of the set of atoms in the snapshot corresponding
to ri, but there is a vertex m˜ corresponding to n’s entry in the dependencies of the
snapshot in Gn, where a was still present: a ∈ read(Gn, m˜). Thus, there is an edge
m˜ ≺G ri in G. Since m has happened after ri, it must have also happened after the
first message mn,i by n after ri, and we get m˜ ≺Gn ri ≺Gn mn,i Gn m. Furthermore,
since mn,i Gn m, there is a path of vertices corresponding to messages by n,
mdev,i → mˆ1 → ...→ mˆl in Gn such that mˆ1 is a dependency of m. Since the vertices
correspond to messages processed by an honest device, the same path has to exist
in G, and we get ri ≺G mn,i G m. By the precondition, a /∈ read(Gn, ri) implies
that a /∈ read(G, ri), and since a ∈ read(Gn, m˜) IH= read(G, m˜) and m˜ ≺G ri ≺G m,
there must be an insert operation for a preceding ri in G. Because m˜ ≺G ri and
a /∈ read(G, ri), there must be a delete operation for a preceding ri in G. Since
ri ≺G m, a /∈ read(G,m), reaching the desired contradiction.
Therefore, there is no delete operation for a before or at m in Gn, and since the edge
d → m is present in Gn by construction, a must still be present at m in n’s view.
Thus, a ∈ read(Gn,m).
Case d /∈ Gn. As before, there are two cases. Either m is the first message by n after a
snapshot (since n must have received all direct dependencies of any other message
before processing it), or m is the first message by another honest device nˆ, and d is
the vertex corresponding to the snapshot received by nˆ.
In the first case, since d ∈ G and d → m ∈ G, there must be at least one honest
device n′ that has processed d and m. By the induction hypothesis, read(Gn, d) =
read(Gn′ , d), and therefore a ∈ read(Gn′ , d). For the same reasons as above, there
cannot be a delete operation for a before or within m in Gn, and therefore a must
still be present at m in n′’s view. Since both n and n′ are honest devices, and n′
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must have verified the accumulator of m, they must have seen the same set of atoms
at m, a ∈ read(Gn′ ,m) = read(Gn,m).
In the latter case, by precondition, a ∈ read(Gnˆ, d), implying that mI,a Gnˆ d.
Again, there cannot be a delete operation for a before or at m in G, and thus a must
still be present in nˆ’s view at m. Therefore, a ∈ read(Gnˆ,m), and since n has agreed
on the accumulator value of m and thus on the set of atoms, a ∈ read(G,m).
Lemma 6.4.4. Let rn be a vertex associated with a snapshot s received by n. Then the
read corresponding to this vertex (which returns the atoms that were part of the snapshot)
fulfils property FJC2 with regard to G, i.e. read(Gn, rn) = read(G, rn).
Proof. By well-founded induction on rn (using the happened-before ordering induced by
G).
If n has created the document, the statement is trivially true. Otherwise, let An =
read(Gn, rn), and A = read(G, rn). Let nˆ be the device creating the snapshot. If nˆ behaves
correctly, this implies that the snapshot corresponds to a message ms created by nˆ. By
induction and Lemma 6.4.3, read(Gnˆ,ms) = read(G,ms), and since the only incoming
edge for rn in both G and Gn is from ms, read(Gn, rn) = read(Gnˆ,ms) = read(G,ms) =
read(G, rn).
If nˆ is faulty, we first show that An ⊆ A. Let a = (src, ctra, , ) ∈ An. Thus, a was
part of the set of atoms presented as part of the snapshot. We define sh to be the message
by honest device h corresponding to the h’s state descriptor. We consider three cases:
src is an honest device. Let (src, ctr src, , , acc,mh, sig ,wit) be the state descriptor
for src presented in the snapshot, let msrc be the corresponding message from src
with sequence number ctr src, and let mI,a be the message containing the insert
operation for a. The snapshot is only accepted by n if ctra < ctr src. Using sig ,
acc, and wit , n has verified that a ∈ read(Gsrc,msrc) IH, Lemma 6.4.3= read(G,msrc), and
mI,a ≺G msrc ≺G m. It remains to be shown that there is no delete operation for a
in G before m.
For each honest device h that was part of the snapshot where sh happened after
mI,a, n has verified using the Merkle consistency proofs that mI,a ≺Gh sh, and it
has verified using h’s witness that a ∈ read(Gh, sh) IH, Lemma 6.4.3= read(G, sh), and
thus there exists no delete operation for a before any sh. Lastly, since a is part of
the snapshot, no delete operation for a is added in point 5 of the construction of G
(Definition 6.7).
src is faulty. We further consider two sub-cases: whether at least on one honest device h
has observed an insert operation for a before ssrc.
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If yes, based on the dependencies in h’s state descriptor, n can infer that the insertion
has happened before sh. Again this means that n has verified using h’s witness that
a ∈ read(Gh,mh). The rest of the argument is as in the previous case.
If not, since a is part of the snapshot, the construction of G, in particular point 5,
ensures that there exists an insert operation for a before rn, and no delete operation.
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Now we show that A ⊆ An. Let a ∈ A. For the sake of contradiction, assume a /∈ An.
We consider two cases:
a ∈ S (ops(s)) (as defined in G’s construction). This implies that in G, an operation
delete(a) was added before rn, contradicting a ∈ A.
a /∈ S (ops(s)). This implies that either no honest device has seen an insert operation for
a before rn, or at least one has seen a delete operation for a. Either way, a /∈ A.
Corollary 6.4.4.1. For a device n and a message m ∈ Gn, n’s view of the document at m is
equal to the state according to G, read(G,m) = read(Gn,m). Thus, the privacy-enhanced
protocol preserves FJC2.
6.5 Convergence and availability
For the basic protocol, convergence and availability directly follow from the properties
of the CRDT and from the use of cryptographic hashes for dependencies. However, a
fork-resolution protocol is required to resolve forks caused by misbehaving devices. Such a
protocol is out of scope of this dissertation.
For the privacy-enhanced protocol, fork-join-causal consistency ensures that the views of
honest group members converge to a consistent state. This again requires a fork-resolution
protocol in case a misbehaving devices causes the views of honest devices to be forked. Any
two participants can generally communicate even if other collaborators are oﬄine; however,
if multiple devices join concurrently, they require the help of an existing collaborator
to reach a state where they can collaborate directly, since neither of them has seen all
required dependencies of the others at the time of joining.
6.6 Discussion
The privacy-preserving variant of our protocol has a significant computational and metadata
overhead. The costs seem reasonable for text editing with line-granularity atoms, especially
since most of the expensive operations can be parallelized and typically can be run in
the background without interrupting the editing process. However, for character-level
granularity or similar, the costs seem prohibitive, in particular if the document is large and
collaborators get added frequently, or when edits are performed at a high frequency. The
protocol may be well suited for other types of collaborative applications such as shared
calendars or to-do lists [KB17a].
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While the protocol has a relatively large overhead, it scales well with the size of the
document. Assuming a bounded number of devices and not considering costs for the CRDT
metadata, communication and computation costs for editing operations are constant or
amortized constant, except when a new collaborator is added, in which case the cost is
(practically) linear in the number of atoms.
However, communication costs also grow with the number of operations due to the
CRDT metadata. We used the Treedoc CRDT without optimizations, which generates
a relatively large communication overhead for CRDT metadata because the tree is not
balanced and every tree node stores a device identifier. To counter this, one can use a
CRDT more optimized for the application, e.g. LSEQ [NMMD13] for text editing, and
introduce device identifier compression. Furthermore, metadata overhead can be reduced
by allowing a list of operations to be sent within a message instead of only a single
operation per message.
To reduce the cost for insert operations and snapshot verification, if the prime represen-
tative is generated as described in Section 2.3.1, the device inserting the atom can include
the last 2 bytes of the prime representative with the atom metadata. Other devices only
need to verify its validity, but do not need to recompute it. Note that in this case it is not
necessary that the smallest d is chosen, as long as the result is a prime and every device
uses the same d.
Some information about the history can still be inferred from the metadata found in
the privacy-enhanced scheme, in particular how many operations have been performed on
each device, and the position identifiers and counters may allow some inferences about
the positions where text fragments were deleted and how much was deleted. On the
other hand, it may be desirable to know at which positions parts of the document have
been deleted, as the device creating a snapshot can omit arbitrary atoms and therefore
potentially completely change the meaning of the content. Metadata does not, in general,
allow someone in possession of only a snapshot to infer positions where atoms have been
deleted.
Lastly, our protocol relies on CRDTs where atoms have totally ordered position
identifiers. More research is needed to add support for other operation-based CRDTs that
do not have this property, like RGA [RJKL11].
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we evaluated the performance of the protocol for authenticated snap-
shots presented in Chapter 5. We further revisited the correctness and security goals
in Section 5.2.1, and showed how they are achieved. The performance evaluation was
done based on editing histories of 270 Wikipedia pages, and showed that while it has a
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significant computational overhead – primarily due to the use of RSA accumulators – its
performance is reasonable if applied to small documents or using a coarse granularity (e.g.
line-based rather than character-based). 99% of insert operations were processed within
11.0 ms, and 99% of delete operations within 64.9 ms. We also measured a median 84%
reduction in the data transferred to a new collaborator by using authenticated snapshots
compared to a basic protocol that transfers the full editing history. Therefore it may be
well suited for applications such as shared calendars and to-do lists, where users tend to
make relatively few edits, and a coarser granularity of edits may be acceptable. Further
research is needed to make the protocol more practical for general real-time editing with
character-level granularity.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
The aim of this work was to provide fundamentals for collaborative applications that are
more decentralised in their architecture, with security, integrity, and privacy properties
that rely less on a central server or authority. The focus was on two aspects: a decen-
tralised and privacy-preserving communication channel between devices; and a protocol
for authenticated snapshots for collaborative applications that hide the edit history from
new collaborators without sacrificing integrity and consistency.
We considered using Tor and its hidden services as a decentralised and privacy-
preserving communication medium between devices. In the Western world, smartphones
are now the most widely used computing devices suitable for the kind of collaborative
applications we considered, but also the most resource-constrained ones. We therefore
evaluated the costs of running a Tor hidden service on a smartphone. We estimated that
maintaining a hidden service would require a median of 198 MiB monthly cellular data
traffic, assuming a typical usage pattern. The majority of this cost was due to regular
downloads of the Tor network status consensus document. We then evaluated a number of
optimisations to reduce cellular data usage. The strategy that was most effective based on
our models – transferring diffs of the network status document instead of the full document
each time – has since been integrated into the Tor code. Based on our estimates, this
should roughly half the overall cellular data traffic to around a hundred MiB per month.
With regards to battery usage, we estimated the network activity would cost at least 9.6%
of battery capacity on a Nexus One connected to the Internet via 3G with a daily charge
cycle.
With growing data allowances, the amount of cellular data traffic is becoming less of a
concern, but it currently remains significant and will likely be an obstacle for wide adoption
on smartphones in the near future. A wide adoption would be particularly desirable, since
it would increase the size of the anonymity set of smartphone users. Another potential
barrier to adoption is battery usage. More research is needed into battery usage on
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modern smartphones. However, anecdotal evidence from developers and users of Briar – a
smartphone application that already uses hidden services as a communication channel –
shows that battery usage tends to be an important issue for users [akw15]. Additionally,
during our experiments we found that the Tor code did not interact well with aggressive
sleep policies in more recent Android versions, such as Doze. Addressing these problems
and other open bugs will likely decrease battery usage. Reductions in network traffic will
similarly have positive effects on battery usage.
An architecture with devices communicating peer-to-peer also requires that the com-
municating peers are connected via some kind of network, and ready to send and receive
simultaneously. Research is needed to evaluate how this affects the synchronization delays
for users with different kinds of devices and connectivity patterns, and for different kinds
of applications and group sizes. Smart scheduling of communication between devices may
help to reduce battery consumption and network traffic. Another approach to tackle this
problem is to provide oﬄine storage. This could be done using a decentralised distributed
data store such as Freenet [CSWH01]. Loopix [PHE+17] is another promising anonymity
network, which provides oﬄine storage for users, but requires them to choose and connect
to a fixed provider that stores messages for them. Another advantage of Loopix over Tor
is that it is resistant against a global passive adversary. This comes at a cost of additional
bandwidth costs for cover traffic, and an increased message delivery delay in the order of
seconds, but these may be acceptable for some applications.
We also presented a protocol for real-time collaborative editing that supports authenti-
cated snapshots. Snapshots allow collaborators to invite new collaborators and present to
them the current state of the shared document, without revealing the past edit history.
Authenticated snapshots allow a new collaborator to verify the consistency of their state
with the views of other honest devices, even if other devices are faulty or malicious. We
evaluated the costs of the protocol using the editing history of 270 Wikipedia pages,
and compared it to a basic protocol without snapshots. We showed that the protocol is
scalable for a bounded number of users. However, computational costs include a significant
constant factor due to the use of RSA accumulators. In our experiments, 99% of insert
operations were processed within 11.0 ms, and 99% of delete operations within 64.9 ms on
a single core on a 2013 i5 desktop CPU. The computational cost for verifying a snapshots
was, in practice, approximately linear in the number of atoms and collaborating devices;
it took roughly half a millisecond per atom per device on average. On the other hand,
snapshots can reduce the amount of data transfer necessary to add a new collaborator.
We measured a median 84% reduction of data transferred compared to a basic protocol
that sends the complete editing history to a new collaborator. We further showed how the
protocol achieves the desired integrity, privacy, and availability properties.
108
The substantial computational costs likely make the protocol too costly for general
real-time editing of documents on a character-granularity in the near future, in particular
for resource-constrained devices like smartphones. More research is needed to determine
how to reduce these costs; one possible direction could be to explore adaptive or hierarchical
granularity of atoms. Another research question is whether more efficient constructions
exist that can replace the RSA accumulators. However, while the computational costs
are significant, they are not prohibitive for applications where edits are less frequent and
where the number of atoms remains relatively small. The protocol may be well suited for
applications such as shared to-do lists, photo albums, contact lists, or calendars.
Apart from improving efficiency, there are other interesting research directions to
explore for protocols that provide authenticated snapshots. The protocol presented leaks
some information about the editing history through metadata. One question is whether it
is possible to reduce or eliminate this leak. Another question is whether one can design
a protocol that not only hides the edit history of a document, but also the creator of
individual atoms. Lastly, the protocol described can detect inconsistencies or forks between
honest devices. However, we did not explain how to resolve such a situation once it is
detected. Future work may consider suitable resolution mechanisms.
Apart from the challenges tackled in this dissertation, there are other areas that require
more research before completely decentralised solutions can be deployed in practice. One
such challenge is the trust establishment problem. Current methods for exchanging public
keys between users either rely on centralised infrastructure, or require manual verification
by users. Colleagues are currently investigating the use of gossiping on local networks as a
decentralised approach for trust establishment.
A decentralised architecture also changes the way data is synchronized between devices.
Since devices can be oﬄine or partitioned, different devices can be in many different states
before edits are merged. There is no longer just a linear history that is ordered by a central
server; the history becomes a directed acyclic graph. In some kinds of applications, this
may lead to semantic conflicts between concurrent changes, where manual resolution may
be desirable. More research is needed on how to design user interfaces that help users deal
with the additional complexity.
A limitation of our system design is that it does not provide an atomic operation to
update an atom; an update is currently realised by performing a deletion followed by an
insertion. This can also lead to conflicts, e.g. if two users concurrently, while being not
being connected, change a word in a text document or the date of a calendar entry. One
possible direction to address the problem of dealing with conflicting current edits is to
investigate more elaborate, application-specific data representations. For example, source
code could be stored as an abstract syntax tree, reducing the likelihood of conflicts, e.g.
when code is refactored.
109
110
Bibliography
[ABG+16] Hagit Attiya, Sebastian Burckhardt, Alexey Gotsman, Adam Morrison,
Hongseok Yang, and Marek Zawirski. Specification and Complexity of Col-
laborative Text Editing. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Symposium on
Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2016, pages 259–268. ACM, 2016.
[AHF14] Tanya Agrawal, David Henry, and Jim Finkle. JPMorgan hack
exposed data of 83 million, among biggest breaches in history.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-cybersecurity/
jpmorgan-hack-exposed-data-of-83-million-among-biggest-
breaches-in-history-idUSKCN0HR23T20141003, 2014. Accessed on
10 March 2019.
[akw15] akwizgran. Briar Issue #44 – Reduce battery consumption. https://code.
briarproject.org/briar/briar/issues/44, 2015. Accessed on 10 March
2019.
[And] Optimize for Doze and App Standby. https://developer.android.com/
training/monitoring-device-state/doze-standby.html. Accessed on 10
March 2019.
[BB04] Dan Boneh and Xavier Boyen. Short Signatures Without Random Oracles. In
Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2004, pages 56–73. Springer, 2004.
[BD93] Josh Benaloh and Michael De Mare. One-way accumulators: A decentralized
alternative to digital signatures. In Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT
’93, pages 274–285. Springer, 1993.
[BGG94] Mihir Bellare, Oded Goldreich, and Shafi Goldwasser. Incremental Cryp-
tography: The Case of Hashing and Signing. In Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO ’94, pages 216–233. Springer, 1994.
111
[BP97] Niko Baric´ and Birgit Pfitzmann. Collision-Free Accumulators and Fail-Stop
Signature Schemes Without Trees. In Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT
’97, pages 480–494. Springer, 1997.
[Bre00] Eric A. Brewer. Towards Robust Distributed Systems. In Proceedings of the
Nineteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing,
PODC 2000, page 7. ACM, 2000.
[CF13] Dario Catalano and Dario Fiore. Vector commitments and their applications.
In Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2013, pages 55–72. Springer, 2013.
[Cha81] David L. Chaum. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital
Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84–90, 1981.
[CHKO12] Philippe Camacho, Alejandro Hevia, Marcos Kiwi, and Roberto Opazo. Strong
accumulators from collision-resistant hashing. International Journal of Infor-
mation Security, 11(5):349–363, 2012.
[CKS09] Jan Camenisch, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Claudio Soriente. An Accumulator
Based on Bilinear Maps and Efficient Revocation for Anonymous Credentials.
In Public Key Cryptography – PKC 2009, pages 481–500. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2009.
[CL02] Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya. Dynamic Accumulators and Appli-
cation to Efficient Revocation of Anonymous Credentials. In Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2002, pages 61–76. Springer, 2002.
[CSWH01] Ian Clarke, Oskar Sandberg, Brandon Wiley, and Theodore W. Hong. Freenet:
A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System. In
Hannes Federrath, editor, Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pages
46–66. Springer, 2001.
[CW09] Scott A. Crosby and Dan S. Wallach. Efficient Data Structures for Tamper-
evident Logging. In Proceedings of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium,
pages 317–334. USENIX Association, 2009.
[DAKS13] Stephen Doswell, Nauman Aslam, David Kendall, and Graham Sexton. Please
Slow Down!: The Impact on Tor Performance from Mobility. In Proceedings of
the Third ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones & Mobile
Devices, SPSM 2013, pages 87–92. ACM, 2013.
[DDM03] George Danezis, Roger Dingledine, and Nick Mathewson. Mixminion: Design
of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol. In Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2003, pages 2–15. IEEE, 2003.
112
[DGHS16] Benjamin Dowling, Felix Gu¨nther, Udyani Herath, and Douglas Stebila.
Secure Logging Schemes and Certificate Transparency. In Computer Security
– ESORICS 2016, pages 140–158. Springer, 2016.
[DHS15] David Derler, Christian Hanser, and Daniel Slamanig. Revisiting cryptographic
accumulators, additional properties and relations to other primitives. In Topics
in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2015, pages 127–144. Springer, 2015.
[DKAS15] Stephen Doswell, David Kendall, Nauman Aslam, and Graham Sexton. A
longitudinal approach to measuring the impact of mobility on low-latency
anonymity networks. In Proceedings of the 2015 International Wireless Com-
munications and Mobile Computing Conference, IWCMC 2015, pages 108–113.
IEEE, 2015.
[dMLP+12] Hermann de Meer, Manuel Liedel, Henrich C. Po¨hls, Joachim Posegga, and
Kai Samelin. Indistinguishability of one-way accumulators. Technical Report
MIP-1210, Department of Informatics and Mathematics, University of Passau,
2012.
[DMS04] Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson. Tor: The Second-
Generation Onion Router. Technical Report ADA465464, Naval Research
Laboratory, Washington DC, 2004.
[DPSS16] David Derler, Henrich C. Po¨hls, Kai Samelin, and Daniel Slamanig. A General
Framework for Redactable Signatures and New Constructions. In Information
Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2015, pages 3–19. Springer, 2016.
[DR10] John Day-Richter. What’s different about the new Google Docs: Mak-
ing collaboration fast. https://drive.googleblog.com/2010/09/whats-
different-about-new-google-docs.html, 2010. Accessed on 10 March
2019.
[EG89] Clarence A. Ellis and Simon J. Gibbs. Concurrency Control in Groupware
Systems. In Proceedings of the 1989 ACM SIGMOD International Conference
on Management of Data, volume 18, pages 399–407. ACM, 1989.
[FMMS17] Dennis Felsch, Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, and Jo¨rg Schwenk.
SECRET: On the Feasibility of a Secure, Efficient, and Collaborative Real-
Time Web Editor. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Asia Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, AsiaCCS 2017, pages 835–848. ACM,
2017.
113
[FZFF10] Ariel J. Feldman, William P. Zeller, Michael J. Freedman, and Edward W.
Felten. SPORC: Group Collaboration Using Untrusted Cloud Resources. In
Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Conference on Operating Systems Design and
Implementation, OSDI 2010, pages 337–350. USENIX Association, 2010.
[GL02] Seth Gilbert and Nancy Lynch. Brewer’s Conjecture and the Feasibility of
Consistent, Available, Partition-Tolerant Web Services. ACM SIGACT News,
33(2):51–59, 2002.
[GRS99] David Goldschlag, Michael Reed, and Paul Syverson. Onion routing. Com-
munications of the ACM, 42(2):39–41, 1999.
[GT96] Ceki Gulcu and Gene Tsudik. Mixing E-mail with Babel. In Proceedings of
the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, SNDSS
1996, pages 2–16. IEEE, 1996.
[HE11] Yan Huang and David Evans. Private Editing Using Untrusted Cloud Services.
In Proceedings of the 31st IEEE International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems Workshops, pages 263–272. IEEE, 2011.
[IMOR03] Abdessamad Imine, Pascal Molli, Ge´rald Oster, and Michae¨l Rusinowitch.
Proving Correctness of Transformation Functions in Real-Time Groupware.
In ECSCW 2003, pages 277–293. Springer, 2003.
[Int18] Internet access – households and individuals, Great Britain:
2018. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/
householdcharacteristics/homeinternetandsocialmediausage/
bulletins/internetaccesshouseholdsandindividuals/2018, 2018.
Accessed on 10 March 2019.
[IROM06] Abdessamad Imine, Michae¨l Rusinowitch, Ge´rald Oster, and Pascal Molli.
Formal design and verification of operational transformation algorithms for
copies convergence. Theoretical Computer Science, 351(2):167–183, 2006.
[JMSW02] Robert Johnson, David Molnar, Dawn Song, and David Wagner. Homomorphic
signature schemes. In Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2002, pages 244–262.
Springer, 2002.
[KB17a] Martin Kleppmann and Alastair R. Beresford. A Conflict-Free Replicated
JSON Datatype. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,
28(10):2733–2746, 2017.
114
[KB17b] Stephan A. Kollmann and Alastair R. Beresford. Supporting data for “The
Cost of Push Notifications for Smartphones using Tor Hidden Services”.
https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.7547, 2017.
[KB17c] Stephan A. Kollmann and Alastair R. Beresford. The Cost of Push Notifica-
tions for Smartphones Using Tor Hidden Services. In Proceedings of the 2017
IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW),
pages 76–85. IEEE, 2017.
[Kho17] Dara Khosrowshahi. 2016 Data Security Incident. https://www.uber.com/
newsroom/2016-data-incident, 2017. Accessed on 10 March 2019.
[Kob18] Nadim Kobeissi. Capsule: A Protocol for Secure Collaborative Document
Editing. IACR Cryptology ePrint 2018/253, 2018.
[Kol19] Stephan A. Kollmann. Code supporting “Snapdoc: Authenticated snapshots
with history privacy in peer-to-peer collaborative editing”. https://doi.
org/10.17863/CAM.39062, 2019.
[LLK13] Ben Laurie, Adam Langley, and Emilia Kasper. RFC 6962: Certificate
Transparency. IETF, 2013.
[LLS04] Rui Li, Du Li, and Chengzheng Sun. A time interval based consistency control
algorithm for interactive groupware applications. In Proceedings of the Tenth
International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems, ICPADS 2004,
pages 429–436. IEEE, 2004.
[LLW09] Jo¨rg Lenhard, Karsten Loesing, and Guido Wirtz. Performance Measurements
of Tor Hidden Services in Low-Bandwidth Access Networks. In Applied
Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2009, pages 324–341. Springer,
2009.
[LM07] Jinyuan Li and David Mazie´res. Beyond One-third Faulty Replicas in Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerant Systems. In Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Conference on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation, NSDI 2007, pages 131–144.
USENIX Association, 2007.
[LSWW08] Karsten Loesing, Werner Sandmann, Christian Wilms, and Guido Wirtz. Per-
formance Measurements and Statistics of Tor Hidden Services. In Proceedings
of the 2008 International Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT
2008, pages 1–7. IEEE, 2008.
115
[MAD11] Prince Mahajan, Lorenzo Alvisi, and Mike Dahlin. Consistency, Availability,
and Convergence. Technical Report UTCS TR-11-22, Department of Computer
Science, The University of Texas at Austin, 2011.
[Mar14] Daniel Mart´ı. [GSoC] Consensus diffs - Fourth report. https://lists.
torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-July/007163.html, 2014. Ac-
cessed on 10 March 2019.
[MB09] Prateek Mittal and Nikita Borisov. ShadowWalker: Peer-to-peer Anonymous
Communication Using Redundant Structured Topologies. In Proceedings of
the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS
2009, pages 161–172. ACM, 2009.
[MBB+15] Marcela S. Melara, Aaron Blankstein, Joseph Bonneau, Edward W. Felten,
and Michael J. Freedman. CONIKS: Bringing Key Transparency to End
Users. In Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX
Association, 2015.
[MCPS04] Ulf Mo¨ller, Lance Cottrell, Peter Palfrader, and Len Sassaman. Mixmas-
ter Protocol Version 2. https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sassaman-
mixmaster-03, 2004. Accessed on 10 March 2019.
[Mer88] Ralph C. Merkle. A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption
Function. In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO ’87, pages 369–378. Springer,
1988.
[MOT+11] Prateek Mittal, Femi Olumofin, Carmela Troncoso, Nikita Borisov, and
Ian Goldberg. PIR-Tor: Scalable Anonymous Communication Using Private
Information Retrieval. In Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Security Symposium.
USENIX Association, 2011.
[MSL+11] Prince Mahajan, Srinath Setty, Sangmin Lee, Allen Clement, Lorenzo Alvisi,
Mike Dahlin, and Michael Walfish. Depot: Cloud Storage with Minimal Trust.
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 29(4):12:1–12:38, 2011.
[MTHK09] Jon McLachlan, Andrew Tran, Nicholas Hopper, and Yongdae Kim. Scalable
Onion Routing with Torsk. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2009, pages 590–599. ACM,
2009.
[MUW10] Ste´phane Martin, Pascal Urso, and Ste´phane Weiss. Scalable XML Collabo-
rative Editing with Undo. In On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems:
OTM 2010, pages 507–514. Springer, 2010.
116
[NCDL95] David A. Nichols, Pavel Curtis, Michael Dixon, and John Lamping. High-
Latency, Low-Bandwidth Windowing in the Jupiter Collaboration System. In
Proceedings of the 8th Annual ACM Symposium on User Interface Software
and Technology, UIST 1995, pages 111–120. ACM, 1995.
[Ngu05] Lan Nguyen. Accumulators from Bilinear Pairings and Applications. In Topics
in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2005, pages 275–292. Springer, 2005.
[NMMD13] Brice Ne´delec, Pascal Molli, Achour Mostefaoui, and Emmanuel Desmontils.
LSEQ: an Adaptive Structure for Sequences in Distributed Collaborative Edit-
ing. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM Symposium on Document Engineering,
DocEng 2013, pages 37–46. ACM, ACM, 2013.
[NW06] Arjun Nambiar and Matthew Wright. Salsa: A Structured Approach to Large-
Scale Anonymity. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS 2006. ACM, 2006.
[OUMI05] Ge´rald Oster, Pascal Urso, Pascal Molli, and Abdessamad Imine. Proving cor-
rectness of transformation functions in collaborative editing systems. Technical
Report RR-5795, INRIA, 2005.
[Pal08] Peter Palfrader. Provide diffs between consensuses. https://gitweb.
torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/140-consensus-diffs.
txt, 2008. Accessed on 10 March 2019.
[Per17] Nicole Perlroth. All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected by 2013 At-
tack. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yahoo-hack-3-
billion-users.html, 2017. Accessed on 10 March 2019.
[Per18] Jen Person. Time to Upgrade from GCM to FCM. https://firebase.
googleblog.com/2018/04/time-to-upgrade-from-gcm-to-fcm.html,
2018. Accessed on 10 March 2019.
[PHE+17] Ania M. Piotrowska, Jamie Hayes, Tariq Elahi, Sebastian Meiser, and George
Danezis. The Loopix Anonymity System. In Proceedings of the 26th USENIX
Security Symposium. USENIX Association, 2017.
[PK01] Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Ko¨hntopp. Anonymity, Unobservability, and
Pseudonymity – A Proposal for Terminology. In Designing Privacy Enhancing
Technologies, pages 1–9. Springer, 2001.
117
[PMSL09] Nuno Preguic¸a, Joan Manuel Marques, Marc Shapiro, and Mihai Letia. A
Commutative Replicated Data Type for Cooperative Editing. In 29th Inter-
national Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2009, pages
395–403. IEEE, IEEE, 2009.
[PRR09] Andriy Panchenko, Arne Rache, and Stefan Richter. NISAN: Network Infor-
mation Service for Anonymization Networks. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2009. ACM,
2009.
[PSP12] Henrich C. Po¨hls, Kai Samelin, and Joachim Posegga. Length-Hiding
Redactable Signatures from One-Way Accumulators in O(n). Technical
Report MIP-1201, Department of Informatics and Mathematics, University
of Passau, 2012.
[Rab80] Michael O. Rabin. Probabilistic Algorithm for Testing Primality. Journal of
Number Theory, 12(1):128–138, 1980.
[Rib04] Paulo Ribenboim. The Little Book of Bigger Primes. Springer, 2004.
[RJKL11] Hyun-Gul Roh, Myeongjae Jeon, Jin-Soo Kim, and Joonwon Lee. Replicated
abstract data types: Building blocks for collaborative applications. Journal
of Parallel and Distributed Computing, 71(3):354–368, 2011.
[RP04] Marc Rennhard and Bernhard Plattner. Practical Anonymity for the Masses
with MorphMix. In Financial Cryptography, FC 2004, pages 233–250. Springer,
2004.
[RSA78] Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. A Method for Obtaining
Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems. Communications of the
ACM, 21(2):120–126, 1978.
[SB13] Petter Solberg and Bram Bezem. Performance of hidden services in Tor.
Master’s thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department
of Telematics, 2013.
[SBZ01] Ron Steinfeld, Laurence Bull, and Yuliang Zheng. Content Extraction Signa-
tures. In Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2001, pages 285–304.
Springer, 2001.
[Sin10] Nilotpal K. Sinha. On a new property of primes that leads to a generalization
of Crame´r’s conjecture. arXiv preprint arXiv:1010.1399, 2010.
118
[SJZ+98] Chengzheng Sun, Xiaohua Jia, Yanchun Zhang, Yun Yang, and David Chen.
Achieving Convergence, Causality Preservation, and Intention Preservation in
Real-Time Cooperative Editing Systems. ACM Transactions on Computer-
Human Interaction, 5:63–108, 1998.
[SPBZ11a] Marc Shapiro, Nuno Preguic¸a, Carlos Baquero, and Marek Zawirski. A
comprehensive study of convergent and commutative replicated data types.
Technical Report RR-7506, INRIA, 2011.
[SPBZ11b] Marc Shapiro, Nuno Preguic¸a, Carlos Baquero, and Marek Zawirski. Conflict-
free Replicated Data Types. In Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Dis-
tributed Systems, SSS 2011, pages 386–400. Springer, 2011.
[Tam03] Roberto Tamassia. Authenticated data structures. In Algorithms – ESA 2003,
pages 2–5. Springer, 2003.
[Tora] Tor Metrics – Servers. https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.
html. Accessed on 10 March 2019.
[Torb] Tor Rendezvous Specification. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.
git/tree/rend-spec-v2.txt. Accessed on 10 March 2019.
[Torc] Tor Rendezvous Specification – Version 3. https://gitweb.torproject.
org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt. Accessed on 10 March 2019.
[tord] Tor Ticket #13339 – Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC
project. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13339. Ac-
cessed on 10 March 2019.
[tore] Tor Ticket #16387 – Improve reachability of hidden services on mobile
phones. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19522. Ac-
cessed on 10 March 2019.
[torf] Tor Ticket #19522 – HS intro circuit retry logic fails when network interface is
down. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19522. Ac-
cessed on 10 March 2019.
[torg] Tor Ticket #8239 – Hidden services should try harder to reuse their old
intro points. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8239.
Accessed on 10 March 2019.
119
[VCFS00] Nicolas Vidot, Michelle Cart, Jean Ferrie´, and Maher Suleiman. Copies
Convergence in a Distributed Real-time Collaborative Environment. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2000 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative
Work, CSCW 2000, pages 171–180. ACM, 2000.
[VNTP14] Ekhiotz Jon Vergara, Simin Nadjm-Tehrani, and Mihails Prihodko. Energybox:
Disclosing the wireless transmission energy cost for mobile devices. Sustainable
Computing: Informatics and Systems, 4(2):118–135, 2014.
[WJ02] James Weatherall and Alan Jones. Ubiquitous networks and their applications.
IEEE Wireless Communications, 9(1):18–29, 2002.
[WMLT15] David Wang, Alex Mah, Soren Lassen, and Sam Thorogood. Apache Wave
(incubating) Protocol Documentation, Release 0.4. https://people.apache.
org/~al/wave docs/ApacheWaveProtocol-0.4.pdf, 2015. Accessed on 10
March 2019.
[WRB14a] Daniel T. Wagner, Andrew Rice, and Alastair R. Beresford. Device Ana-
lyzer: Large-scale mobile data collection. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance
Evaluation Review, 41(4):53–56, 2014.
[WRB14b] Daniel T. Wagner, Andrew Rice, and Alastair R. Beresford. Device Ana-
lyzer: Understanding Smartphone Usage. In Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems:
Computing, Networking, and Services, pages 195–208. Springer, 2014.
[WSSN07] Rungrat Wiangsripanawan, Willy Susilo, and Rei Safavi-Naini. Achieving
Mobility and Anonymity in IP-Based Networks. In Cryptology and Network
Security, CANS 2007, pages 60–79. Springer, 2007.
[WUM09] Ste´phane Weiss, Pascal Urso, and Pascal Molli. Logoot: A Scalable Optimistic
Replication Algorithm for Collaborative Editing on P2P Networks. In 29th
IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS
2009, pages 404–412. IEEE, IEEE, 2009.
[WUM10] Ste´phane Weiss, Pascal Urso, and Pascal Molli. Logoot-Undo: Distributed
Collaborative Editing System on P2P Networks. IEEE Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems, 21(8):1162–1174, 2010.
[XS16] Yi Xu and Chengzheng Sun. Conditions and Patterns for Achieving Conver-
gence in OT-Based Co-Editors. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, 27(3):695–709, 2016.
120
APPENDIX A
List of Wikipedia pages used for
experiments in Chapter 6
1981 Grand Marnier Tennis Games
1995 Stockholm Open – Singles
2001 French rugby league tour of New Zealand and Papua New Guinea
2001 World Archery Championships - Men’s Individual Recurve
2010 US Open – Wheelchair Women’s Doubles
2012–13 Appalachian State Mountaineers men’s basketball team
2017 Americas Challenge
2018 Irving Tennis Classic – Singles
Ag˘amalılar
Acrosticta rufiventris
Addicted to Love (TV series)
Adolf Dieudonne´
A Double-Threaded Life
Agnes Zurowski
Alfie Joey
A Life Force
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1991)
Al Noor Hospitals
Ammeldingen bei Neuerburg
Anglicisation of names
Antaramej
Argenton, Lot-et-Garonne
Aristide Caradja
Armando Rossi
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Association for Perioperative Practice
Baggbo¨le Manor
Bagirmi language
Bakhtiyar Khilji’s Tibet campaign
Baqershahr
Bardeh Rashan, Bukan
Basil Coad
Behind Locked Doors
Ben Small
Benwee Head
Bernardia
Bernold
Big-eared brown bat
Bingham Wapentake
Blood, Guts, Bullets and Octane
BlowOut
Bolivia–Denmark relations
Boxing at the 2013 Mediterranean Games – Men’s light heavyweight
Brave Rabbit 2 Crazy Circus
Braxton Family Christmas
Broo Brewery
Brooks Public Library
Buchanania arborescens
Burgum
Burila Mare
A´rneshreppur
E´raville
E´tienne Lamotte
Cadwallon ap Gruffydd
Canton of Tre´lissac
Capital Athletic Conference Men’s Basketball Tournament
Cardamine impatiens
Cards on the Table (Vietnamese telefilm)
Casey Radio
Central District (Dorud County)
CFL Class 3600
Chapel Hill (Mint Spring, Virginia)
Charles Dewey Day
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Charlie Shoemake
Cheri Madsen
Chris Wakelin
Clayton County Courthouse
Coalescence (physics)
Collared palm thrush
Como, Colorado
Confidence, West Virginia
Cross-country skiing at the 1936 Winter Olympics
David Starr, Space Ranger
Du¨sseldorf-Wersten
Dera Din Panah
Divergence (statistics)
Do G’s Get to Go to Heaven?
Drilosphere
Dusˇan Petricˇic´
Duotone
East and West Blockhouses
Ectoedemia longicaudella
Edmonton municipal election, 1898
Elachista semnani
Endre Elekes
Ethmia kabulica
F2RL2
Filip Chlup
Firuzabad District (Kermanshah Province)
Four Great Towers of China
Freddy Mart´ın
Fredrik Johan Wiik
Fred Smye
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (Nova Scotia)
Fuster
Game Critter Super-Squad!
Ganda Singhwala railway station
George Marsden (boxer)
Gilbert Houngbo
Giovanni Fouchetti
Good King Dagobert
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Gore Metal (album)
Grand Orient of Russia’s Peoples
Grant Michaels
Greater Lebanon
GT8
Gus: The Theatre Cat
Gymnastics at the 1924 Summer Olympics – Men’s rings
Halophanes
Haridas Chaudhuri
Henriett Koo´sz
Henry Holland (mayor)
Henry Stokes Tiffen
Herbert Koch
Hilal Al-Makdesi
Hiroko Saito
Hizaj
HMS Mackerel
Hoddevik
Holywell Press
Hotel El Convento
House of Stolberg
Hypolycaena similis
Hypothetical astronomical object
If-by-whiskey
Ilario Pegorari
I P Mission School
Ivan Mikhailovich Obolensky
Jacques-E´mile Blanche
James Charles Dalbiac
James del Piano
James Joseph Hines
Jangsan station
Jason Hammel (musician)
Jedlnica
Jimmy Lahoud
Johan Nygaardsvolds plass
John Duncan (neuroscientist)
John Kay (spinning frame)
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John Peter Barnes
John Schappert (video game executive)
Julia Pierson Emmet
Karan Higdon
Kargilik Town
Karnataka State Film Award for Best Child Actor (Female)
Kelp goose
Khaled Soliman
Kiki Strike
Knox Helm
Krasino, Arkhangelsk Oblast
Krayem Awad
Krokosua Hills Forest Reserve
Kumalo
Lakenheath Fen RSPB reserve
Laramie Boomerang
Laurence Olivier Award for Supporting Artist of the Year
Liezen District
Linderpur
List of Billboard number-one country albums of 1980
List of English Twenty20 cricket champions
List of state leaders in 1357
List of Wyoming companies
Livens Projector
Loot system
Lorraine Loots
Luzˇce
Ludovico Balbi
Luxiol
Ma lecz
Margarites olivaceus
Matthew 5:22
Medeas
Medicago murex
Megachile minor
Michel Clair
Mildred Brown Schrumpf
Mohammad Yousuf (cricketer, born 1935)
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Monte Verde, Cape Verde
Monumento a la Mujer
Munkustrap
NCK2
Never Turn Away
Newell, California
Newgrange (song)
Nieuport Memorial
Northwest Territories general election, 1954
Nova Scotia Route 205
Nowy Lindo´w
Ochlochaete
Old Calendarist Romanian Orthodox Church
Otterwisch
Our Lady of Lourdes Medical Center
Pancreatic stellate cell
Pay the Butler
Pedro de Arau´jo
Pegaso Z-403
Pequea Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania
Perry, Arkansas
Peter I of Bulgaria
Photon surface
Pig pickin’
Politics of Transnistria
Posterior labial nerves
Professional boxing in New Zealand
Rajinder Singh (wrestler)
Ralph Abercrombie (public servant)
Randegg
Ravna (Knjazˇevac)
Reading First
Reksio
Release (agency)
Ricardo Zamora
Rick MacInnes-Rae
Right to withdraw
Robbie Venter
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Robert de Ferrers, 1st Earl of Derby
Robert Niven (New Zealand cricketer)
Roman Catholic Diocese of Wheeling–Charleston
Rome Kirby
Sacramento Islamic Mosque
Sarcolaena oblongifolia
Sarola Brahmin
Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement
Se´rgio Dias Branco
Scenes from the Passion of Christ
Seehorn, Illinois
Sendets, Pyre´ne´es-Atlantiques
Shut Up and Dance: Mixes
Sid Applebaum
Smartbomb (book)
South African Class 24 2-8-4
Still Falling in Love
Stuart Hamblen
Suzuka Hasegawa
Svelgen
Sym River
Tarachodes maurus
Tarong North Power Station
Tentacled dragonet
Terrington
The Gift (Douglas novel)
The Leake County Revelers
Themes (Vangelis album)
The Rahway Murder of 1887
The Roxy (Rathbone Place)
The Wages of Sin (Upstairs, Downstairs)
ThinkServer
Thiruvidandai
Thomas Blakiston
Thomas Smedley House
Thomas Wright (social commentator)
Three for the Money
Timeline of Orlando, Florida
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Tor Miller
Toyin Saraki
Trevor the Traction Engine
Tropimetopa simulator
Twisted Hessian curves
Ube Industries
United Services Recreation Club
Unley, South Australia
Van Lieshout
Verckys Kiamuangana Mateta
Virginia Allen Crockford
Washington Mustangs
Whose Doctor Who
X-fast trie
Xia Qin
Yehoshua Feigenbaum
YOYOW
Zaghmar
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